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Abstract
To demonstrate the existence of Aboriginal title, claimants must prove that their ancestors
exclusively occupied a given tract of land at the time of the assertion of British sovereignty over
that territory. The indisputable presence of Aboriginal peoples in Canada’s Maritime Provinces
at the time the British acquired sovereignty in the region, coupled with scant European
settlement at the time, lead to the conclusion that the Aboriginal occupation in much of the
region was exclusive at the relevant dates for assessing Aboriginal title claims. In light of this,
this thesis begins by arguing that Aboriginal title existed in the region at the dates of sovereignty,
while stopping short of making determinations as to the precise geographical scope of title.
The question that occupies the remainder of this thesis is whether Aboriginal title has
been extinguished. This thesis articulates a clear framework for assessing purported incidents of
legislative extinguishment of title by identifying the legal parameters governing which legislative
bodies had the authority to extinguish Aboriginal title during distinct eras in Canada’s
constitutional history and providing an analysis of what laws or principles bound the conduct of
those legislative bodies. This thesis draws on both contemporary and historical law in providing
clear guidelines governing the extinguishment of title and concludes that no evidence of
extinguishment exists in the Maritime Provinces.
The final issue this thesis addresses is what happened to Aboriginal lands, and how they
came to be in the possession of European settlers, if Aboriginal title was not lawfully
extinguished. An analysis of the relevant historical material reveals that what began as a
relationship grounded in a system of inter-societal law, given expression through the treaty
process, became one in which the British fully extended their own legal regime, assuming
jurisdiction over Aboriginal peoples. This process allowed the British to embrace a terra nullius
approach to settlement and land use, denying that the prior inhabitants ever held rights to the
territory they occupied. This thesis argues that this terra nullius approach, given expression
through fee simple grants of settlement and the taking up of lands as Crown lands to be licensed
and sold where the Crown saw fit, could not have had the effect of legally extinguishing
Aboriginal title in the region.
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Introduction

In the summer and fall of 2013, citizens from the Elsipogtog First Nation in Southeastern New
Brunswick protested against shale gas exploration in their traditional territory. On October 17 th,
paramilitary RCMP forces broke up the largely peaceful protests, with several dozen protestors
arrested and several police vehicles burned in the ensuing violence. The purported goal of the
police action was to enforce a court injunction against the protestors, granted in favour of a shale
gas development company, SWN Resources. The protests were part of a broader movement in
the Maritime Provinces in which Aboriginal peoples have asserted Aboriginal and treaty rights to
their traditional territories and resources. To this end, in October 2013, the Chief and council of
the Elsipogtog First Nation passed a Band Council Resolution calling for an end to shale gas
exploration in their traditional territory; it stated: “let it be known to all that we as Chief and
council of Elsipogtog are reclaiming all unoccupied reserved Native lands back and put in the
trust of our people.”1 This statement is but the latest in centuries of Aboriginal assertions of land
rights in Canada’s Maritime Provinces.
In the language of the Canadian legal system an Aboriginal right to the exclusive use and
occupation of land is known as Aboriginal title. The federal and provincial governments long
held that Aboriginal title had been extinguished in the Maritime Provinces. As Professor Richard
Bartlett noted, “[t]he provincial governments of the [Maritime] region and the federal
government have always considered that aboriginal title to the land had been extinguished.” 2
Much has changed, however, since the Calder decision first forced governments in Canada to
reconsider their understanding of Aboriginal rights and title over forty years ago. In particular,
“the Supreme Court has gradually elaborated a comprehensive scheme of aboriginal and treaty
rights that recognizes them as legal rights and not merely rights held at the pleasure of the
Crown.”3 The recognition of Aboriginal title as a legal right has reinforced the protections it is

1

Miles Howe, Elsipogtog Chief Issues Eviction Notice to Texas Based Frackers, “online”, Halifax Media Coop
<http://halifax.mediacoop.ca/story/elsipogtog-chief-issues-eviction-notice-texas-base/19097>
2
Richard H. Bartlett, Indian Reserves and Aboriginal Lands in Canada: A Homeland (Saskatoon: University of
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1990) at 33.
3
Brian Slattery, “Some Thoughts on Aboriginal Title” (1999) 48 UNBLJ 19 at 21 [Slattery, “Some Thoughts on
Aboriginal Title”].
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afforded at law and modified the conceptual and legal framework governing its extinguishment.
As such, extinguishment is no longer presumed to have occurred in the Maritime Provinces.4
Given this reality, it is the aim of this thesis to assess whether Aboriginal title continues
to exist in the region. A resolution of this question has important implications for the relationship
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people and governments in the region. In light of a spate
of highly contentious resource development projects,5 conflict is likely to continue until some
determination of the title question is made, be it through negotiation or the courts. The analysis
presented here works from the assumption that Aboriginal title did exist at some point in the
Maritime Provinces. This assumption presents two further questions. The first is a question of
extent: how much of the region, and which areas in particular, were subject to Aboriginal title?
This question is beyond the scope of this paper to address in detail, as it would require an
extensive historical investigation spanning a vast geographical area and several centuries. As
such, the question of where title existed will be addressed only inferentially. My focus here will
be only on what types of land may be subject to title, drawing on enough historical evidence to
demonstrate that those lands did in fact exist and to provide context for future research.
Thus, Chapter 1 demonstrates that Aboriginal title did exist in the Maritimes, while
stopping short of arguing precisely where that may have been the case. I provide justification for
my conclusion that Aboriginal title existed in the Maritimes on three grounds. First, I analyze the
clear articulation of the judicial test for proving Aboriginal title provided by the Supreme Court
in the Tsilhqot’in Nation6 decision. This establishes a framework through which the precedential
value of past court decisions concerning Aboriginal title in the Maritime Provinces and the
framework to be applied by future courts may be assessed. Second, I examine the Marshall and
Bernard cases in which the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were found by the
Supreme Court to have failed to establish title in specific locations in those provinces despite
victories at the provincial courts of appeal.7 This decision, I argue, should not be taken as

4

As Professor Slattery has stated, “[t]o my mind, then, the question of aboriginal title in New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia is very much alive.” Slattery, “Some Thoughts on Aboriginal Title”, supra note 3 at 40.
5
In particular, the proposed Energy East Pipeline project, the Sisson Mine Project, several hydraulic fracturing
projects, and a highly contentious forestry management project.
6
Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in Nation].
7
A note on spelling, here I use “Mi’kmaw” as an adjective, while “Mi’kmaq” is used as a noun, both in the plural
and singular.
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evidence that title does not exist in the provinces in question.8 In fact, as I hope to demonstrate,
the appellate level decisions in that case, which held that the Mi’kmaq had established title,
apply an analysis much closer to that applied by the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in than that
which the same Court applied in Marshall/Bernard. As such, the appellate level decisions in the
Marshall and Bernard cases suggest strongly that title does continue to exist un-extinguished to
significant areas in the region. Third, I argue that the treaties of peace and friendship, signed
between the British and the Aboriginal peoples of the region, recognize the existence of
Aboriginal title. These arguments will be buttressed by an analysis of salient historical material
and extant case law which, in light of the Tsilhqot’in decision, leave little doubt that title existed
in the region at the time when the British acquired sovereignty. In assessing whether title
continues to exist, the question then becomes whether it has been extinguished.
Chapter 2 provides a detailed analysis of the legal parameters of the extinguishment of
Aboriginal title. This analysis draws on contemporary judicial pronouncements regarding the
extinguishment of title, scholarship clarifying and critiquing the court’s decisions, and 18th and
19th century judicial holdings and legal thinking. Contemporary judicial treatments of
extinguishment are relied on to establish the framework governing extinguishment that is likely
to be applied by courts in future litigation. Prior to the constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights
in 1982, extinguishment of Aboriginal title could have occurred in two ways at common law: by
voluntary surrender, or unilaterally through legislation. Extinguishment by unilateral legislation
must have met two criteria: (1) the legislation being relied on must have been passed by a
legislative body that was competent to extinguish Aboriginal title; and (2) the legislation must
not have been repugnant to superseding law (i.e. constitutional laws or principles, or British laws
extending to the colony in question). Further, any legislation that satisfies these tests is also
subject to the common law requirement that it evidence a “clear and plain intent” to extinguish
the right in question. In respect of the first of these requirements, I draw on 18th and 19th century
case law and legal thought to determine which legislative bodies may have been competent to
extinguish title in the period from the assertion of British sovereignty to confederation. More
specifically, I address the authority of the Imperial Crown to legislate in colonies under the royal
prerogative, the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, and the delegated nature of the authority
8

This view was shared by LeBel J, who wrote in his concurring opinion in Marshall/Bernard that “I do not wish to
suggest that this decision represents a final determination of the issue of aboriginal title rights in Nova Scotia or
New Brunswick.” R v Marshall; R v Bernard, [2005] 2 SCR 220, at para 141 [Marshall; Bernard].
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exercised by both the executive and legislative branches of colonial governments. This provides
a clear view of where the authority to legislatively extinguish title resided during different
periods of colonial development and the conditions under which that authority may have been
delegated, with the aim of identifying particular bodies of legislation that may be examined for
evidence of extinguishment.
In Chapter 3 I apply the principles articulated in Chapter 2 to the unique factual
circumstances in the Maritime Provinces. I first examine the question of whether title has been
extinguished through voluntary surrender. I then address the issue of unilateral legislative
extinguishment. This is done first by determining which governmental bodies were competent to
extinguish Aboriginal title during different periods in the region’s history. In particular, I
examine what authority the Imperial Crown held in the region and the jurisdiction of the colonial
assemblies during different periods in the development of colonial governance in the region. I
then provide a close analysis of legislation from both the colonial and imperial legislatures to
assess whether it may have extinguished title. This legislation is assessed on the basis of
legislative competence, repugnancy, and the clear and plain intent test. The resulting analysis
supports the conclusion that Aboriginal title has likely not been extinguished by legislation in the
Maritime Provinces. Further, it develops a framework through which future assertions of
extinguishment may be assessed. Having found that Aboriginal title in the Maritime Provinces
has likely not been extinguished pursuant to the test established by the Supreme Court, Chapter 3
concludes with an examination of how the Aboriginal peoples of the region were dispossessed of
their traditional lands and provides an analysis of the legal parameters of assessing this
dispossession in light of my conclusion that Aboriginal title has not been extinguished by
voluntary surrender or clear legislation.
This analysis is similar in many respects to that provided in Our Land: The Maritimes9,
by Gould and Semple, though my analysis builds on that work in two important respects. First,
that work was published in 1980, before the constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights. Thus,
there have been a number of substantial judicial articulations and a great body of scholarly work
on the doctrine of Aboriginal title since Our Land was published. This work builds on earlier
scholarship by incorporating recent developments in the law, especially in the period since the
9

G.P. Gould and A.J. Semple, Our Land: The Maritimes (Fredericton: Saint Annes Point Press, 1980).
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constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights in 1982. Aboriginal title in the Maritime Provinces was
litigated at the Supreme Court in Marshall/Bernard. This analysis, then, while probing many of
the same issues as Our Land, benefits from three decades of Supreme Court decisions, including
the first judicial declaration of title in the Tsilhqot’in decision and the only Supreme Court
pronouncement on title in the Maritimes in Marshall/Bernard. Second, while much of the
historical material drawn on here is similar to that drawn on in Our Land, the development of the
doctrine of title since that work was published colours the approach to the historical evidence. In
particular, my analysis places a much greater emphasis on the issues of exclusivity of occupation
and the extinguishment of title, an emphasis which reflects developments in case law.
Nonetheless, this work should be taken as complementing, rather than replacing, earlier works on
Aboriginal title in the region. Sakéj Henderson’s “Mi’kmaw Tenure In Atlantic Canada”10 and
The Mikmaw Concordat,11 in particular, are invaluable contributions to the analysis of title in the
Maritime Provinces that have been drawn on heavily here.
In concluding that Aboriginal title has not been extinguished in the Maritime Provinces,
this thesis ends where a new discussion begins. Put simply, the recognition that title has not
lawfully been extinguished, including by pre-confederation grants of settlement, raises a host of
difficult questions regarding how best to reconcile the land rights of Aboriginal peoples with
existing third party interests. Though this issue is not addressed in this paper, it should be
understood as underlying the conclusions that are reached here.

10
11

James (Sakéj) Youngblood Henderson, “Mi’kmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada” (1995) 18 Dal LJ 196 at 235.
James (Sakéj) Youngblood Henderson, The Mikmaw Concordat (Halifax: Fernwood, 1997).
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1.

Proof of Aboriginal Title
A. Proving Title

Establishing Aboriginal title requires proof of exclusive occupation at the date of the Crown
assertion of sovereignty.1 The Supreme Court sought to clarify the test for establishing title in
Tsilhqot’in Nation,2 where McLachlin CJ followed Delgamuukw in grounding the test for
establishing title in “occupation” prior to assertion of European sovereignty. 3 She then identified
three features that must characterize Aboriginal occupation in order for it to result in a finding of
Aboriginal title, stating: “[i]t must be sufficient; it must be continuous (where present occupation
is relied on); and it must be exclusive.”4 McLachlin CJ then discussed the competing approaches
to determining sufficiency of occupation that animated the litigation in the lower courts; she then
noted, “[t]he trial judge in this case held that ‘occupation’ was established for the purpose of
proving title by showing regular and exclusive use of sites or territory.” 5 Recognizing that the
“regular and exclusive use” of territory may ground Aboriginal title, the trial judge found that
title might be found not only to intensively used village or agricultural sites, but also to broad
tracts of exclusively used or controlled territory.6
The British Columbia Court of Appeal applied a much narrower test, requiring that an
Aboriginal group demonstrate that “a definite tract of land with reasonably defined boundaries”7
was used regularly and intensively at the time of the assertion of sovereignty.8 Put otherwise, the
Court of Appeal applied a “site specific”9 standard in which title could only be proven to small,

1

Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, at para 155 [Delgamuukw]; R v Marshall; R v Bernard,
[2005] 2 SCR 220 at para 40 [Marshall; Bernard]; Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at para 24
[Tsilhqot’in Nation].
2
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 24.
3
Ibid. at para 25.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid. at para 27.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid. at para 28.
8
Ibid.
9
For a discussion of site-specific vs. territorial conceptions of Aboriginal title see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in
Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial?” (2012) 91 Canadian Bar Review 745 [McNeil, “Site-Specific or Territorial?”].
McNeil argues that a site-specific approach is “[a] purely proprietary approach, based on occupation of land and the
effect given to occupation by the common law” while a territorial approach “is derived from both common law and
Indigenous law and has governmental dimensions.”
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intensively used, areas. Explaining the consequences of the differing approaches taken by the
trial court and the Court of Appeal, McLachlin CJ noted:
For semi-nomadic Aboriginal groups like the Tsilhqot’in, the Court of Appeal’s
approach results in small islands of title surrounded by larger territories where the
group possesses only Aboriginal rights to engage in activities like hunting and
trapping. By contrast, on the trial judge’s approach, the group would enjoy title to
all the territory that their ancestors regularly and exclusively used at the time of
assertion of European sovereignty.10
In determining the correct approach, McLachlin CJ emphasized the importance of the Aboriginal
perspective in assessing title claims, finding that the three characteristics of occupation sufficiency, continuity, and exclusivity - must be considered in light of the this perspective.11
The requisite characteristics must not be conceived of in a manner that privileges the common
law definitions of those terms, and treating those requirements independently from each other,
rather than as a single concept, can tend to obscure the Aboriginal perspective. 12 Therefore,
“[s]ufficiency, continuity and exclusivity are not ends in themselves, but inquiries that shed light
on whether Aboriginal title is established.”13 While these concepts are “useful lenses through
which to view the question of Aboriginal title,”14 courts must be cautious not to employ them in
such a manner so as “to lose or distort the Aboriginal perspective by forcing ancestral practices
into the square boxes of common law concepts.”15 Despite this warning, McLachlin CJ
proceeded to discuss each of the requirements in turn. I will therefore follow suit and discuss the
approach taken to each of these requirements in Tsilhqot’in.
I. Sufficiency of Occupation
McLachlin CJ identified sufficiency of occupation as the most pertinent question before
the Court; that is, in assessing the merits of the site-specific vs. territorial approach, determining
the intensity or degree of occupation required to ground a finding of title is central to the
10

Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 29.
Ibid. at paras 30 – 32.
12
Ibid. at para 31.
13
Ibid. at para 32. It is important to note here that sufficiency, continuity, and exclusivity are framed as
characteristics of Aboriginal title that can be used to assist a court in determining whether title existed, not strict
requirements for proving title. This is an important conceptual shift, though it is unclear what the practical impact
will be.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
11
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analysis.16 In contextualizing the inquiry, McLachlin CJ cited Delgamuukw with approval,
stating that the “question of sufficient occupation must be approached from both the common
law perspective and the Aboriginal perspective.”17
From the common law, the Court “imports the idea of possession and control of the
lands.”18 The sufficiency of occupation required to establish Aboriginal title, in other words,
requires that a common law burden of “possession and control” be met. Crucially in the context
of the distinction between site-specific and territorial approaches, McLachlin CJ noted that “[a]t
common law, possession extends beyond sites that are physically occupied, like a house, to
surrounding lands that are used and over which effective control is exercised.”19 This is a rearticulation of the well known statement of Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw that:
Physical occupation may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from the
construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular
use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its
resources.20 [Emphasis mine]
Thus, in Tsilhqot’in, McLachlin CJ framed the common law perspective as emphasizing control
as opposed to use.21 It seems, then, that even before the Aboriginal perspective is considered,
there are serious problems with the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in Tsilhqot’in
(Williams) that:
Aboriginal title cannot generally be proven on a territorial basis, even if there is
some evidence showing that the claimant was the only group in a region or that it
attempted to exclude outsiders from what it considered to be its traditional
territory.22
By requiring an intensity of use that Aboriginal peoples only displayed in respect of small areas
of land, the Court of Appeal effectively precluded a finding of title to broad contiguous tracts of
land, an approach that stands in contrast to that employed by the trial judge and upheld by the
Supreme Court.
If intensive use is not required, the question then becomes what degree of occupation is
sufficient to establish title. Determining sufficiency of occupation is “a context-specific
16

Ibid. at para 33.
Ibid. at para 34.
18
Ibid. at para 36.
19
Ibid. at para 36.
20
Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para 149, citing with approval Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title
(Oxford: Claredon, 1989), at 201-202 [McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title].
21
Kent McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation and Joint Aboriginal Title”, forthcoming UBC L Rev. at 9. [McNeil, “Joint
Aboriginal Title”].
22
William v British Columbia, 2012, BCCA 285 at para 220 [William].
17
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inquiry.”23 It is by way of this context-specific inquiry that the Court draws on the unique factual
circumstances of the Aboriginal group in question to expand the acceptable indicia of occupation
beyond merely “the construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields” to
include the “regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its
resources.”24 It is clear from this distinction that “regular use” falls somewhere short of dwelling
upon or intensively using. Defining the scope of regular use in this broader sense requires that
the context-specific nature of the inquiry apply to both the frequency and intensity of use. For
example, the carrying capacity of the land must be considered in assessing the intensity of use; if
the land could only support 1,000 people, the fact that it was not more densely populated cannot
be used as evidence of an absence of use or occupation.25 As McLachlin CJ stated in Tsilhqot’in,
“[t]he intensity and frequency of the use [required to establish sufficient occupation] may vary
with the characteristics of the Aboriginal group asserting title and the character of the land over
which title is asserted.”26
The question of intensity of use, however, has become increasingly intertwined with the
question of exclusive occupation. In Tsilhqot’in, McLachlin CJ stated that in order to fulfill the
sufficiency requirement, an Aboriginal group must demonstrate that “it has historically acted in a
way that would communicate to third parties that it held the land for its own purposes.”27 Though
this “does not demand notorious or visible use akin to proving a claim for adverse possession,” it
nonetheless cannot be “purely subjective or internal.”28 In other words, the Court will not deem
occupation to have been sufficient merely because an Aboriginal group believes that it had
exclusive use and occupation of the land in question at the time of the assertion of Crown
sovereignty. The Court will require objective evidence of
…a strong presence on or over the land claimed, manifesting itself in acts of
occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating that the land in
question belonged to, was controlled by, or was under the exclusive stewardship
of the claimant group.29
The requirement, then, is not that land was used, but that it “belonged to” or was “controlled by”
the Aboriginal group. This “belonging to,” in turn, can be evidenced through exercising control
23

Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 37.
Delgamuukw, supra note 1 at para 149 as quoted in Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 37 as authority.
25
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 37.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid. 38.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
24
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over, or exclusive stewardship of, the territory in question. For this reason, “[c]ultivated fields,
constructed dwelling houses, invested labour, and a consistent presence on parts of the land may
be sufficient, but are not essential to establish occupation” [emphasis mine].30 Further, as
McLachlin CJ stated, “the notion of occupation must also reflect the way of life of the
Aboriginal people, including those who were nomadic or semi-nomadic.”31 Importantly, this
phrase clarifies beyond question that semi-nomadic occupation may be sufficient to ground a
finding of title. This reflects the important shift from a conception of occupation grounded
strictly in common law conceptions of use, as in the site-specific conception of title, to
occupation through control.32
In Tsilhqot’in, McLachlin found support in the decision delivered by Cromwell JA, then
of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, in the Marshall portion of the Marshall/Bernard decision.
There, Cromwell JA likened “the sufficiency of occupation required to establish Aboriginal title
to the requirements for general occupancy at common law.”33 At common law, a person could be
considered a “general occupant” if they asserted possession of land when “no one else has a
present interest or with respect to which title is uncertain.”34 In other words, it is the exclusive
nature of the occupation that grounds the interest and determines the sufficiency of occupation at
common law. What an Aboriginal group must demonstrate, then, are “acts of occupation that
demonstrate possession at law.”35 Again, the acts of occupation that will suffice to demonstrate
possession will change depending on the circumstances of the peoples and lands in question.36
Occupation, as stated above, must also be considered in light of what the Court terms the
“Aboriginal perspective.” For the most part, when the Court indicates that it intends to
incorporate the Aboriginal perspective, what it is in fact referring to is an analysis of
circumstances that, while undeniably creating a more favorable requirement for Aboriginal
peoples, is hardly an expression of a “perspective” at all. An acknowledgement that it is not
30

Ibid.
Ibid.
32
This shift is in fact a necessary corollary to the “territorial” – as opposed to “site specific” – conception of title. If
title is to be demonstrated over a broad area, the sufficiency requirements cannot be based on “intensive use.” What
is unclear is whether the approach is territorial because the test is occupation, or whether the test is occupation
because the approach is territorial. For a discussion of these points see McNeil, “Site-Specific or Territorial?”, supra
note 9 at 752 - 761; William, supra note 22 at paras 210-217.
33
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 39.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid. at para 40.
36
See Ibid., where McLachlin CJ quoted at length Cromwell’s decision in R v Marshall, 2003 NSCA 105 at para
137 [Marshall, NSCA].
31
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reasonable to require an impossible burden to be met (e.g. requiring written documentation
evidencing pre-contact occupation or a standard of land use that would require a greater number
of people than the territory could support given the lifestyle and modes of subsistence of the
occupants) is not an incorporation of an Aboriginal perspective; rather, it is an acknowledgment
that systemic legal biases militating against the recognition of Aboriginal land rights should be
mitigated. Crucially though, the Aboriginal perspective is given some substantive role insofar as
the Court has noted that an Aboriginal group’s laws are part of the perspectives that it will take
into account.37
The essential point is that activities such as hunting can ground title to broad tracts of
land so long as there is an intention to exclude others or enjoy the land exclusively. The role of
indigenous systems of law is that they can be used as evidence of such exclusivity. 38 Thus, the
Court in Tsilhqot’in concluded:
There is no suggestion in the jurisprudence or scholarship that Aboriginal title is
confined to specific village sites or farms, as the Court of Appeal held. Rather, a
culturally sensitive approach suggests that regular use of territories for hunting,
fishing, trapping and foraging is “sufficient” use to ground Aboriginal title,
provided that such use, on the facts of a particular case, evinces an intention on
the part of the Aboriginal group to hold or possess the land in a manner
comparable to what would be required to establish title at common law.39
This standard for determining the sufficiency of occupation will be essential in considering the
claims of the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s finding in
Marshall/Bernard that the Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had failed to establish
title to the locations in question in those cases.
II. Continuity
The requirement of continuity only applies “[w]here present occupation is relied on as
proof of occupation pre-sovereignty.”40 In such cases, there must be continuity between pre-

37

Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 1 at para 41. The “aboriginal perspective” is discussed in more detail below, see
infra notes 54, 96.
38
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to establish exclusive occupation must take into account the context of the aboriginal society at the time of
sovereignty. For example, it is important to note that exclusive occupation can be demonstrated even if other
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39
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sovereignty and present occupation.41 Another way to formulate the continuity requirement is
that a court cannot infer pre-sovereignty occupation from present occupation. Even where
present occupation exists, evidence must still be brought to establish pre-sovereignty occupation.
The continuity requirement has caused undue confusion, as it is often interpreted to mean
that an Aboriginal group seeking to establish title must demonstrate continuity between their
occupation at the time of the British assertion of sovereignty and the present. However, as
Cromwell JA, then of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, stated in Marshall:
…continuity of occupation from sovereignty to the present is not part of the test
for aboriginal title if exclusive occupation at sovereignty is established by direct
evidence of occupation before and at the time of sovereignty. This view is
consistent with the basic principle underpinning Delgamuukw that title crystalizes
at that time. It also responds to the concern that requiring continuity of occupation
after sovereignty would undermine the purpose of s.35 by giving effect to
displacement of aboriginals by Europeans as a result of post-sovereignty
indifference to aboriginal rights.42
In other words, requiring continuity between occupation at the time of sovereignty and
occupation in the current day would undermine s.35 by legitimizing the dispossession of
Aboriginal peoples. Aboriginal title, as a concept, would be fundamentally altered and divorced
from its historical roots as a right grounded in pre-sovereignty occupation of territory. The
continuity “requirement” would introduce a new mode of extinguishing title, which would see
any displacement of Aboriginal people between the date of sovereignty and the present day as
validly extinguishing title.43
The lack of clarity regarding the continuity requirement was furthered by the explanation
provided in Marshall/Bernard. There, McLachlin CJ construed continuity as the requirement that
the claimants demonstrate that they are descendants of the pre-sovereignty people whose
occupation they were relying on to establish the right. 44 A third distinct conception of continuity
is found in the Supreme Court’s Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, where it has established a
requirement for continuity between pre-contact and present-day practices in proving Aboriginal
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rights other than title.45 Thus, the Court has used the term continuity in at least three distinct
senses when discussing Aboriginal rights and title. The sense in which the term is employed in
Tsilhqot’in could easily be eliminated, as it requires nothing more than that the regular test for
establishing title be applied whether the Aboriginal group is currently occupying the land being
claimed or not. Present occupation is evidence that can be relied upon to help prove occupation
at the date of sovereignty. Continuity only arises when present occupation is relied on in this
manner and is not a requirement for proving title in and of itself.46
III. Exclusivity of Occupation
Exclusivity of occupation is the central requirement for establishing title. As will be seen,
the other requirements have effectively been folded into the exclusive occupation test. On the
non-intensive use standard, demonstrating exclusive use presupposes a level of use sufficient to
ground title – the test for sufficiency (intention to control for one’s own exclusive use) is no
more than a re-articulation of exclusive occupation – exclusive occupation is by definition
sufficient occupation. In other words, if a group exclusively occupies a territory, the exclusive
nature of that occupation is evidence of use sufficient to ground title. While in theory there is a
distinction between proving sufficiency of occupation on the one hand and exclusivity on the
other, the categories blend together in practice.47 Indeed, exclusive occupation is defined by the
Court as “‘the intention and capacity to retain exclusive control’ over the lands.”48 Exclusivity is
not based on use of the land, but control of it; that is, “[e]xclusivity should be understood in the
sense of intention and capacity to control the land.”49 Lamer CJ discussed the exclusivity
requirement at length in Delgamuukw:
45
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Finally, at sovereignty, occupation must have been exclusive. The requirement for
exclusivity flows from the definition of aboriginal title itself, because I have
defined aboriginal title in terms of the right to exclusive use and occupation of
land. Exclusivity, as an aspect of aboriginal title, vests in the aboriginal
community which holds the ability to exclude others from the lands held pursuant
to that title. The proof of title must, in this respect, mirror the content of the
right.50
The intention and capacity to control the land is a matter of fact that is to be determined by the
trier of fact. As McLachlin CJ stated in Tsilhqot’in:
Whether a claimant group had the intention and capacity to control the land at the
time of sovereignty is a question of fact for the trial judge and depends on various
factors such as the characteristics of the claimant group, the nature of other groups
in the area, and the characteristics of the land in question.51
Like the test for determining sufficiency of occupation, assessing exclusivity of occupation
requires the trier of fact to consider the historical context of the Aboriginal group and the lands
in question.52 Further, “[a]s with the proof of occupation, proof of exclusivity must rely on both
the perspective of the common law and the aboriginal perspective.”53
As with the sufficiency framework, the concept of exclusivity is drawn from the common
law, while the fact that the court must take into consideration the historical context is said to give
credence to the Aboriginal perspective.54 Exclusive occupation, therefore, can be demonstrated
by proving “that others were excluded from the land, or by proof that others were only allowed
access to the land with the permission of the claimant group.”55 In this light, the presence of
others with permission may actually strengthen a claim of exclusive occupation as “the very fact
that permission was asked for and given would be further evidence of the group’s exclusive
control.”56 The presence of other groups also must be assessed in light of the Aboriginal
50
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perspective. As Lamer CJ stated in Delgamukw, that perspective may “lead to the conclusion that
trespass by other aboriginal groups does not undermine, and that presence of those groups by
permission may reinforce, the exclusive occupation of the aboriginal group asserting title.”57
As with the test for determining sufficiency of occupation, the incorporation of the
Aboriginal perspective in respect of exclusivity has the potential to be much more substantive
than under the current analysis. While weeding out Eurocentric bias should not in itself be
construed as substantially incorporating the Aboriginal perspective, the reference to Aboriginal
systems of law to substantiate the Aboriginal perspective and act as evidence of the exclusive
nature of Aboriginal occupation holds promise. In Delgamuukw, Lamer CJ employed terms such
as “trespass” and “permission” while discussing of the role of Aboriginal laws.58 Lamer CJ
stated: “aboriginal laws under which permission may be granted to other aboriginal groups to use
or reside even temporarily on land would reinforce the finding of exclusive occupation.” 59 In
other words, when assessing whether Aboriginal occupation had the requisite sufficiency and
exclusivity to ground a finding of title, the internal laws governing the use and occupation of
land in the territory which that Aboriginal group occupied must be taken into consideration. This
was recognized as essential to establishing title in Tsilhqot’in, where McLachlin CJ stated that
“[t]he trial judge found that the Tsilhqot’in, prior to the assertion of sovereignty, repelled other
people from their land and demanded permission from outsiders who wished to pass over it. He
concluded from this that the Tsilhqot’in treated the land as exclusively theirs.”60
It is clear, then, that the test for establishing Aboriginal title requires that exclusive
occupation at the time of the British assertion of sovereignty be demonstrated. Further, the Court
explicitly rejected the “intensive use” standard and noted the connection between the intensity of
use required to prove title and the territorial scope of title. In dismissing the findings of the
was requested and granted or refused, or that treaties were made with other groups, may show intention and capacity
to control the land.”
57
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British Columbia Court of Appeal, McLachlin held:
the Court of Appeal based its rejection of Aboriginal title on the legal proposition
that regular use of territory could not ground Aboriginal title — only the regular
presence on or intensive occupation of particular tracts would suffice. That view,
as discussed earlier, is not supported by the jurisprudence; on the contrary,
Delgamuukw affirms a territorial use-based approach to Aboriginal title.61
McLachlin CJ then went on to state that “[b]y examining a large number of individual sites, the
trial judge was able to infer the boundaries within which the Tsilhqot’in regularly and
exclusively occupied the land. The trial judge, in proceeding this way, made no legal error.”62

B. The Marshall/Bernard Decisions
What does this clear application of the title test tell us about the Maritime Provinces?
Further, what does it tell us about how we should consider the Marshall/Bernard decision? The
Marshall/Bernard decision dealt with appeals from two cases, one from Nova Scotia and one
from New Brunswick. In both cases Mi’kmaq people were charged with illegally removing
timber from Crown lands. The defence in both cases argued that Mi’kmaq individuals did not
require provincial authorization to harvest timber as they held rights to do so pursuant to treaty
right and/or Aboriginal title.63 As McLachlin CJ stated, “[t]he respondents claim that they hold
aboriginal title to the lands they logged and that therefore they do not need provincial
authorization to log. They advance three different grounds for title: common law; the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 … and Belcher's Proclamation.”64 The defendants in both cases were
convicted at trial and had their convictions upheld by the summary convictions courts. In both
cases the courts of appeal set aside the convictions, with a new trial being ordered in Marshall
(Nova Scotia) and an acquittal in Bernard (New Brunswick).65
The trial and appellate level cases in the Marshall/Bernard litigation are of particular
interest in assessing Aboriginal title in the Maritimes in light of the Tsilhqot’in decision. In both
the Marshall and Bernard cases, the different opinions of the trial and appellate level judges
rested almost entirely on competing views of which standard should be applied in assessing the
61
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degree of sufficiency of use required to establish title.66 In both instances, the trial courts applied
an intensive use standard and, as a necessary corollary, embraced a site-specific, as opposed to
territorial, conception of title. In other words, the lines drawn between the trial and appellate
courts were the same lines drawn between the British Columbia Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in.67 As such, we can now assess the competing judgments
in Marshall and Bernard in light of clear and unambiguous precedent from the Supreme Court.
As will be discussed in more detail below, this was not the case following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Marshall/Bernard, which sowed considerable confusion by professing to adhere to
the same interpretation of Delgamuukw as the courts of appeal while nonetheless overturning
their decisions and reinstating those of the trial courts while remaining ambiguous on important
doctrinal matters.68 Charting the prevailing arguments through the courts in the Marshall and
Bernard cases provides a clear justification for assuming that title at some point existed in Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick.
In the Tsilhqot’in decision, McLachlin CJ adopted the reasoning of Cromwell JA from
the Marshall decision at the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. In overturning the trial level decision
that determined that the Mi’kmaq had failed to establish title, Cromwell JA stated:
In my respectful view, the courts below erred in requiring proof of regular,
intensive use of the cutting sites to establish aboriginal title. In my opinion, this
standard of occupation misapplies the common law perspective, fails to give equal
weight to the aboriginal perspective, and does not take into account the nature of
the land under consideration.69
In itself, the fact that the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in explicitly adopted Cromwell JA’s
reasoning on the most salient points of law relative to the determination of a title claim should
indicate that there is a strong possibility that title could be found to have existed in the Maritime
Provinces.70 In assessing whether the Mi’kmaq had demonstrated occupation sufficient to ground
title to the particular areas where the charged individuals were harvesting wood, Cromwell stated
66
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at the appellate level: “[t]he question, in my opinion, is not whether exclusive occupation of the
cutting sites was established, but whether exclusive occupation of a reasonably defined territory
which includes the cutting sites, was established.”71 Similarly, in Tsilhqot’in, McLachlin CJ held,
in dismissing the appellate court’s holdings, that “[t]he alleged failure to identify particular areas
with precision likewise only makes sense if one assumes a narrow test of intensive
occupation.”72 This echoes Cromwell’s reasoning in Marshall where he argued that the trial
judge had “erred in law by requiring the appellants to prove intensive, regular use of the cutting
sites.”73 The evident symmetry between the Tsilhqot’in decision and the decisions of the New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia courts of appeal in the Bernard and Marshall decisions,
respectively, raises questions about the predictive value of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Marshall/Bernard in terms of assessing future title litigation in the Maritime Provinces. Though
Marshall/Bernard is directly on point, following Tsilhqot’in there is good reason to suspect that
a future claim may produce a different result.74
As discussed above, at the NSCA Cromwell JA held that, in applying a site-specific,
intensive-use standard, the trial judge had erred in law.75 This view was shared by the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal, where Justice Daigle concluded that, in applying an intensive use
standard, the trial judge had “failed to comply with the principles set out in Delgamuukw and
committed errors of law”76 and, further, “that he erred in law when his central concern became
the proof of specific acts of occupation and regular use.”77 The New Brunswick Court looked to
the common law to ground this conception of title, citing Calder78 alongside one of the famed
US Marshall trilogy cases (Johnson v. M’Intosh)79 as standing for the principle that:
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The forthright recognition as a historical fact of the prior occupation of North
America by aboriginal peoples embodies the foundation of aboriginal title.
Aboriginal title is thus derived at common law from the historic occupation and
possession of ancestral lands by aboriginal people and their relationship to those
lands.80
Daigle JA, then, recognized title as being grounded in the prior occupation of Aboriginal
peoples.81 The recognition that title is grounded in the exclusive occupation of the land leads to
the conclusion that the interest title refers to and seeks to protect is that same type of
occupation.82 Daigle JA elaborated, stating that:
…the criteria for occupation and the common law analysis … stand for the
proposition that the common law concept of occupation requires proof of a
"definite tract of land" (i.e. the Northwest Miramichi watershed) over which the
Mi'kmaq "habitually and exclusively ranged". To constitute occupation, a specific
confined area within the claimed territory need not be "in actual use by them at
any given moment". Moreover, the aboriginal perspective on the occupation of
and association with their lands must be taken into account. On that basis, the
hunting grounds of a hunting and gathering aboriginal community, considering
their habits and modes of life and the resulting occupation pattern of their lands,
would be as much in their actual possession and use as their permanent
settlements. The common law does not require proof of intensive, regular or
physical use of every narrowly confined area within a claimed territory to
constitute occupation of that territory.83
Again, this mirrors the approach found in Cromwell’s decision in Marshall. The courts of appeal
in both provinces, then, clearly and unequivocally repudiated the trial judges’ decisions grounded
on an intensive use standard.
Recalling that my purpose here is to demonstrate why it is reasonable to assume that title
did at some point exist in the Maritime Provinces, the similarity between the decisions from the
courts of appeal and the Supreme Court’s decision in Tsilhqot’in is an important consideration,
especially in light of the lines of argumentation employed by each in dismissing the site“Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power
over Foreign Affairs” (2002) 81:1 Tex L Rev 1 at 30 – 41.
80
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specific/intensive use standard.84 What is more, it is likely that title could be proven to exist,
albeit to a more limited range of land, even on a more restrictive standard. This is precisely what
happened at the Nova Scotia Provincial Court where the trial judge in Marshall stated that “the
Mi’kmaq of the 18th century on mainland Nova Scotia probably had aboriginal title to lands
around their local communities, but not to the cutting sites.”85 Thus, even in applying the unduly
restrictive intensive use standard that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Tsilhqot’in, the
trial court in Nova Scotia recognized that title likely could be proven. It is clear that the
assumption that title existed somewhere is a safe one on the basis that New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia courts suggested title likely existed on both the standard that has been unequivocally
upheld by the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in and on the much more restrictive standard.
One item that remains outstanding in this analysis, though, is the fact that the Supreme
Court in Marshall/Bernard overturned the Courts of Appeal. That the majority did so while
giving ambiguous signs about their position on the proper standard only renders the decision
more opaque. There are several examples of the lack of clarity brought by the Supreme Court in
this decision.86 In the first instance, McLachlin CJ purported to faithfully apply Delgamuukw
and, in so doing, emphasized exclusive occupation as the basis of Aboriginal title. She stated:
“[t]he common law theory underlying recognition of aboriginal title holds that an aboriginal
group which occupied land at the time of European sovereignty and never ceded or otherwise
lost its right to that land, continues to enjoy title to it”87 and, further, that “[t]hese principles were
canvassed at length in Delgamuukw… which enunciated a test for aboriginal title based on
exclusive occupation at the time of British sovereignty.”88
McLachlin CJ seemingly incorporated two fundamental principles for assessing the
sufficiency of occupation from Delgamuukw, namely the requirements that the Aboriginal
84
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perspective be taken into account and that intensive use of specific sites is not required to ground
title. She approvingly quoted Lamer CJ, as he then was, who defined “occupation” in
Delgamuukw as follows:
Occupation may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from the
construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular
use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its
resources.89
Thus, McLachlin embraced a broad definition of “occupation” as including more than only
intensively used sites. She was also alive to the evidentiary issues that are inherent to assessing
the degree of historical occupation of Aboriginal groups, echoing the New Brunswick Court of
Appeal in saying that to “insist on evidence of overt acts of exclusion in such circumstances
may, depending on the circumstances, be unfair.”90 McLachlin CJ then addressed the issue of
exclusivity, stating that:
It follows that evidence of acts of exclusion is not required to establish aboriginal
title. All that is required is demonstration of effective control of the land by the
group, from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that it could have
excluded others had it chosen to do so. The fact that history, insofar as it can be
ascertained, discloses no adverse claimants may support this inference. This is
what is meant by the requirement of aboriginal title that the lands have been
occupied in an exclusive manner.91
In the passages above it seems as though McLachlin CJ was articulating a standard of occupation
consistent with both Delgamuukw and the Courts of Appeal in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.
In several other instances, however, McLachlin CJ was much more ambiguous about the correct
standard. She stated that
…exclusive possession in the sense of intention and capacity to control is required
to establish aboriginal title. Typically, this is established by showing regular
occupancy or use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or exploiting
resources: Delgamuukw, at para. 149. Less intensive uses may give rise to
different rights.92
While this statement is accurate insofar as it describes the fact that an Aboriginal group may
have distinct Aboriginal or treaty rights that are exercisable on a territory over which they do not
hold title, it sows confusion insofar as McLachlin CJ draws a distinction between “occupation”
89
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and “use” and relies on a standard that looks to the intensity of use to determine the types of
rights that may be derived from that historical use. In Delgamuukw, as well as at the appellate
courts in the Marshall/Bernard cases, and later at the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in, exclusivity
of use is the prevailing factor.
Thus, while on the one hand McLachlin CJ stated that exclusivity could be inferred, she
later tethered exclusivity to common law notions of physical occupation:
It was not in error to state, as Cromwell J.A. did, that acts from which intention to
occupy the land could be inferred may ground a claim to common law title.
However, as discussed above, this must be coupled with sufficiently regular and
exclusive use in order to establish title in the common law sense.93
Evidence of sufficiently regular and exclusive use, of course, would negate the need to infer an
intention to occupy land, rendering it unclear in which circumstances, if any, McLachlin CJ
would consider Cromwell JA’s non-erroneous statement to apply. If intention to occupy can be
inferred, but only where sufficiently regular use is established, the intention to occupy is
redundant at best and cannot ground title alone.
While these statements are largely ambiguous in respect of the applicable standard,
several other statements suggest strongly, though perhaps short of explicitly, that the Court
applied a site specific, intensive use standard.94 Thus, McLachlin CJ stated:
It follows from the requirement of exclusive occupation that exploiting the land,
rivers or seaside for hunting, fishing or other resources may translate into
aboriginal title to the land if the activity was sufficiently regular and exclusive to
comport with title at common law. However, more typically, seasonal hunting and
fishing rights exercised in a particular area will translate to a hunting or fishing
right.95
Here, it is suggested that the exclusive occupation standard can be undermined if that exclusive
occupation is not year round; further, it required that the use of land “comport with title at
common law.” As the Court itself noted, however, the common law does not require continuous
use. Needless to say, the Aboriginal perspective is not incorporated in this view.96 Most
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suggestive though, was McLachlin CJ’s statement that:
The trial judge in each case applied the correct test to determine whether the
respondents' claim to aboriginal title was established. In each case they required
proof of sufficiently regular and exclusive use of the cutting sites by Mi'kmaq
people at the time of assertion of sovereignty.97
Though the requirement of sufficient and regular use follows the standard set in Delgamuukw,
requiring exclusive use of the cutting sites themselves applies a site-specific standard and
requires an intensity of use seemingly beyond that envisaged by the court in Delgamuukw.98 Any
claim that McLachlin CJ did not apply a site-specific standard in Marshall/Bernard would
seemingly have to say the same of the trial courts.99 In light of the view expressed in
Marshall/Bernard, it is worth recalling McLachlin CJ’s statement in Tsilhqot’in:
For semi-nomadic Aboriginal groups like the Tsilhqot’in, the Court of Appeal’s
approach results in small islands of title surrounded by larger territories where the
group possesses only Aboriginal rights to engage in activities like hunting and
trapping. By contrast, on the trial judge’s approach, the group would enjoy title to
all the territory that their ancestors regularly and exclusively used at the time of
assertion of European sovereignty.100
At the heart of the lack of consistency is the need to distinguish between “lesser and higher”
Aboriginal rights and the requirements for proof of those rights. The concern in
Marshall/Bernard seems to be that if the bar for title is set too low, there will no longer be any
space for other Aboriginal rights, which seems to be what McLachlin CJ thinks the jurisprudence
requires. Thus, citing the Adams and Côté decisions as authority, McLachlin stated:
The common law right to title is commensurate with exclusionary rights of
control. That is what it means and has always meant. If the ancient aboriginal
practices do not indicate that type of control, then title is not the appropriate right.
To confer title in the absence of evidence of sufficiently regular and exclusive
pre-sovereignty occupation, would transform the ancient right into a new and
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different right. It would also obliterate the distinction that this Court has
consistently made between lesser aboriginal rights like the right to fish and the
highest aboriginal right, the right to title to the land.101
This causes confusion in the case concerning what type of proof is required to establish title and
which augurs instead for recognition of a more limited right. In the passage above, McLachlin CJ
stated both that title is “commensurate with exclusionary rights of control” and required an
intensity of use incommensurate with a finding of title on territory which Aboriginal peoples
occupied to the exclusion of others. It is as though the full scale of the distinction in approaches
between the trial and appellate courts in the Marshall/Bernard litigation was not grasped by the
Supreme Court, in particular as those approaches pertain to the relationship between the intensity
of use required to prove title and the geographical ambit of title.
Part of the problem with the reasoning in Marshall/Bernard stems from a lack of
conceptual clarity concerning the proof for Aboriginal title and proof for “lesser” Aboriginal
rights.102 This results in a mistaken emphasis on Aboriginal “practices,” with that term coming to
be used in the place of both “occupation” and, importantly, “perspectives.”103 Emphasizing
practices at the expense of occupation can colour one’s perspective of the “sufficiency” of
occupation required to establish title. Further, as Professor McNeil has pointed out, “[t]he
emphasis on practices in fact rearticulates the common law perspective and fails to draw on
Lamer CJ’s statements in Delgamuukw concerning Aboriginal law.”104 In other words, reducing
the Aboriginal perspective to a “faithful” translation of practices to an equivalent common law
right eliminates any meaningful reference to Aboriginal legal traditions.105 As Professor McNeil
stated:
Aboriginal law and the common law had each been proposed as viable, alternative
sources, but the Supreme Court had not yet pronounced on the matter. If
Aboriginal law was relied upon, the doctrine of continuity would apply, and so
Aboriginal title would be derived from, and be defined by, the pre-existing laws
of the Aboriginal people in question. If the common law was relied upon,
Aboriginal title would depend on occupation of lands by Aboriginal peoples at the
time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty and the legal effect given to occupation
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by the common law…The resulting title is a common law rather than an
Aboriginal law title, but it is unlike any previously-known common law interest in
land because it has several sui generis aspects, specifically pre-sovereignty
source, inalienability, communal nature, and inherent limit.106
It should be noted that McLachlin CJ took the opportunity in Tsilhqot’in to reject Professor
McNeil’s interpretation of her decision in Marshall/Bernard. Noting that the province relied on
McNeil’s argument that the Court had rejected a territorial approach to title in Marshall/Bernard,
McLachlin stated that:
In fact, this Court in Marshall; Bernard did not reject a territorial approach, but
held only (at para. 72) that there must be “proof of sufficiently regular and
exclusive use” of the land in question, a requirement established in
Delgamuukw.107
While it is clear that the standard applied in Marshall/Bernard requiring “proof of sufficiently
regular and exclusive use” of the land is a feature drawn from Delgamuukw, it is how those terms
are interpreted and applied that is at issue. As discussed, at the trial level in the Marshall and
Bernard decisions, “regular use” was interpreted in such a manner as to preclude a finding of
title over a parcel of land on which the defendants could not prove intense and regular activity;
they were, in other words, required to demonstrate physical use and occupation of each parcel of
land they hoped to establish title to. The courts of appeal, by contrast, found that no such proof
was necessary, as the sites fell within the territory over which the Mi’kmaq exercised exclusive
occupation. What is superficially the same test – i.e. proof of “sufficiently regular and exclusive
use” - leads to very different results when the language is carefully parsed.
In sum, in the period following Delgamuukw, two clearly defined standards came to be
applied in Aboriginal title cases. The trial level courts in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia
applied a site-specific, intensive use standard that would, by dint of the requirement of regular,
intensive use, necessarily confine title to small specific sites such as villages. The other
approach, applied by the Courts of Appeal in those same cases, would apply a standard of
occupancy grounded primarily in the exclusivity rather than the intensity of use, resulting in the
possibility of findings of title over broad territories. Though the two standards often employ the
same language (regular use, etc.) and can for that reason seem difficult to distinguish, a crucial
factor separating them is how they incorporate Aboriginal laws. The cases applying a site-
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specific standard emphasize the common law requirement of physical occupation, purporting to
import the Aboriginal perspective, if at all, only through a ‘translation’ of a pre-sovereignty
practice to a modern right. The cases that, following Lamer CJ’s clear outline in Delgamuukw,
looked to the Aboriginal perspective on the nature of their relationship to, and control over, the
land, applied the territorial notion of title. Though McLachlin CJ muddied the conceptual waters
considerably in Marshall/Bernard, in Tsilhqot’in the matter was put to rest, likely for the
foreseeable future, with the unanimous court soundly rejecting the British Columbia Court of
Appeal’s application of the site-specific standard.
In respect of the question that animates this chapter – that is, can it be assumed that title
existed in the Maritime Provinces – four conclusions become clear. First, new litigation is likely
to be tried on the standard laid out in Tsilhqot’in. For reasons I have outlined above, a decision
that faithfully followed Tsilhqot’in would apply an analysis much closer to that found in the
decisions from the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Courts of Appeal – cases that found the
Mi’kmaq had established title to broad territories in Nova Scotia and Northeastern New
Brunswick – than that applied by the Supreme Court in Marshall/Barnard. Second, it is clear
that even on the more restrictive standard applied by the trial courts, it is very likely that title
could be proven to specific intensively used sites. The Nova Scotia trial court in Marshall and
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Isaac confirmed this. Even if a court retreated to the
Marshall/Bernard framework analysis, it seems that title could be proven to certain well-defined,
intensively used sites. Third, there is good reason to believe that a stronger evidentiary case
could be made for title in the region. As Lebel J. noted in his concurring opinion in
Marshall/Bernard, in which he applied an analysis much closer to that adopted by the Supreme
Court in Tsilhqot’in, the problems with the case were largely evidentiary. This issue was
twofold; the courts were looking for the wrong type of evidence108 and the claimants did not
bring enough of the right kind of evidence. In particular, more evidence of the Mi’kmaq legal
and political framework, such that it evidences exclusive control of broader territory, should
have been brought, while the courts should not have focused so narrowly on evidence of use of
the cutting sites themselves. Fourth, Marshall/Bernard should not be taken to foreclose a future
108
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finding of title in favour of the Nova Scotia or Miramichi Mi’kmaq. This was stated explicitly by
Lebel J. in his concurring opinion. It is also the case because, as I have demonstrated above,
Marshall/Bernard appears to be a departure from the principles articulated in Delgamuukw.109
With Tsilhqot’in, the Court realigned its analysis with Delgamuukw, at least on the salient
features pertaining to proof of title, making the principles articulated in Marshall/Bernard
dubious in terms of their precedential value.110
Nonetheless, while the types of evidence that may suffice to ground title have been
clarified in Tsilhqot’in,111 it is clear that the evidentiary burden contributed to the Mi’kmaq’s
inability to establish title. As Professor McNeil stated following the decision in
Marshall/Bernard:
In future cases … I think it will be important for Aboriginal title claimants to
present strong evidence of the existence and application of Aboriginal law in
relation to land, in addition to evidence of physical occupation, particularly where
they are asserting title over their traditional territory rather than over specific
sites.112
This is perhaps even truer following the Tsilhqot’in decision, with a renewed emphasis on the
exclusivity of occupation, grounded in control rather than intensity of use.113 Thus, as discussed
above, the most recent judicial articulations on Aboriginal title, coupled with an analysis of the
109
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case law emanating from the region, makes it highly probable that title could be proved.
In light of this clarified legal framework, the historical record can be reexamined. As
noted earlier, there is a temptation when analyzing evidence to do so in light of the legal test one
is applying. That is, the temptation is to look for evidence that will be definitive in light of the
test being applied. Evidence from the Maritime Provinces has been examined through the lens of
an incorrect legal test (at the trial courts and Supreme Court) and through the lens of the correct
test (at the courts of appeal). Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly engage
the historical record pertaining to proof of title, it is worth briefly reviewing some of the salient
features of the historical record that demonstrate the probability of title being proved in light of
the Tsilhqot’in decision. Again, this analysis is not meant to suggest the precise geographic areas
where title may be demonstrated to have existed. Rather, it is meant only to demonstrate the high
probability that title could be proven to have existed.

C. Historical Occupation
The relevant time period that must be examined in assessing Aboriginal occupation for the
purpose of establishing title is the date of the British Crown’s sovereignty; title is established
with reference to Aboriginal occupation of the territory in question at the date of sovereignty.
That date was determined by the courts to be 1713 for mainland Nova Scotia, 1759 for New
Brunswick, and 1763 for Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island.114 Taking these dates as a
baseline, we can examine the historical record for evidence of the exclusive occupation required
to establish title. As discussed above, there are two ways that occupation may be demonstrated.
The first is physical use and occupation of land. This reflects the common law requirement that
rights to land be established through the physical possession of that land, as evidenced through
114
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its use. The second is based on control, or the exclusivity of occupation. This reflects both the
common law understanding that title may extend to an area under one’s exclusive control and the
court’s attempt to incorporate the “Aboriginal perspective” into the concept of Aboriginal title by
relying on Aboriginal conceptions of land use and territoriality to shape the content of title.
Importantly, this includes Aboriginal laws and legal systems insofar as they relate to the
exclusive control of a given territory.115
That the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy physically occupied many sites in the
Maritime Provinces at sovereignty is clear. As Curran J. noted at the Nova Scotia Provincial
Court:
When the British acquired sovereignty in 1713, the only people living in most of
mainland Nova Scotia were Mi’kmaq. The Mi’kmaq had lived in Nova Scotia
since centuries before Europeans arrived. There is no reason to believe any other
aboriginal group lived here during that time or later. There were about 2,500
Acadians in the province, but most of them lived in a few concentrated areas
along the Bay of Fundy. Besides that, there was just a small British garrison at
Annapolis.116
He continued:
They [the Mi’kmaq] were living near Port Royal, Minas, Cape Sable, LaHave,
Chebucto (Halifax), Musquodoboit and the St. Mary’s River in Guysborough
County, along the Northumberland Strait and near Chignecto (Amherst). They
lived mostly near the coast, but not at fixed locations throughout the year or from
year to year. The fur trade was past its peak, but they still used the interior of the
province far more intensively than they had before Europeans came.117
Though Curran J. stated that “[i]t is almost certain there were substantial tracts of land unclaimed
and largely unused between the communities,”118 he also observed that “[t]he Mi’kmaq
communities were not isolated from each other, particularly in the summer. They spoke a
common language with little variation in dialect throughout Nova Scotia and beyond. They could
and did travel the length and breadth of the mainland using the many interconnected
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waterways.”119 He concluded that “[t]here is no doubt the Mi’kmaq moved at will throughout
mainland Nova Scotia in 1713, except perhaps in the Acadian areas and at Annapolis.”120 It is
clear that in 1713, “the colony remained an enclave of the Mi’kmaq and the Acadians.” 121 This
state of affairs was echoed in respect of the Mi’kmaq in New Brunswick by Daigle JA, who held
that “the evidence clearly demonstrates that by 1759 there had been no displacement by
Europeans of the Mi'kmaq occupation of their traditional territory. In fact, no other aboriginal
groups or Europeans challenged the exclusive use and occupation of the Northwest Miramichi
watershed by the Mi'kmaq between contact in 1500 and British sovereignty in 1759”122 and
further, that “[t]he evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Mi'kmaq were peaceably
and exclusively occupying the Northwest Miramichi watershed.”123
Curran J. similarly found that there had been little displacement of the Mi’kmaq on Cape
Breton, stating that, “the only European settlement of any consequence other than Louisbourg
was a small French community at Port Toulouse (St. Peters).”124 This led him to the extremely
important factual conclusion, not disturbed by the higher courts, that:
The question of exclusiveness really does not arise in this case. There was no
other aboriginal group in Nova Scotia in 1713 or 1763. On the mainland in 1713
there were a few Acadian enclaves and one small British outpost. In Cape Breton
119

Ibid. at para 129. It is useful to compare Curran J.’s comments to Justice Vickers’ description of Tsilhqot’in
occupation at the trial level in Tsilhqot’in Nation: “[a]t the time of sovereignty assertion, Tsilhqot’in people living in
the Claim Area were semi-nomadic. They moved up and down the main salmon bearing river, the Tsilhqox (Chilko
River), in season. They fished the smaller lakes to the east and west of the Tsilhqox, particularly in the spring
season. They gathered berries, medicines and root plants in the valleys and on the slopes of the surrounding
mountains. They hunted and trapped across the Claim Area, taking what nature had to offer. Then, for the most part,
they returned on a regular basis to winter at Xeni (Nemiah Valley), on the eastern shore of Tsilhqox Biny (Chilko
Lake), on the high ground above the banks of the Tsilhqox, and on the shores of adjacent streams and lakes, from
Naghatalhchoz Biny (Big Eagle Lake) and eastward into Tachelachíed.” Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia,
2007 BCSC 1700 at para 953 [Tsilhqot’in Trial].
120
Marshall, NSPC, supra note 85 at para 131.
121
Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties, supra note 116 at 109.
122
Bernard NBCA, supra note 75 at para 171 (Daigle JA).
123
Ibid. at para 148 (Daigle). Daigle JA also provided persuasive reasoning on how the courts should approach the
task of determining exclusivity of occupation where there is not evidence of active exclusion of other groups. In
discussing the exclusivity of Mi’kmaw occupation of an area of Northeastern New Brunswick, he stated: “[t]he
picture that emerges from the totality of the evidence is that of peaceable relations between the various aboriginal
groups living in New Brunswick, in particular between the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet. The evidence leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the Mi'kmaq were peaceably and exclusively occupying the Northwest Miramichi
watershed without protest from neighbouring tribes and without challenge to the possession of their lands. In these
circumstances, why look for or require evidence of the negative side, of forced exclusion of others, or of hostile acts
or violence where none exists. In my view, exclusive occupation of land rather emerges from evidence of positive
activities and uses of the land, from the factual reality of peaceable and exclusive occupation.”
124
Marshall, NSPC, supra note 85 at para 132. Though Louisbourg was an immense fort for its time, with 1,191
military personnel stationed there by 1734, there was little French presence beyond the fort. Wicken, Mi’kmaq
Treaties, supra note 116 at 102 .

30

between the fall of Louisbourg and 1763 there was one small French community
and some scattered French settlers. There is no reason to believe there was any
European on any of the cutting sites, or for that matter on most of the mainland or
in most of Cape Breton, at the relevant times. That leaves the question of
occupancy.125
In other words, for the trial Judge, who applied the incorrect and too stringent test for title,
exclusivity of occupation was not an issue. As Curran J. noted, this leaves unanswered the
“question of occupancy.” That is, the question is not whether Mi’kmaw occupation was
exclusive, but whether the intensity or frequency of that occupation was sufficient to ground a
finding of title. In light of the clarified framework provided in Tsilhqot’in, in which the intensity
of use has in large part been subsumed into the exclusivity of use, this finding is of particular
note and further substantiates the view that Aboriginal title existed in many areas.
The Mi’kmaq were also present on pre-sovereignty Prince Edward Island, which was
unquestionably an important part of their traditional territory; their name for the Island was
Abegweit.126 While the Mi’kamq undoubtedly occupied the island before European arrival, the
extent of their occupation at the time of the British acquisition sovereignty is more difficult to
peg with precision. After the fall of Louisbourg on 26 July 1758, the British decided to evacuate
the Acadians and Mi’kmaq from Prince Edward Island, though about 200 of each remained on
the island.127 As of the 1830s there were about 500 Mi’kmaq on the island.128 An 1838 petition
from Oliver Thomas LeBone, Chief of the Prince Edward Island Mi’kmaq, stated that “they were
but ‘a skeleton’ of ‘our once numerous tribe.’”129 Prior to the British acquisition of sovereignty,
however, there was a French presence on the island, with many Acadians being expelled from
the Island following the fall of Louisbourg.130
As with the Mi’kmaq, there is unequivocal evidence of Maliseet occupation in the region.
While determining the areas where this occupation may suffice to establish title would require
research that is beyond the scope of this analysis, my purpose here, as stated above, is simply to
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establish that Maliseet occupation would suffice to prove title somewhere. The names given and
used by the Maliseet speak to their intimate association with the Saint John River valley. Indeed,
the British referred to them as the “St. John River Indians”, while they referred, and often still
refer to themselves as Wuastukwiuk, which means ‘people of the Wulastuk (Saint John)
River.’131 The Maliseet travelled the length of the river, camping along its shores in the summer
and travelling into the forests in the winter to hunt.132 As historian W.O. Raymond wrote of the
Maliseet,
The dark recesses of the forest, the sunny glades of the open woodland, the mossy
dells, the sparkling streams and roaring mountain torrents, the quiet lakes, the
noble [Saint John] river flowing onward to the sea with islands here and there
embosomed by its tide – all were his. The smoke of his wigwam fire curled
peacefully from Indian village and temporary encampment. He might wander
where he pleased with none to say him nay.133
While such a statement lacks the specificity required to ground a claim for Aboriginal title, it
nonetheless provides a clear view of the understanding of pre-sovereignty Maliseet occupation of
the Saint John River region from the eyes of an historian at the turn of the 20th century. Of
particular note is Raymond’s use of the possessive phrase “all were his,” indicating a recognition
that the Maliseet ‘owned’, occupied, and held the territory as their own, and the last sentence
confirming that Maliseet occupation was exclusive. One of the principal Maliseet sites on the
river was at Medoctec, just south of present day Woodstock.134 Medoctic was well beyond the
reach of English settlement until after the arrival of the Loyalists in 1784-85 and was an
important portage site linking Maliseet territory to their Abenaki neighbours.135 There are many
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reports from early explorers detailing the Maliseet presence, archeological sites running the
length of the Saint John River and around the Grand Lake region, and many early 18th century
maps representing Maliseet villages from Fredericton to Madawaska.136 In sum, there is little
doubt that the Maliseet occupied the Saint John River and many of its tributaries at the date of
the assertion of sovereignty, though the issue of adducing evidence of that occupation sufficient
to ground title, and what geographical ambit that evidence might support, is a task for historical
researchers.
In respect of both the Mi’kmaq and the Maliseet, the fact that they were there, living on
the land in organized societies at the date of the assertion of sovereignty makes it difficult to
imagine a scenario in which their occupation would not be sufficient on physical occupation
alone to establish title somewhere within what we know to be their traditional territory. Indeed,
courts in the Isaac, Thomas Peter Paul, Marshall, and Bernard decisions have confirmed this,
even if a case has yet to succeed at the Supreme Court. As has been described above, however, it
is now clear that occupancy should be assessed not only in terms of physical occupancy, but also
in terms of the exclusive control of broader territory. Further, occupation can be demonstrated for
the purpose of establishing title with reference to prevailing Aboriginal conceptions of
territoriality, as evidenced in part by their distinct legal and political orders.137 In this light, it is
notable that Curran J. stated:
The Mi’kmaq had, as Dr. von Gernet put it, “a sense of territoriality.” That was
clear from everything they said to the British from 1713 to 1760 and beyond well
into the 19th century. They made it clear they considered all of Nova Scotia their
Houghton, 1892) at 317 – 318. This system of waterways was said to have been “used by the Indians from time
immemorial.” George Frederick Clarke, Six Salmon Rivers and Another (Brunswick Press: Fredericton, 1960) at 92.
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land, their territory. They repeatedly accused the British of taking their land
without permission.138
This again speaks to the issue of exclusivity,139 but perhaps more importantly, it makes clear that
the Mi’kmaq considered themselves to have the capacity to exclude others and to do so pursuant
to their own internal legal regimes.140 This was echoed by Professor William Wicken, an expert
witness in the both the Marshall and Bernard cases and a number of other cases involving
Aboriginal peoples in the Maritime region. Speaking to the issue of Mi’kmaq control of territory,
Wicken stated on the stand in Bernard that:
...[T]here was a protocol, there was a relationship, a customary relationship that
evolved over time between these people and which governed their relationships. If
somebody come [sic] on to your territory then in fact there was a law, if I can use
that word, aboriginal law, their law, about how this infringement upon their
territory would be dealt with.141
This legal regime pre-dated the arrival of Europeans. Professor Sakéj Henderson, commenting on
the views expressed by early Europeans in the region, stated:
Neither European adventurers nor missionary priests of the seventeenth century
who encountered the sacred order of the Mikmaq (Mikmaki) perceived an
unorganised society. They did not find the anarchy that their state of nature theory
presumed. Instead, they reported a natural order, with a well-defined system of
consensual government and both an international and domestic law.142
In other words, at the date of sovereignty, there was a clearly defined territory over which the
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Mi’kmaq exercised exclusive occupation, evidenced not only by their use of the land, but by the
existence of complex social, political, and economic structures linking communities across the
region.143
Domestically, the Mi’kmaq political order was structured in part by the regulation of
hunting grounds. Hunting groups were “composed of people related through marriage.”144 These
groups “held exclusive hunting, trapping, and fishing rights over a clearly defined territory” and
had the authority to request compensation from interlopers.145 Hunting grounds in the 17th
century were distributed by the “head of the nation,” indicating a degree of centralized
governance beyond the leaders of individual hunting groups. In the 1690’s, the missionary
Chrestien Le Clercq observed that among the Mi’kmaq of the Gaspé Peninsula (in present day
Québec), hunting grounds were distributed “according to the customs of the country, which serve
as laws and regulations to the Gaspesians.”146 At some point Mi’kmaw territory became divided
into seven hunting districts covering all of present day Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island,
eastern New Brunswick, and the Gaspé region of Québec.147
While the division of hunting grounds was essential to Mi’kmaw political structures and
conceptions of territoriality, the use of hunting grounds was primarily a winter activity. In the
summer, hunting groups congregated in summer villages along the coastline adjacent to the
territory they occupied during the winter months. Summer villages played an important role in
governance, where “affairs were governed through a collective decision making process
involving adult village members.”148 Drawing on his analysis of the negotiation and signing of
the 1726 treaty, Professor Wicken has illustrated that “individual leaders were delegated to
143
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represent the interests of a broader political entity, the summer village.” 149 Mi’kmaw political
organization in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, then, was characterized by two distinct
elements. Hunting territories, assigned by regional leaders “based on permissions by local,
regional or national consensus,”150 were occupied by extended families related by marriage who
held rights to occupy, and use resources in, specified areas. In the summer months, families
gathered in summer villages where political decisions were made, including the identification of
suitable marriage partners for political purposes. Summer villages were the decision-making
centres of the broader political community. This domestic legal and political framework was
made possible by the fact that the Mi’kmaq recognized “an affiliation that superseded their
family and hunting group. It was this relationship to this territory that formed how individual
Mi’kmaq conceptualized the world.”151 While political affiliation was grounded as much by
relationships to people and places as geography, a sense of territoriality prevailed at both local
(hunting group) and regional levels.152 Thus, Professor Wicken argues that “the territorial
division of lands for the winter hunt created boundaries within Mi’kmaw society as well as
customary laws governing the land and each family’s relationship to it” and “that this
relationship identified individual groups of families as inhabiting defined areas, where they
enjoyed specific rights and obligations.”153 The seven districts further formalized the political
nature of these divisions. To this one might add the presence of dispute resolution mechanisms,
evidenced for example by the protocols regarding restitution for trespass, as further
substantiating the characterization of the Mi’kmaq political order as a legal regime. 154
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Professor Henderson has argued persuasively that the Mi’kmaq legal and political order
also extended to the international sphere. The international elements of Mi’kmaw law were
recognized both by other Aboriginal nations and by the imperial European powers, evidenced,
for example, by the fact that in 1719 the British instructed the newly commissioned governor,
Richard Philipps, “to deal with the Mi’kmaq according to the protocols of Algonkian
diplomacy.”155 The British not only recognized that the Mi’kmaq had existing diplomatic
protocols, they instructed their early governors in Nova Scotia to engage the Mi’kmaq according
to those protocols.156 The existence of the Wabanaki Confederacy is further evidence of the
international scope of Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy law. When Europeans arrived in
the 16th century, the the Wabanaki Confederacy included the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, Penobscot, and
Passamaquoddy, groups inhabiting the present day Maritime Provinces, the Gaspé Peninsula, and
parts of New England.157 While the Wabanaki Confederacy was an important pan-national
alliance, it was only one part of a broader international legal order, the “Nikmanen Order,” in
framework governing such resolution. As Professor Val Napoleon has argued, a theoretical view of Indigenous law
qua law can also be grounded in a positivist framework. Napoleon argues that the legal traditions of the Gitksan
exhibit the same second order rule making capacity required by Hartian positivism, which Hart assumes is the
exclusive purview of a Westphalian nation-state. See Valerie Ruth Napoleon, Ayook: Gitksan Legal Order, Law,
And Legal Theory (PhD Diss. University of Victoria, 2009) at 240 – 261. In speaking of Indigenous constitutional
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Every state, by the mere fact that it is a state, i.e., something more than a disconnected number of individuals who
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from other political societies: there must be certain ways in which the various elements or parts of which it is
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which the Mi’kmaq understood themselves to be active agents.158 The nations of the Nikmanen
Order were allied by consensus and, as such, “[t]he Nikmanen Order illustrates the development
of a voluntary transnational law that was not based on the family structure. Instead the order was
based on consensual agreements among the indigenous federations and European
monarchies.”159
The nation-to-nation engagement displayed by members of the Wabanaki Confederacy,
both in their dealings with each other and imperial powers, provides further evidence of their
domestic political organization. As Professor Wicken has argued, “[s]ince the Mi’kmaq
participated in treaty negotiations, they must have had the political capacity to do so. They must
have had an explicit political order and common political will or they could not have exerted any
influence on the treaty making process.”160 A group lacking a clear domestic political order, in
other words, could not engage in substantive treaty negotiations. As with the Mi’kmaq the
Maliseet presence at treaty negotiations and their role in regional diplomacy indicates the
existence of a domestic political order able to facilitate such involvement.161
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At the dates of British assertions of sovereignty, then, exclusive Aboriginal occupation
can be demonstrated in much of the Maritime region. This is evidenced both by acts of physical
occupation and by the existence of legal and political regimes governing the use and occupation
of the territory. This is not to say that occupation sufficient to ground a declaration of Aboriginal
title can or will be demonstrated over the entirety of this territory. As in the trial decision in
Tsilhqot’in, evidence of “presence” throughout a “traditional territory” can be recognized while
falling short of the evidentiary requirements required to establish title.162 It should also be
mentioned that, though I have focused above on the period around the date of British
sovereignty, the legal regimes of Aboriginal peoples in the region continue to exist and were
recognized as continuing to govern their internal affairs well into the 19th century. In 1823, for
example, Nova Scotia Judge T.C. Haliburton wrote of the Mikmaq that “[t]hey never litigate or
are in any way impleaded. They have a code of traditionary and customary laws among
themselves.”163 The Mi’kmaq consistently refused to accept colonial jurisdiction over matters
they considered internal to them or protected by treaty. As Professor L.F.S. Upton wrote,
“[e]very local jurisdiction passed ordinances at one time or another to regulate, among other
things, the taking of fish and the lighting of fires in the woods. In moving around the provinces,
the Micmacs would not observe such restrictions. They set their camps regardless of the title
deeds of newly arrived settlers.”164 While the colonial and imperial governments understood the
importance of regulating the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and newly arrived settlers,
“the British had no real interest in attempting to regulate the Natives' internal criminal and civil
affairs” and the “Mi'kmaqs and Maliseets continued largely outside the practicalities of the
colonizing power's legal system” well into the 19th century.165
The fact that the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy were there, living on the land
in organized societies, is reason enough to believe that their occupation would have been
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sufficient to ground Aboriginal title. The “intention to control” land, so important following
Tsilhqot’in, is evidenced by the exclusive nature of the respective group’s occupation of their
territory and by the clear sense of territoriality evidenced by their domestic, regional, and
international legal regimes. Further, the intention to control is a common law requirement.
Following Delgamuukw, Aboriginal notions of property and territoriality should be used not only
as evidence of occupation on the common law standard; the content of title itself is shaped by
these Aboriginal perspectives and the evidence required to prove title must be interpreted in a
manner that substantiates the sui generis nature of the right. In light of this, we can assume that
title existed to lands in the Maritime Provinces at the dates of British sovereignty. Before moving
on to the question of whether this title has been extinguished, I will first look to the treaties of
peace and friendship, which I will argue both recognize Aboriginal title and provide valuable
insights into Aboriginal conceptions of territoriality and land use from which the basis for
assessing title in the Maritime Provinces can be derived.

D. Title by Treaty
In addition to the usual method of proving title through historical occupation, it is also
possible that title may be recognized and affirmed by treaty in the Maritime Provinces.166 It is
166
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widely acknowledged that the treaties in the Maritime Provinces did not cede land to the
Crown.167 Though it is correct to state that the treaties did not cede land, it is often mistakenly
thought that this is a result of the fact that the treaties “said nothing about land.”168 This view
overlooks the fact that the treaty of 1726 treaty dealt explicitly with the future settlement of land,
the status of existing British settlements, and the status of Aboriginal lands vis-à-vis these
settlements.169 To understand how the 1726 treaty recognizes and affirms Aboriginal title, we
must look to both the text of the treaty and the historical context in which the treaties were
signed.
Clause 3 of the Articles of Peace and Agreement contained in the 1726 treaty states that
“the Indians shall not molest any of His Majesty’s Subjects or their Dependants in their
Settlements already made or Lawfully to be made.”170 As discussed above, the British settlement
in the region in 1726 was limited to the fort at Annapolis. Even after the founding of Halifax in
1749 the British had very little presence outside the two established forts. The Acadian presence
was larger than it had been in 1713, though still confined to lands under agricultural
development. By the terms of the treaty, then, any settlement to occur outside those settlements
must have occurred ‘lawfully.’ As Professor Wicken has pointed out, though, the term ‘lawfully’
was not defined in the written versions of the treaty. Nonetheless, an analysis of both the broader
British policy concerning the acquisition of Indian lands and the unique historical context of the
treaties entered into by the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy provides clear sign posts.
The prevailing British policy in the 17th and 18th centuries was to purchase Indian lands
before settling them.171 This policy guided the contemplations of the treaty signatories in the
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Maritime Provinces, a view supported not only by wording of the 1726 treaty, but also by the
royal instructions to early colonial governors and the historical context of the treaties. An
understanding of the 18th century treaties must be developed with reference to the earlier
Abenaki treaties. Recalling that the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy were close allies of
the Abenaki as members of the Wabanaki Confederacy, these earlier treaties, four of which were
signed from 1678 -1713, provide valuable insights into how the parties would have approached
later treaty negotiations.172 The third clause in the 1726 Articles of Peace and Agreement, that
which prohibited unlawful future settlements, was drawn explicitly from the earlier Abenaki
treaties.173 Those treaties clearly sought to restrict further settlement to areas agreed upon at the
time the treaties were signed and considered purchase, or another form of explicit Aboriginal
permission, to be the appropriate means through which the Crown could acquire land for further
settlements.174 Indeed, it was the encroachment of British settlement beyond the borders the
Abenaki understood to be established by the treaties that led to the war of 1722 – 1725; as
Professor Wicken stated, the “war was about land.”175 The Mi’kmaq and Maliseet joined the
Abenaki as allies against the British in this conflict, which eventually gave rise to the treaty
negotiations of 1725.176 The 1726 treaty, then, was the product of long-standing disputes over
British settlement.
The perspective of the Aboriginal negotiators on the issue of settlement was made clear
when peace was negotiated in July of 1725. The Penobscot delegates rejected the British claim to

something not to be taken from him except by his consent and then upon such consideration as should be agreed
upon.”
172
John G. Reid, Essays On Northeaster North America: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2008) at 155. Professor Wicken argues that “[t]he experience of the Abenaki would
have been central to how Mi’kmaq leaders understood British policies.”: Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties, supra note 116
at 128.
173
The 1713 Treaty, for example, to which the Maliseet were signatories, clearly conceived of two types of land,
those already under British settlement, and the Indian lands outside those settlements. It stated in part: “That her
Majesty’s Subjects, the English, shall & may peaceably & quietly enter upon, improve, & forever enjoy, all and
singular their Rights of Land & former Settlements, Properties, & possessions, within the Eastern Parts of the said
Provinces of the Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire, together with all the Islands, Islets, Shoars, Beaches, &
Fisheries within the same, without any molestation or claims by us or any other Indians, And be in no wais
molested, interrupted, or disturbed therein. Saving unto the said Indians their own Grounds, and free liberty for
Hunting, Fishing, Fowling, and all other their Lawful Liberties & Privileges.” W. Daugherty, Maritime Indian
Treaties in Historical Perspective, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Research Branch , 2d ed, Ottawa 1983 at 70
– 71.
174
The war of 1722 – 1725 was a result of “the British intent to enclose lands and Abenaki attempts to mark the
limits of English settlement.” Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties, supra note 116 at 74.
175
Ibid. at 87.
176
Ibid. at 79; See also Prins, supra note 157 at 137 – 140.

42

dominion over their lands and, further, rejected the British claim to be ‘master’ of the lands they
had purchased.177 This later claim is particularly notable, as it suggests that, far from accepting
British sovereignty, the Aboriginal delegates viewed themselves as maintaining sovereignty even
over lands purchased and settled on by the British.178 That the delegates believed their consent to
be required for British settlement to occur is further evidenced by the response of Penobscot
delegate Loron Sagourrab to the British request that he acknowledge the fighting of 1722 – 1725
to have been the fault of the Abenaki. Sagourrab stated simply that he had not come to the
negotiations to ask pardon, make submission, or receive commands, but rather to hear
propositions for a settlement the British hoped to establish.179 In other words, the delegates
believed that future British settlement was something that had to be negotiated and receive their
approval. The delegates rejected the notion that they had submitted to the authority of the King
of England; Sagourrab stated: “I recognize him King of all his lands, but… do not hence infer
that I acknowledge thy King as my King, and King of my lands.”180 In Professor Wicken’s view,
“[i]t was the British claim to their lands that the Abenaki found most puzzling.”181
The perspectives of the delegates at the July 1725 peace conference shed light on the
prevailing Aboriginal perspective held by the individual Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy
communities tasked with ratifying the subsequent treaty. That treaty, on which negotiations
began in Boston on November 11th of 1725, was again negotiated by delegates of the Abenaki,
177

Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties, supra note 116 at 84. Negotiations began in Boston in mid-July of 1725 with a
cessation of arms being announced on July 31st. The Mi’kmaq and Maliseet were represented at the July 1725
conference by two Penobscot delegates, Loron Sagourrab and John Ehennekouit, while the British were represented
by the Lieutenant-Governor of Massachusetts William Dummer. The treaty would later be ratified by individual
communities: Ibid. at 83.
178
This reflects the early Mi’kmaw view of Acadian settlement, in which they considered the Acadians to have a
usufructuary right only. Dickason, supra note 57 at 108. It also speaks to one of the essential grounds of the treaty.
Through the treaty, the British were attempting to get Aboriginal support for the treaty of Utrecht by recognizing the
British acquisition of sovereignty.
179
Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties, supra note 116 at 84.
180
Ibid. For Loron Sagourrab’s full statement see Colin G. Calloway, ed., The World Turned Upside Down: Indian
Voices From Early America. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1994) at 92 – 94.
181
Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties, supra note 116 at 85. The British account of the July peace conference differed and it
seems that the parties left the conference with differing interpretation of their agreement. The Aboriginal delegates’
views, expressed above, differed from the British account, recorded in English, which stated that the Abenaki had
assumed responsibility for the war, submitted to the authority of the English King, promised to honour previous
purchases of Abenaki lands, and agreed that disputes between the “Indians and Englishmen” would be settled by
British law. The perspective of the Aboriginal delegates discussed above was a view expressed by them some six
months later, recounting what had transpired and rejecting that British interpretation. As Professor Wicken has
pointed out, the later reliance on the written British copy of the text to “demonstrate that the Penobscot had
recognized New England’s title to the lands along the Kennebec [River]” was “a good example of how British
officials used a written text to enforce agreements that emphasized their own understanding at the expense of native
people’s understanding.”

43

Penobscot, Maliseet, and Mi’kmaq along with representatives from both Massachusetts and
Nova Scotia.182 Two treaties were signed on December 15 of 1725, one between the Mi’kmaq,
Maliseet, and Nova Scotia, the other between the Abenaki, Penobscot, New Hampshire and
Massachusetts. Together, these formed the basis of the relationship between the British colonies
of north-eastern North America and the Aboriginal peoples of the region.183
The interpretation of the Penobscot delegates to the July peace conference underscores
the perspective that the Aboriginal parties brought to the subsequent treaty. Like the Abenaki, the
Mi’kmaq rejected the assumed British jurisdiction over their lands and asserted that settlement
could only occur with their consent.184 The Mi’kmaq rejected the British assertion that the right
of the British to settle lands in Nova Scotia had been acquired from France, stating that the King
of France never possessed such a right and that only they had the capacity to grant lands. 185 This
returns us to the issue of whether the phrase “lawfully to be made” should be interpreted as
meaning “having been purchased or otherwise ceded.” Though the British insisted that previous
purchases be recognized and that they had jurisdiction over the entirety of the land in the
colonies in question, they accepted the need to purchase lands or otherwise obtain Aboriginal
consent before settling them. Thus, Massachusetts negotiators at the 1725 treaty conference
stated, “[w]hen we come to Settle the Bounds We shall neither build or settle any where but
within our own Bounds so settled, without your Consent” and further promised that “you shall
certainly be paid for such Lands as you shall hereafter dispose of to the English.”186
British settlement was further restricted by another clause of the 1726 treaty. The treaty
promised that the “Indians shall not be molested in their persons, Hunting, Fishing, Planting
Grounds nor any other of their Lawfull Occasions.”187 Lawful settlement under the treaty, then,
182
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was not only contingent on Aboriginal consent, “[s]ettlements ‘lawfully to be made’ were those
which did not infringe on the areas the Mi’kmaq used for hunting, fishing, and planting.” 188 That
is, the treaty recognized that the lands used and occupied by the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet would
bound future settlement. As Professor Wicken stated:
In the name of King George, Doucett acknowledged the right of the Mi’kmaq to
the lands they used… the British accepted that at the same time as farmers were
cultivating land and raising livestock, the Mi’kmaq would live as they had before
on other parcels of land outside the British and Acadian settlements.189
This is particularly notable in light of the role that the division of hunting grounds played in both
the Mi’kmaq social and political order and in the development of a clear sense of territoriality
associated with those hunting grounds.
Further evidence that the British had come to accept the need to purchase lands before
settling them in Nova Scotia and the broader region is evident from the wording of the royal
commissions and instructions sent to early governors in the colony. A standard commission
included a clause reading:
And we do hereby likewise give and grant unto you full power and authority, by
and with the advice and consent of our said Council, to settle and agree with the
inhabitants of our province and territories aforesaid, for such lands, tenements,
and hereditaments, as now are, or hereafter shall be in our power to dispose of,
and then to grant to any person or persons upon such terms, and under such
moderate quit-rents, services, and acknowledgments, to be thereupon reserved
unto us, as you, by and with the advice aforesaid, shall think fit.190
This clause, which was included in commissions to the early governors of Nova Scotia, is
notable as it seems to direct the governor to purchase or otherwise acquire the consent of the
Aboriginal inhabitants of the colony – to “settle and agree” with them - before granting the lands
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to settlers.191 As will be discussed, in Chapter 3, however, it is not entirely clear that
“inhabitants” should uniformly be read to include Aboriginal peoples. If it is read to include
Aboriginal peoples, this clause seems to incorporate the treaty provisions regarding the
acquisition of land.
Both the broader historical context of early British colonial policy and the specific history
of British treaties with the Wabanaki suggest strongly that the term “lawfully” in the 1726 treaty,
when used to refer to future settlements, should be understood to mean purchased or otherwise
ceded and should be read as creating a restriction on settlement that would adversely affect
Aboriginal use and occupation of land for hunting, fishing, and other “lawfull occasions.” 192 As
will be discussed in Chapter 3, this requirement should have a bearing on the issue of
extinguishment of Aboriginal title in the Maritime Provinces, as the treaties created legally
binding guidelines for the acquisition and settlement of Aboriginal lands, guidelines that, if not
adhered to, would prevent the valid extinguishment of title by rendering any such purported
extinguishment illegal. The issue here, though, is demonstrating the existence of title. Though
the source of Aboriginal title is grounded in Aboriginal peoples’ prior occupation of the territory
in question, the land provisions of the 1726 treaty recognize an Aboriginal interest in land by
requiring that the Aboriginal interest be purchased or ceded before settlement could occur. A
policy of acquiring the Aboriginal interest in land prior to settlement would clearly be
inconsistent with a belief that they held no interest in the land. Further, provisions recognizing
the right to continue to use and occupy lands other than those set aside for settlement also
recognized an Aboriginal right to use and occupy the land. As with other treaty and Aboriginal
rights, the treaties recognize, rather than create, Aboriginal title. Though this does not speak to
the extent of title recognized by the treaties, it may be used as evidence of the existence of title at
191
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the time of the assertion of sovereignty and, further, places a legal restriction on the settlement of
any Aboriginal lands after 1726. The treaties, and the negotiations leading up to them, should
also be used to inform a future court’s interpretation of the “Aboriginal perspective.”
This interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court’s holdings on treaty interpretation.
In interpreting a treaty between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, courts “must take into
account the historical context and perception each party might have as to the nature of the
undertaking contained in the document under consideration.”193 In interpreting the historical
context of the treaty and the perceptions of the signatories, courts are required to give the treaty a
“just, broad and liberal construction”194 and resolve ambiguities and uncertainties “in favour of
the Indians.”195 In Sioui, Lamer J approvingly cited decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Jones v. Meehan,196 where the Court held that a “treaty must therefore be construed, not
according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they
would naturally be understood by the Indians.”197 In Marshall # 1, the Supreme Court confirmed
that extrinsic evidence may be used in the interpretation of treaties even where there is no
evident ambiguity in the treaty.198 Crucially, the Court in Marshall #1 held that “where a treaty
was concluded verbally and afterwards written up by representatives of the Crown, it would be
unconscionable for the Crown to ignore the oral terms while relying on the written terms.”199 The
liberal approach to treaty interpretation is grounded in the presumption that the Crown took an
honourable approach to treaty making such that a flexible interpretation must be applied,
including the use of “context and implied terms to make honourable sense of the treaty
arrangement” and the terms of the treaty.200 In this context, the discussion provided above
regarding the historical background of the treaties and the Aboriginal perspectives on their
crucial clauses concerning settlement and land use suggest that a faithful application of the
193
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Supreme Court’s clear jurisprudence on treaty interpretation indicates that the treaties should be
interpreted as both recognizing and providing a range of protection to the Aboriginal interest in
land.
This was the position taken by Turnbull J. at the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench
in the Thomas Peter Paul decision.201 Here, Mr. Peter Paul, a New Brunswick Mi’kmaq, was
charged with illegally removing logs from Crown lands without a license. The defense argued
that Mr. Peter Paul had a treaty right to harvest timber from Crown lands and, as such, did not
require a license to do so. The Crown Lands and Forests Act202, the defence argued, could not
prevent Mr. Peter Paul from exercising his constitutionally protected treaty right to harvest
timber. At the trial level Justice Arsenault agreed with the defence, acquitting Mr. Peter Paul of
the charges and holding that the treaty of 1726 protected the right to harvest timber for
commercial purposes on a small scale. Such activity, Arsenault J. held, was a “lawfull occasion”
as described in the treaty. On appeal at the Court of Queen’s Bench, Turnbull J. went further.
While he agreed with Arsenault J’s conclusion that the defendant should be acquitted, Turnbull J.
held that an acquittal was justified not on the basis that the treaty of 1726 protected a right to
harvest lumber off Crown land, but because the treaty protected a right to the land itself. He
stated:
I am of the opinion that the Indians of New Brunswick do have land rights and
that such are treaty rights. I believe it is like a usufructuary right. It does not
matter what such rights are called. It is not a right restricted to personal use, but a
full blown right of beneficial ownership and possession in keeping with the
concept of this is our land - that is your land.203
Put otherwise, on Turnbull J’s interpretation the treaty of 1726 clearly distinguished between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal lands and was designed to protect the Aboriginal interest in those
lands. As he stated, “[g]overnments must accept that Dummer's Treaty was understood to protect
Indian land.”204 Further, while stating that the Aboriginal interest was “like a usufructuary right,”
Turnbull J. clearly distinguished the type of interest he had in mind from a merely usufructuary
right, holding that the Aboriginal interest encompassed both beneficial ownership and a right of
possession. This view is commensurate with that described above where it was argued that the
treaty of 1726 recognized, affirmed, and protected Aboriginal title. Given that Turnbull J. did not
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call into question British sovereignty itself, it seems clear that he believed that the British
assertion of sovereignty “did not affect the existence of aboriginal title in the Province, other
than to give the Crown an underlying title to the soil.”205
On appeal, however, Turnbull J. was overturned. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal
held that the 1726 Treaty “does not create or acknowledge and aboriginal title to land. Indeed, by
it Mr. Peter Paul’s ancestors acknowledge not only the Crown's jurisdiction and dominion over
the lands, but also the Crown's title and rightful possession to the lands.”206 For reasons that have
been detailed above, this conclusion does not appear to be consonant with the intention of either
the British or Aboriginal signatories to the treaty. While the Court of Appeal properly identified
the Supreme Court’s guidelines concerning treaty interpretation discussed above, it held that
there was insufficient evidence tendered at trial to conclusively resolve the ambiguities in the
terms of the treaty.207 Thus, the Court of Appeal overturned both Turnbull J.’s ambitious
decision and the more reserved decision of the trial court recognizing a treaty right to harvest
timber commercially on a small scale.208 While the Court of Appeal dismissed Turnbull J.’s
findings regarding treaty protected Aboriginal land rights in New Brunswick, they rebuked his
decision much more forcefully on other grounds. The Court of Appeal held that Turnbull J. had
taken judicial notice of disputed historical facts well beyond the permissible scope of such
notice, had decided a matter that had not been argued before the court, had relied on his own
external research rather than the evidence put properly before the court, and had decided points
of law on which neither party to the case had be given the opportunity to make representations to
the court.209 In the result, the Court of Appeal stated that the case had “evolved from an alleged
regulatory violation at trial to…a land claim to the entire Province by the status Indians of New
Brunswick.”210 Thus, there is good reason to treat the decision of the Court of Appeal with some
skepticism. While the Court did clearly reject Turnbull J.’s findings regarding a treaty protected
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right to land, it did so largely on procedural and technical grounds. The Court of Appeal’s
analysis of the substantive issue of treaty protected land rights was cursory and relied on an
evidentiary record put forward to argue a separate matter (the Court having stated that Turnbull
J. relied on external materials which they could not consider). The question of whether the peace
and friendship treaties protect an Aboriginal right to land should be properly argued before a
court with the assistance of a complete evidentiary record. As argued above, there is good reason
to believe that a court may decide such a case differently if the matter were properly pleaded on
the basis of a more complete evidentiary record.

E. Summary
There is good reason to assume that Aboriginal title can be proven to have existed in the
Maritime Provinces. Though the exact parameters of that title are subject to future research, the
historical record clearly indicates that there had been very little displacement of Aboriginal
peoples by European settlement at the dates of the British assertion of sovereignty. Knowing that
the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy peoples were living in the region, governing it
through their indigenous legal, social, political, and economic structures, it is clear that the
degree of occupation required by the Supreme Court to establish title can be evidenced
somewhere. Further, the Supreme Court’s explicit embrace of the territorial conception of title
expands the geographical range over which title is likely to be found. Additionally, the treaties
should be relied on not only as evidence that title was not ceded, but also as evidence of
recognition by the British of Mi’kmaw title and as a body of law governing future dealings
concerning Aboriginal lands. Having established that title is very likely to have existed in the
Maritime Provinces, the remainder of this paper will focus on the question of extinguishment.

50

2.

Modes of Extinguishment: Voluntary Surrender and Unilateral
Legislation

Assuming, for the reasons outlined above, that Aboriginal title can be demonstrated to have
existed in the Maritime Provinces, the central question becomes one of extinguishment; that is,
where Aboriginal title can be proven to have existed, has it been legally extinguished? This
chapter outlines the ways in which Aboriginal title was capable of being extinguished in both the
pre-confederation and post-confederation eras. Having articulated the legal framework governing
extinguishment, subsequent chapters will provide an assessment of instances of possible
extinguishment in the Maritime Provinces with the aim of assessing whether unextinguished
Aboriginal title continues to exist in the region.
Historically, extinguishment of Aboriginal rights and title could occur in two ways at
common law: by voluntary surrender or unilaterally through legislation. 1 Since Aboriginal rights
received constitutional protection in 1982, they are no longer extinguishable through unilateral
legislation and any infringement of such rights must be justified pursuant to the standards
established by the Supreme Court.2 Accordingly, voluntary surrender is now the only means by
which title may be extinguished. As McLachin CJ stated in Marshall/Bernard:
The common law theory underlying recognition of aboriginal title holds that an
aboriginal group which occupied land at the time of European sovereignty and
never ceded or otherwise lost its right to that land, continues to enjoy title to it.
Prior to constitutionalization of aboriginal rights in 1982, aboriginal title could be
extinguished by clear legislative act (see Van der Peet, at para. 125). Now that is
not possible.3
This extinguishment framework is derived from both the common law and the
constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights. The source of Aboriginal title is Aboriginal people’s
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rights and required their extinguishment by cession, conquest or legislation.” [Van der Peet]. See also R v Sparrow
[1990] 1 SCR 1075 at paras 35-37 [Sparrow]; Mitchell v MNR [2001] 1 SCR 911 at para 11 [Mitchell].
2
Van der Peet, supra note 1 at para 28. See also Mitchell, supra note 1 at para 11 where McLachlin CJ stated that
“[t]he common law status of Aboriginal rights rendered them vulnerable to unilateral extinguishment, and thus they
were "dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign": see St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen
(1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.), at p. 54. This situation changed in 1982, when Canada's constitution was amended to
entrench existing Aboriginal and treaty rights.”
3
R v Marshall; R v Bernard, [2005] 2 SCR 220 at para 39 [Marshall; Bernard].
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prior occupation of the land.4 Aboriginal rights, including title, survived the assertions of
sovereignty of colonizing European powers and, as such, continue to exist until they are legally
extinguished. Thus, the “existing Aboriginal and treaty rights” recognized and affirmed under
s.35(1) are those which had not been extinguished prior to April 17, 1982. As Professor Slattery
explains:
…the phrase "existing aboriginal and treaty rights" does not cover rights
extinguished by legislation or other acts before the commencement date. In
principle, then, no conflict can arise between rights "existing" on that date and
acts passed before then, because the former are defined and limited by the latter.
The real problem is determining whether an act passed before the commencement
date actually extinguished the right in question.5
Assessing whether a given right has been extinguished, then, requires an analysis of whether the
right has been voluntarily surrendered or unilaterally extinguished by legislation prior to 1982.
Prior to 1982, extinguishing Aboriginal title by unilateral legislation required that two criteria be
met: the legislative body must have been competent to legislate in respect of both common law
property rights and Aboriginal lands - that is, the legislation must not have been ultra vires the
legislative body which enacted it - and the legislation in question must not have been repugnant
to higher order constitutional laws or principles by which the legislative body was bound. 6
Though title can no longer be extinguished through unilateral extinguishment, these principles
remain fundamental in assessing the historical dispossession of Aboriginal lands and determining
the continued existence of Aboriginal title.7 In the context of this paper, this mode of
extinguishment will be of central significance. Should legislation be found which meets these
criteria, a further common law requirement stipulates that the intention to extinguish rights must
have been “clear and plain.”

4

Calder v. British Columbia (A.G), [1973] SCR 313 at 328 [Calder]; Guerin Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 SCR
335 at 376 [Guerin]; Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at paras 114, 126 [Delgamuukw].
5
Brian Slattery, “The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” (1984) 32:2 The American Journal of
Comparative Law 361 at 385 [Slattery, “Hidden Constitution”]. See also Sparrow, supra note 1 at para 23 where
Lamer CJ and LaForest J stated that “[t]he word "existing" makes it clear that the rights to which s. 35(1) applies are
those that were in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect. This means that extinguished rights
are not revived by the Constitution Act, 1982. A number of courts have taken the position that "existing"' means
being in actuality in 1982.”
6
Framing this as an issue of competence and repugnancy was adopted from Bruce Clark’s argument in Native
Liberty, Crown Sovereignty. See Bruce Clark, Native Liberty, Crown Sovereignty: The Existing Aboriginal Right of
Self-Government in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press: Montreal & Kingston, 1990) at 71 [Clark, Native
Liberty, Crown Sovereignty].
7
As described above, existing Aboriginal rights in s.35(1) are rights that were not extinguished prior to s.35 coming
into force: Sparrow, supra note 1 at 1090.
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A. Voluntary Surrender
The practice of acquiring the Aboriginal interest in land prior to settlement, be it by
purchase or cession, dates to the earliest days of British colonization.8 The ability of Aboriginal
peoples to voluntarily enter into agreements with the Crown that have the effect of extinguishing
title has never been questioned; rather, “[i]t has always been considered possible for a native
people to cede aboriginal lands to the Crown by treaty, and this historical practice is reflected in
the wording of sec. 35(1).”9 This policy was given legal force in the Royal Proclamation, 1763,
which “laid down a uniform legal regime governing native title, whereby native groups were
recognized as holding communal rights to their unceded lands, subject only to a restriction of
alienation.”10 As Professor Slattery stated, “[t]he Proclamation of 1763 has a profound
significance for modern Canada. Under its terms, aboriginal peoples held continuing rights to
their lands except where these rights have been extinguished by voluntary cession.” 11 In other
words, the Proclamation not only established legal parameters for acquiring Aboriginal lands, it
also confirmed that Aboriginal land rights were communally held, continued to exist where they
had not been extinguished, and that they could, from that point on, be extinguished only by
voluntary surrender to the Crown.12
Following the Royal Proclamation, Aboriginal title could not be extinguished by transfer
to any party other than the Crown, owing to the general inalienability of Aboriginal lands to any
party other than the Crown; that is, transfers of land to parties other than the Crown could not be
8

Banner, Stuart. How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2005) at 48; Dickason, Olive Patricia. Canada’s First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples From Earliest
Times (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992) at 109.
9
Slattery, “Hidden Constitution”, supra note 5 at 387.
10
Ibid. at 373. The necessity to clear Aboriginal title by treaty has long been recognized as a legal imperative. See
for example the description of the signing of the numbered treaties as a “legal imperative” from the Crown
perspective in James Daschuk, Clearing the Plains: Disease, Politics of Starvation, and the Loss of Aboriginal Life
(Regina: University of Regina Press, 2013) at 79.
11
Slattery, “Hidden Constitution”, supra note 5 at 372. It is also important to note that the Proclamation should not
be read as a product of Crown benevolence. Eric Kades, for example, has pointed out that one function of
prohibiting alienation to parties other than the Crown was to create a monopsony in favour of the Crown. See Eric
Kades, “History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M’Intosh” (2001) 19:1 Law and History Review
67 at 111-112.
12
As such, the Proclamation recognized, rather than created, Aboriginal title. See Guerin, supra note 3 at 379. The
authority to legislatively extinguish title could not have existed until such time as the jurisdiction of the Imperial
Parliament was extended over the lands in question through the acquisition of sovereignty. In the Maritime
Provinces, then, the possibility of legislative extinguishment pre-dated the Proclamation.
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made legally and, therefore, could not have had the effect of validly extinguishing title.13 The
prohibition on alienation derived from the Royal Proclamation remained in force postconfederation until the Statute of Westminster in 1931 and restrictions on alienability of Indian
reserve lands have been incorporated into the Indian Act.14 In Chippewas of Sarnia, the Ontario
Court of Appeal held that the legal framework established by the Royal Proclamation, in
particular the prohibitions on alienation and the procedural requirements governing the
acquisition of Aboriginal lands, were and are a part of the common law and exist independently
of the Proclamation.15
As Professor McNeil has pointed out, however, this framework governing the voluntary
surrender of lands fails to take into account the fact that an absolute surrender of title may not
have been permissible under given indigenous legal regimes.16 McNeil argues that “where the
law of an Aboriginal nation prohibits an absolute transfer of that nation's title, voluntary
extinguishment by treaty or land claims agreement would not be possible.”17 This can be
construed in two ways. First, it could be presumed that Aboriginal nations have acted in a
manner that does not violate their own laws. This presumption should not be read so as to
minimize Aboriginal agency or capacity to surrender lands and enter into meaningful treaty
negotiations. Rather, it should be used as an interpretive tool in resolving ambiguities and
interpreting historical context where surrenders are relied on as evidence of extinguishment. On
this view, evidence of historical surrenders would be assessed first with reference to the
prevailing indigenous laws governing such surrenders. Should that law be found to prohibit such
surrenders, that finding would colour the interpretation of the evidence relied on to demonstrate
the validity of the surrender.18 Second, the Supreme Court has been clear in stating that the
nature of Aboriginal title itself is shaped in part by the “Aboriginal perspective.” 19 Incorporation
13

Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, Jurisprudence” (2002) 33
Ottawa LR 301 (QL) at 3 [McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title”].
14
On inalienability Kent McNeil, “Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title” (2002) 47 McGill L
J 473.
15
Chippewas of Sarnia Band v Canada (Attorney General), [2000] OJ No. 4804; 51 OR (3d) 641 at paras 195 – 99.
Inalienability has also been recognized as a characteristic of Aboriginal title quite apart from the Royal
Proclamation: see Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 113; Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at
para 74. Inalienability except to the Crown was also given statutory force in respect of Indian reserve lands in the
Indian Act (RSC, 1985, c-I-5) ss.37 – 39.
16
McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title”, supra note 13 at 4
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid. at 5.
19
Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at paras 82-83, 112, 147-149.
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of the Aboriginal perspective requires that courts interpret historical facts in a manner that does
not unfairly prejudice Aboriginal claimants (e.g. looking to the carrying capacity of territory in
interpreting what population numbers say about the intensity of land use).20 Further, it requires
that Aboriginal laws and legal traditions be taken into consideration. The incorporation of the
Aboriginal perspective bears not only on the evidentiary standard for establishing title, but also
on the very nature of the title interest itself. As Lamer CJ stated in Delgamuukw, Aboriginal title
is “sui generis in the sense that its characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference
either to the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property found in aboriginal
legal systems.”21 That is, the characteristics of the interest protected by Aboriginal title are
shaped in part by Aboriginal legal systems. At a practical level, then, a prohibition on the
absolute surrender of title under indigenous law would preclude such a surrender if the
Aboriginal party was assumed to be acting in accordance their own law and would provide an
important interpretive lens through which to assess purported surrenders of land. At a theoretical
level, the nature of the proprietary interest itself would prohibit an absolute surrender.22 In this
scenario, the Aboriginal interest in land could not be subject to extinguishment by surrender once
it had “crystallized” at the date of the assertion of British sovereignty as the nature of the interest
itself would be inimical to such extinguishment. These considerations aside, voluntary surrender
is one mode of possible extinguishment of Aboriginal title. The other is unilateral legislative
extinguishment prior to 1982.

B. Legislative Competence
At British and Canadian law, the powers of government are divided between executive,
legislative, and judicial branches.23 In assessing whether a given act of government was
competently carried out, the range of powers belonging to each branch must be clearly identified.
Competence must be assessed both in terms of distinct branches of government (i.e. legislative
20

Ibid. See also Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 15 at para 35-38; Marshall/Bernard, supra note 3 at paras 45-48.
Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 112.
22
For more discussion see, Sakéj Handerson, “Mi’kmaw tenure in Atlantic Canada” (1995) 18 Dalhousie LJ 196 at
216 – 236 [“Mi’kmaw Tenure”].
23
Sir John G. Bourinot, Canada Under British Rule 1760 – 1900 (London: C.J. Clay & Sons, 1900) at 5 [Bourinot,
British Rule]. Hereafter, I will use the phrase “division of powers” to refer to the division of legislative powers in a
federal system and the phrase “separation of powers” to refer to the separation between the executive, legislative and
judicial branches.
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and executive), and in terms of distinct governments operating within the same overarching
constitutional framework. As Lamer C.J. stated in Delgamuukw, “[i]n a federal system such as
Canada’s, the need to determine whether aboriginal rights have been extinguished raises the
question of which level of government has jurisdiction to do so.”24 In the context of the historical
extinguishment of title, this analysis requires an assessment not only of federal and provincial
jurisdiction, but also of colonial and imperial jurisdiction.25 At the outset, it must be noted that
the relationship between the imperial and colonial governments changed considerably over time what was true when peninsular Nova Scotia came under British Sovereignty in 1713 had
changed considerably by the time Nova Scotia’s first assembly was called in 1758, again a
century later when the province had achieved responsible government, and, shortly thereafter,
the terrain shifted again with Nova Scotia joining the Dominion of Canada at confederation. The
principles identified during one period do not necessarily carry over to another. While the most
important distinction is between pre- and post-confederation periods, significant changes also
occurred within each of those eras. During the pre-confederation era the gradual move to
responsible government in the colonies saw their law-making authority increase.26 In the postconfederation era, Canadian independence from imperial influence was gained slowly. As such,
caution must be taken not to speak of the powers of a given level of government in too sweeping
a manner, as the law sees considerable flux over the course of several centuries. When and how
that change occurred is an important part of understanding the nature of the powers themselves
and, while I will confine myself for the most part to the period relevant to this study (sovereignty
until the present), I will supplement this with additional context where appropriate.
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Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 172.
A note on terminology. The relationship between the imperial and colonial governments was directed by a well
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I. Executive and Legislative Authority
Law-making is an activity constitutionally assigned to elected legislatures or bodies
acting upon authority delegated by such a legislature. Executive authority, by contrast, is
typically political or administrative in nature and has its source of authority in statute or royal
prerogative.27 Put otherwise, “[t]he executive power carries out and enforces the law of the land
by the machinery which that law affords,” while “[t]he legislative power makes law and alters
it.”28 The importance of the distinction between executive and legislative authority derives from
the different scope of authority that inheres in each branch of government. In respect of property
rights, it is foundational to the British and Canadian systems of constitutional law and
parliamentary governance that such rights can be extinguished or infringed only under the
auspices of explicit legislative authority.29 Thus, property cannot be taken by the exercise of
prerogative power except if authorized by statute or during wartime and, even then,
compensation is required.30 Private property has been protected from “executive taking” since at
least 1215 when the Magna Carta placed a prohibition on the taking of land by the executive
branch.31 Proprietary interests in land can only be extinguished by lawful authority. Unless
27

Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown and the Relative Rights and Duties of the
Subject (London: Butterworth and Son, 1820) at 2; John Locke & J.W. Gough, ed, The Second Treatise of
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Ballantine, Blackstone’s Commentaries (Chicago: Blackstone Institute, 1915) at 466. As Professor McNeil stated
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legislation.” McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title”, supra note 13 at 9.
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See De Keyser’s, supra note 29 where the Court stated that “the Crown is not entitled in virtue of its ancient
prerogative apart from statute to take the land of a subject compulsorily.” See also Burmah Oil Company (Burma
Trading) Ltd v. Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 at 79, 83 [Burmah Oil], where the Court stated that “[t]he prerogative
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Article 39 of the Magna Carta reads in part: “No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised… unless by
the lawful judgement of his peers, or by the law of the land.” See Mabel Hill & Albert Bushnell Hart. Liberty
Documents: With Contemporary Exposition and Critical Comments Drawn From Various Writers (Cambridge: John
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expressly granted by the legislative branch, the executive does not possess such authority.32
Conversely, there is no inherent limit on the authority of the legislative branch to interfere with
property.33 In the British and Canadian traditions, this authority can be legislatively delegated to
the executive or any other subordinate body.
Courts have relied on principles of statutory interpretation to establish a degree of judicial
oversight over this process, requiring a “clear legislative intent” to legally effectuate the
extinguishment property rights.34 Further, ambiguities will be interpreted as favouring property
owners, and courts will look for compensation to be provided wherever land is taken pursuant to
legislative authority - unless compensation is expressly limited by the legislation itself.35 Courts
have been consistent in stating that the executive branch cannot extinguish property rights in the
absence of clear and plain legislation permitting such an action.36 Before any of the
characteristics unique to Aboriginal title are considered, this should be the basic level of
protection afforded to Aboriginal title lands.37 That is, any protections that Aboriginal title
receives pursuant to its status as an Aboriginal right should be considered in addition to the
protections it receives as a common law property right. Conceptual clarity in this respect is

of his freehold or liberties, or his free customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, but by the
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important to ensure that the sui generis nature of Aboriginal title not be applied in a manner that
derogates from the protections afforded property rights at common law.38
Despite the clear and longstanding principles prohibiting the extinguishment of
proprietary rights by the executive branch, there has been a considerable lack of clarity in
Canadian law concerning the extinguishment of Aboriginal title by unilateral executive act. Two
factors have contributed to this opacity. First, there have been competing arguments regarding
the characterization of Aboriginal title as a proprietary interest. 39 Second, inconsistent
terminology and a lack of substantive judicial analysis regarding the authority of the Imperial
Crown and Imperial Parliament have rendered clarity in respect of jurisdictional issues in the
pre-confederation era difficulty to achieve.
The nature of Aboriginal title (i.e. what type of interest it confers on title holders)
determines which governmental body had the authority to extinguish it. While it has long been
clear that the executive could not unilaterally extinguish proprietary rights, it has perhaps not
always been clear that Aboriginal title should be considered a property right. 40 The Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council articulated a characterization of the interest that Aboriginal title
refers to as something less substantial than a right to the land itself in the St. Catherine’s Milling
decision.41 More specifically, Lord Watson’s characterization of Aboriginal title as a “personal
and usufructuary right, dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign”42 has led to
mischaracterizations of title that have, in turn, led to problematic conceptions of how title may be
extinguished.43 There are two aspects of Lord Watson’s statement that have shaped the discourse
38
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on extinguishment: the characterization of title as “personal and usufructuary,” and the view that
title was “dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign.” Coupled with Watson’s assertion that
Aboriginal title has its source in the Royal Proclamation, the latter of these views led to the belief
that “Aboriginal title is subject to the will of the Crown, and so is extinguishable by the
executive without legislative authorization.”44 The characterization of the Aboriginal interest as
“personal and usufructuary,” rather than proprietary, caused a lack of conceptual clarity
regarding which common law protections the right was owed.
Canadian courts have, however, moved away from Lord Watson’s characterizations in St.
Catherine’s Milling. In Calder, the Court addressed the framing of title as a mere “personal and
usufructuary” right and concluded that the Privy Council’s choice of terminology was not
particularly helpful in explaining the various dimensions of Aboriginal title with Judson J.
dismissing Lord Watson’s characterization.45 The Court has repeatedly held that Aboriginal title
is “personal” only in the sense that it is inalienable except to the Crown.46 The Court also
rejected Lord Watson’s position that title could be extinguished unilaterally by the Crown by
virtue of the fact that it was enjoyed at “the goodwill of the Sovereign,” where Hall J. held that
title could only be extinguished by specific legislation passed by a competent legislative
authority or by surrender to the Crown.47
Thus, the position of the Privy Council in St. Catherine’s Milling has been modified in
two important respects. First, the Court has recognized that the source of Aboriginal title is the
prior occupation of the land by Aboriginal peoples, not a decree or proclamation from the
Crown.48 In Guerin, Dickson re-affirmed the statements pertaining to the sources of title made in
Calder, stating that the Aboriginal “interest in their lands is a pre-existing legal right not created
by Royal Proclamation, by s.18(1) of the Indian Act, or by any other executive order or
legislative provision.”49 Second, the Court has emphasized that title is a proprietary right,
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rejecting the notion that the phrase “personal and usufructuary” limits the proprietary nature of
Aboriginal title. Rather than “personal,” the Court has adopted the terminology used by Dickson
J. in Guerin v The Queen, where the term sui generis emerges.50 The source of Aboriginal title,
as arising from occupation prior to British sovereignty, and its combination of elements of
common law rules of property and those found in indigenous legal systems, contributes to
Aboriginal title’s unique treatment in the common law. In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. emphasized
that the sui generis nature of such title did not derogate from its protection as a common law
property right. He stated:
This Court has taken pains to clarify that aboriginal title is only “personal” in this
sense [that it is inalienable except to the Crown], and does not mean that
aboriginal title is a non-proprietary interest which amounts to no more than a
licence to use and occupy the land and cannot compete on an equal footing with
other proprietary interests.51
Put otherwise, Aboriginal title is a proprietary interest due all of the same legal protections
afforded other proprietary interests at common law. As detailed above, this means that the
executive could not extinguish Aboriginal title absent a clear statement from the legislative
branch delegating it the authority to do so. Thus, it is clear that the authority to extinguish
Aboriginal title was held by the legislative, as opposed to executive, branch. Further, the
Supreme Court of Canada has held that “during the colonial period, the power to extinguish
aboriginal rights rested with the Imperial Crown.”52 This suggests that the authority to extinguish
title in the pre-confederation period sat exclusively with the Imperial Parliament.
It has been illustrated, then, that the authority to extinguish property rights was strictly
legislative in nature, though there were circumstances (e.g. in a colony acquired through
conquest or cession that had not yet been promised representative institutions or where authority
had been appropriately delegated) in which legislative authority was held by the Crown. Though
this preliminary jurisdictional issue is relatively straightforward in respect of the authority to
extinguish property rights, the jurisdictional lines between the Imperial Crown and Parliament in
respect of their relationships to the colonies and, in particular, Aboriginal peoples, are not always
as clear.
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II. The Imperial Crown, Imperial Parliament, and the Royal Prerogative
In the pre-confederation era, the authority to extinguish Aboriginal rights rested with the
Imperial government. Given that rights could only be extinguished legislatively, it follows that
the authority to extinguish title rested exclusively with the Imperial Parliament, a power which it
would retain in theory until at least 1931. As statements from the Supreme Court on the matter
suggest, however, the central role of the Crown in the administration of colonial governance and
in maintaining relationships with Aboriginal peoples has complicated this assessment. For
example, as noted above, Bastarache J. wrote for the majority in Sappier/Gray, “during the
colonial period, the power to extinguish aboriginal rights rested with the Imperial Crown.” 53 This
follows the statement from Hall J. in Calder that "the onus of proving that the Sovereign
intended to extinguish the Indian title lies on the respondent"54 and Dickson CJ and La Forest J’s
holding in Sparrow that “the Sovereign's intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish an
aboriginal right.”55 As it has been seen that the Sovereign did not possess legislative authority to
extinguish proprietary rights except in a limited range of circumstances, there is a clear
contradiction between the Court’s unequivocal statements that title may only be extinguished by
legislation and the statements above which assign the authority to extinguish to the “Crown” or
“Sovereign.” Given this apparent contradiction and lack of judicial reasoning concerning the
choice of terminology, it will be useful to clearly identify the powers of the executive and
legislative branches of both imperial and colonial governments in assessing pre-confederation
extinguishment of Aboriginal title.
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty is foundational to British constitutional law.
Though gained gradually, by 1688 the King-in-Council had clearly become subordinate to the
will of Parliament.56 As Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray put it, “[t]he sovereignty of Parliament, as a

53

Ibid.
Calder, supra note 4 at 404.
55
Sparrow, supra note 1 at 1099. At the trial level in Delgamuukw, Justice McEachern held that the omission of any
express language requiring statutory extinguishment in Sparrow indicates that the Court in that case did not require
evidence of legislative intent, but rather of intent writ large: Delgamuukw Trial, supra note 39 at 668. As will be
discussed below, this view is grounded in a mischaracterization of Aboriginal title as a usufructuary, rather than
proprietary, right. As a proprietary right, title was protected by common law prohibitions on executive taking.
56
Edward Creasy, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution, 16th ed (London: Richard Bentley & Son,
1892) at 168 – 274, 336.
54

62

principle of constitutional law, is so elementary that there is little scope here for discussion.”57
Nonetheless, the Crown retained significant authority, particularly in respect of colonies and the
empire’s relationship with the prior inhabitants of those colonies. Such was the importance of the
prerogative powers in the establishment and administration of colonial affairs that even the
bedrock principle of parliamentary sovereignty took hold somewhat more slowly in that arena.
At the time of England’s first forays into establishing trans-Atlantic colonies, the
administration of colonial governance was under the exclusive purview of the Sovereign. When
Virginia became the first successful British colony in North America in 160758, there was no
specified imperial government department to deal with the colonies and “the whole
administration, both executive and legislative, was exercised by the Sovereign and Privy Council
with the very occasional interference of Parliament.”59 The British sovereigns thought of the
early colonies “rather as part of their own demesnes than as subject to the jurisdiction of the
state.”60 Early 17th century attempts by the Imperial Parliament to legislate in respect of the
fishery off the coasts of Virginia and New England were rebuffed by Crown Ministers who held
that the Parliament had no authority to legislate there.61 The first substantial legislation from
Parliament respecting the colonies was the Navigation Act, 1651.62 The increase in trans-Atlantic
trade which compelled the passage of the Navigation Act also required the development of a
more robust administrative apparatus for managing colonial affairs. To that end, in 1660 Charles
II delegated (by order-in-council) the responsibility for managing the affairs of British
dependencies to a committee of the Privy Council.63 The powers of this committee being too
57
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limited to permit the effectual performance of its intended role, the committee was abolished
some six months after its creation and in its place the “Council of Foreign Plantations,” which sat
in the Star Chamber at Westminster and was wholly separate from the Privy Council, was
established.64 Thus, the early iterations of the committee responsible for the management of
colonial affairs were created by orders in council and were delegated their authority by the
Crown.
Throughout the better part of the next century committees and boards were variously
formed and modified until, in 1782, the Council of Trade and Plantations (as it was then called)
and the Office of the Secretary of State for Colonies were abolished by an Act of Parliament.65
The Act also authorized the King to establish a committee of the Privy Council to carry out the
duties of the recently abolished entities. In 1784, the Committee of the Privy Council on Trade
and Plantations (to be known as the Board of Trade) was formed by order-in-council pursuant to
the authority granted the Crown by the aforementioned statute. From at least 1782 on, then, the
administration of colonial affairs was undertaken by the King or Queen-in-council by means of
authority delegated by statute rather than by royal prerogative. 66 As of the passage of the
Navigation Act in 1651 at the latest, the Imperial Parliament legislated in respect of the
colonies.67 Unquestionably, by the dates relevant to the determination of Aboriginal title in the
Maritime Provinces (the date of sovereignty, 1713 in Nova Scotia), parliamentary supremacy
was firmly established. This is not to suggest that the King or Queen was without legal authority;
the executive continued to possess a clear range of authority. Rather, it means that the legislative
branch was paramount and could, if it wished, legislate in respect of matters that fell within the
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purview of the Crown, including the colonies or, indeed, the powers of the Crown itself.68
While Parliament may have been paramount, the royal prerogative was central to the
establishment and administration of the colonies. So central was the exercise of the prerogative
that one prominent commentator stated that “[a]ll dependent territories owe their existence to the
Prerogative.”69 Though sweeping, such a statement is almost certainly justified, some notable
exceptions notwithstanding.70 There were several types of colony, including proprietary, charter,
crown, and provincial.71 In all instances the constitutive commissions delegating the authority to
establish governmental institutions and establishing the governor as head of the civil government
were granted by the King/Queen-in-council.72 Of particular importance here, though, are
provincial colonies, that being the only type present in the Maritime Provinces at the dates
relevant to this inquiry. The Sovereign granted commissions to governors which delegated the
authority to raise a government.73 The commissions established the governor as head of the
executive branch of the colonial government and representative of the Sovereign and delegated
the authority to establish an executive council and legislature. The authority of colonial
governors was detailed in the royal commission establishing the colony and in subsequent royal
instructions.74 These instruments are considered prerogative instruments. The legislative
authority of the Sovereign pursuant the royal prerogative, then, was constitutive in nature. The
constitutive power was a prerogative legislative power to establish the constitutional basis of
colonial governments through the constitutive power of the Crown.
Despite this importance, the prerogative power in colonies was not absolute. The range of
prerogative powers exercisable in a colony, in particular the extent of the prerogative legislative
authority, was determined to a large extent by the manner in which the colony was acquired.
According to the prevailing legal norms of the colonial era, colonies could be acquired by
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settlement, conquest, or cession.75 In a colony that had been acquired through conquest or
cession, the English sovereign (i.e. the executive) possessed a nearly unlimited legislative
authority in the colony.76 This principle was derived from “[t]he other principle which guided the
lawyers of the day [which] was the doctrine then prevalent at international law of the absolute
power possessed by a conqueror over the people of the country he conquered.”77 As a conquering
power was presumed to hold absolute power over conquered or ceded territory and peoples, the
Crown assumed legislative authority in respect of those territories.78 The granting of colonial
constitutions, however, extinguished the legislative power of the imperial executive in respect of
ordinary legislation.79 The legislative power of the executive extended only to colonies that were
acquired by conquest or cession and then only until such time as provision had been made for the
establishment of a colonial government by means of a constitution (i.e. a governor’s
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commission).80 Importantly, once representative institutions of colonial government were
promised, the Crown could not revoke them. That is:
Even if a Colony had been acquired by conquest, if the Crown had bestowed upon
it a representative constitution, that constitution could not be recalled by the
power which had granted it, and therefore an Imperial Act was needed to secure
the reversal of a policy which might have proved imprudently generous.81
In colonies acquired by settlement the situation was somewhat different.82 As “it was not
possible to deprive an Englishman of the inestimable advantages of English law,” 83 the English
law was said to follow an English citizen wherever they were not under the jurisdiction of
another sovereign. That is, “if he settled in parts abroad which were not under a legitimate
foreign sovereignty, he carried with him so much at least of the English law as was appropriate
to the circumstances in which he found himself.”84 As a result, the prerogative legislative
authority of the Sovereign was limited in settled colonies from the moment they were so
acquired. This did not affect the constitutive power, but it raises questions as to how the
Sovereign could delegate to a legislature a legislative authority which it did not itself possess.
The answer seems to be derived from the same principle which serves to limit the prerogative in
the first instance; that is, as an English citizen could not be deprived of “the inestimable
advantages of English law,” they carried with them the right to representative institutions. Put
otherwise, the colonists in a settled colony possessed “an inherent right to self-government.”85
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It is important to note that a colony did not have to be uninhabited to be acquired through
settlement. The term “settlement” here is a legal category rather than a strictly descriptive term.
As such, colonies, according to a commentator from the era, may have been formed by
“settlement of an unoccupied or barbarous country.”86 As it is clear that few, if any, British
colonies were “unoccupied” prior to British assertions of sovereignty, settlement clearly applies
most precisely to the latter category. This view, that a “barbarous country” may have been
acquired by settlement rather than conquest, is a consequence of the view that English law
followed a citizen unless they were under the jurisdiction of another Sovereign. 87 Under this
view, a “Sovereign” was essentially a head of state recognized by the other heads of state of
Western Europe. Settlement of “barbarous” countries follows the principle of discovery, which
purported to grant exclusive jurisdiction over a given territory to whichever European nation was
the first to “discover” the lands in question.88 Principal among the rights accruing to discovery
were the exclusive right to settle the lands in question and to treat or otherwise negotiate with the
native inhabitants regarding settlement.89 Thus, the legislative authority of the Sovereign in
colonies acquired by cession, as those in the Maritime Provinces, was limited as soon as those
colonies were granted constitutions with representative institutions. Coupled with the judicial
pronouncements that make clear that unilateral extinguishment of Aboriginal title involves an
exercise of legislative power, this suggests that it was only possible for the Imperial Parliament
to extinguish title in the pre-confederation era. As discussed above, however, the courts have yet
to articulate extinguishment in this manner. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the
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ability to extinguish Aboriginal rights was exclusive to the “Imperial Crown” or the
“Sovereign.”90
These statements from the Court may, however, prove problematic. While the Imperial
Crown could extinguish rights by prerogative legislation where colonies were acquired by
conquest or cession, this would not have been true of those acquired by settlement where the
prerogative power was limited. Further, the Crown lost its prerogative legislative power once
colonies acquired by conquest or cession were granted representative institutions.91 While the
power to extinguish rights rested with the Imperial Crown during certain periods of the colonial
era, those periods were typically very short.92 Historically, it seems the only body with the
authority to extinguish Aboriginal title by unilateral legislation was the Imperial Parliament or an
executive or legislative body delegated the authority to do so. One argument, then, would
suggest that Bastarache J. was speaking of the “Imperial Crown” in a unitary sense, meaning
only to distinguish Imperial from colonial authority. On this interpretation, the framework
discussed above, wherein the capacity to unilaterally extinguish proprietary rights through
legislation sat exclusively with the Imperial Parliament, may still apply. In other words, if we
assume that the term “Imperial Crown” is meant here to include both the legislative and
executive (the King/Queen-in-Parliament), as sharing in Imperial sovereignty, the analysis
provided above concerning the scope of authority of the executive and legislative branches vis-àvis proprietary rights suggests that the power to extinguish title would rest solely with the
Imperial Parliament, a finding which would not contradict Bastarache J.’s statement (but would
still be at odds with the view that the “Sovereign” could legislatively extinguish rights, as was
held in Sparrow and by Hall J. in Calder, unless, given parliamentary sovereignty, this referred
to the King/Queen-in-Parliament).93
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On another interpretation, however, Bastarache J. was alive to the distinction between the
Imperial Crown and the Imperial Parliament and chose explicitly to identify the Crown as
holding powers of extinguishment. This reading would align more closely with the use of the
term “Sovereign” in other decisions. Unfortunately, there is little in the decisions to suggest
either interpretation. In Sappier/Gray, Bastarche supports his statement by citing Delgamuukw as
authority, though the statement relied on from Delgamuukw (at paragraph 15) is equally
ambiguous, and is in fact merely a restatement of a finding from the trial decision that the
Supreme Court does not itself comment on; the language of “Imperial Crown” is adopted directly
from that decision.94 Tellingly, the view that extinguishment falls to the “Crown” in the trial
decision in Delgamuukw rests on the erroneous view that Aboriginal rights “exist at the pleasure
of the Crown” and are not proprietary in nature.95 Thus, the term “Imperial Crown” in this
instance is derived from a context in which a mischaracterization of the nature of Aboriginal title
led to erroneous conclusions about how title may have been extinguished. In Sappier/Gray, the
role assigned the Imperial Crown in relation to the extinguishment of rights seems to have been
pulled from St. Catherine’s Milling by way of the trial decision in Delgamuukw. Given that both
of those decisions have been overturned on important points concerning both the nature and
extinguishment of Aboriginal title, we should look upon the conclusion with some skepticism.
Given this, the wording adopted by the Supreme Court in Sappier/Gray illustrates an
important issue. It is clear that jurisdiction to manage the relationship with Aboriginal peoples
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rested with the Imperial government. As the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in Chippewas of
Sarnia96:
First and foremost, dealings between the English Crown and First Nations were
viewed as involving relations between sovereign nations to be governed by
agreements or treaties made by the English Crown and the First Nations.
Relations with the First Nations were an imperial concern to be administered
primarily through the exercise of the royal prerogative.97
There are competing views, however, of the separation of powers between the Imperial Crown
and the Imperial Parliament in this arrangement and it seems clear from the decision in
Sappier/Gray that the distinction is not always delineated as clearly as it could, and perhaps
should, be.
Though it seems unlikely that Bastarache J. indeed intended to identify the Imperial
Crown, as opposed to Parliament, as having the capacity to extinguish rights, it is worth
exploring what such a position might portend. Support for this position is provided by one
interpretation of the Privy Council’s 1743 decision in Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut.98 As
Sakéj Henderson has argued:
[t]he 1743 decision in Mohegan Indians clarified the status of the First Nations in
the imperial law of Great Britain. It recognised treaty federalism and Aboriginal
law as the twin bases controlling the common law in Canadian colonisation.
Henceforth, controversies between Aboriginal nations and colonial authorities
were exclusively under his majesty's foreign jurisdictions, as subject to the royal
prerogative, rather than the parliament of the United Kingdom or any colonial or
local assembly. Treaties with Aboriginal nations or tribes created independent and
separate jurisdictions in the imperial law, as distinct from colonial authority. 99
Henderson argues that the relationship with Aboriginal nations falls under the Crown’s
jurisdiction over “foreign jurisdictions” and, as such, is a distinct jurisdiction within Imperial law
that is beyond the reach of both colonial governments and the Imperial Parliament. He goes on to
suggest that the traditional analysis of imperial law, which has been articulated above and which
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focuses only on the relationship between the colonies and Great Britain, “ignores the distinct
branch of prerogative Treaties and Legislation that developed in British law concerning
Aboriginal nations and the Crown.”100 Henderson grounds his position in two distinct arguments.
The first relies on extensive analysis of the historical experience of the Mi’kmaq and theorizing
about the nature of the treaty relationship.101 For the purposes here I will address a separate
argument grounded in the Mohegan Indians case.102 Henderson argues that,
[c]onsistent with the crown concept of treaty federalism and the Mohegan
decision, royal instructions in New England, Nova Scotia, and other colonies
respected Aboriginal governments and their legal systems, in particular their
proprietary rights. These prerogative instructions accepted Aboriginal legal
systems and land tenure, and implemented the policy of fair and honest purchases
from First Nations.103
On this view, the relationship with First Nations was under the jurisdiction of the Imperial
Crown by way of the royal prerogative. The nature of colonial government lends some credence
to this view, as “[a]ll dependent territories owe or owed their existence as such to Royal pleasure,
manifested by exercise of prerogative powers and in the great majority of cases, their
constitutions and legal systems have (or had) the same root.”104 Colonial governments were
created by and through the royal prerogative. By way of the prerogative in external affairs,
jurisdiction was acquired in new territories.105 As discussed above, the prerogative authority
continued in colonies acquired by conquest or cession.106 It is only in colonies acquired by
settlement, or conquered and ceded colonies where a representative legislature had been
promised that “the Prerogative is plainly and substantially limited.”107
It is clear that at the time that colonies were conquered or ceded they were under the
jurisdiction, both legislative and executive of the Imperial Crown. As discussed above, under the
standard analysis offered by 19th century British courts and commentators, the prerogative could
no longer be exercised in a law-making capacity once a colony was granted a constitution
featuring an assembly.108 Thus, while the prerogative could still be exercised in the same manner
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as it could in Britain, it became constrained and subject to the will of parliament and no longer
extended to ordinary legislation. Drawing on Mohegan Indians, Henderson suggests that the
modified scope of the prerogative applied only to the settlers and the colonial governments
themselves, not Aboriginal peoples and nations. While not explicitly on point, one can find some
support for this view in the commentary of Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, who stated that “[t]hese
general principles [concerning the prerogative] can, it is submitted, apply only to settlers
properly so called; they cannot extend to a remote area, for example in the Antarctic, where there
are no permanent residents.”109 Though this would seem not to apply to distinguish Aboriginal
peoples from settlers, it is important to recall that this body of law was developed in a context in
which a colony could be deemed uninhabited for the purposes of settlement despite the presence
of Aboriginal peoples.110 Embracing this view, however, would suggest that the relationship with
Aboriginal peoples was governed through the prerogative because they lacked any standing or
capacity to engage the imperial powers as nations, a clearly untenable position. Indeed,
Henderson’s claim is in fact the opposite – that Crown recognition of the sovereignty and
nationhood of Aboriginal peoples caused the relationship with them to be governed under the
royal prerogative to manage foreign jurisdictions.
This argument needs to be unpacked. The Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 defines a
“foreign country” as “any country or place out of Her Majesty’s Dominions.”111 Roberts-Wray
argues that the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, a series of Acts which were replaced by the 1890
version,
were intended to regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in two classes of case… (i)
jurisdiction in independent foreign countries (e.g. Turkey and China) where, by
treaty, the Queen had special jurisdiction, principally to set up Courts for the trial
of cases involving British subjects; and (ii) jurisdiction in primitive countries,
mainly in Africa, where British authority was broader and acquired by less formal
means, though as no more than limited jurisdiction and administration were
normally in contemplation, it was not unnatural to regard such countries as
‘foreign,’ even if they were placed under Her Majesty’s protection.112
The Act draws a distinction, however, between the types of territories it contemplates as being
“foreign countries” and those acquired by conquest or cession, which would be considered part
109

Roberts-Wray, supra note 57 at 151.
It is also telling that Roberts-Wray’s text, considered a leading modern authority on colonial law, fills nearly one
thousand pages without mention of Aboriginal peoples or their rights.
111
1890 c.37 (Reg. 53 & 54 Vict.) s.16.
112
Roberts-Wray, supra note 57 at 73.
110

73

of Her Majesty’s Dominions.113 Henderson grounds his argument that Aboriginal nations fell
under the category of foreign jurisdictions on his reading of the Mohegan Indians decision as
standing for the principle that “treaty federalism and Aboriginal law [were] the twin bases
controlling the common law in Canadian colonization.” The difficulty with this view is that once
colonies became part of “Her Majesty’s Dominions” they appear to no longer have fallen under
the category of foreign jurisdictions as far as British law was concerned. Whether Aboriginal
nations were considered “foreign jurisdictions” under British law likely changed over time. As
discussed above, in the early 17th century all colonial activity fell under the purview of the
Crown. In rejecting parliamentary attempts to legislate in respect of the colonies, Ministers
explicitly relied on the argument that the colonies had not yet become “dominions.” Once a
territory became a dominion of the Crown, however, it is unlikely that the Aboriginal peoples
within that territory would have been considered part of a foreign jurisdiction. While it may be
true that “[t]he provinces are constructs of the European imagination,”114 the question of whether
Aboriginal peoples in colonies that had been classified as dominions were considered foreign
jurisdictions for the purposes of the prerogative is a question of British law. This view, however,
has the problematic attribute of accepting without question the ability of the British Crown to
assert dominion over Aboriginal nations and, by the mere assertion of sovereignty, gain
jurisdiction and radical title over their lands, in the process transforming them from “nations” to
“domestic dependent nations” to borrow US Chief Justice Marshall’s terminology.115
Nonetheless, Henderson’s argument speaks to a characterization in British law and must be
assessed on that basis.
There is also some question as to whether the Mohegan Indians decision recognizes the
range of sovereignty that Henderson suggests. Professor Mark Walters argues that the case
does not support the conclusion that native nations on reserved lands within
British colonies were, from the perspective of British law, sovereign in the
international sense. However, the case does confirm that British law recognized
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that such nations were, in certain circumstances at least, governed internally by
systems of Aboriginal customary law and government which were independent
from the local legal systems of the colonies in which they were located.116
Professor Walters stops short of arguing that the case recognizes First Nations as sovereign
nations. In fact, in arguing that the case stands for the proposition that “native nations on
reserved lands within colonial boundaries were not necessarily subject to colonial municipal law
but might retain an independent status”117 [emphasis mine], he acknowledges that native nations
within colonial boundaries may have been subject to colonial law. This scenario would
presumably require that the authority to legislate in respect of Aboriginal peoples and their rights
be delegated in the relevant colonial charter or governor’s commission. This position is in line
with several cases discussed above, including the holding of the Supreme Court in Sappier/Gray,
insofar as it would place relationships with Indigenous nations under Imperial rather than
colonial authority until such time as the authority to legislate in respect of Aboriginal rights was
clearly delegated. On the issue of sovereignty, Professor Walters is circumspect, arguing that the
case “does not clearly recognize or deny rights of Aboriginal sovereignty.”118
Professor Henderson’s claim is broader, as he argues that the case puts the relationship
with First Nations under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Crown in the exercise of its prerogative,
outside the reach of the Imperial Parliament. Again, there is ample support for the view that First
Nations relations was a matter of imperial, and even executive, authority. It is clear, though, that
despite the fact that laws of the Imperial Parliament did not operate in dominions unless
specifically extended to them, the Imperial Parliament had jurisdiction to legislate if it chose
to.119 As the Privy Council stated in Campbell v. Hall, “[a] country conquered by the British
arms becomes a dominion of the King in the right of his Crown; and, therefore, necessarily
subject to the Legislature, the Parliament of Great Britain.”120 Insofar as Henderson implies that
the prerogative was not subject to the will of the Imperial Parliament, then, he appears to have
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been mistaken.121 When a colony was acquired, it was acquired in right of the Crown which ipso
facto extended the jurisdiction of the Imperial Parliament over that territory as far as British law
was concerned.122 Nonetheless, the difficult question Henderson raises is whether the power of
the Imperial Parliament extended only to colonial governments and subjects or to First Nations
as well.
What is at issue is not immaterial; it may determine whether the Imperial Parliament in
fact had the authority to extinguish rights by unilateral legislative Act. Within imperial law, the
answer seems straightforward, with the possible exception of the Mohegan Indians decision.
This question, though, ultimately turns on the question of sovereignty. If it is accepted that the
British assertion of sovereignty legally transferred jurisdiction over First Nation’s land to the
imperial government, then the supremacy of the Parliament vis-à-vis the Crown and colonies
would prevail. If the assertion of sovereignty is effectively disputed, the Imperial Parliament
could no more unilaterally extinguish Aboriginal title in North America than it could acquire a
part of France by unilateral legislation. The idea that Aboriginal title could be unilaterally
extinguished relies on a legal construction of title as a property right already subordinate to
imperial sovereignty.123
The underlying distinction here is between sovereignty, on the one hand, and proprietary
rights on the other. At common law there is clear support for “the principle that a change in
sovereignty over a territory does not in general affect the presumptive title of the inhabitants.”124
The doctrine of continuity presumes that rights continue to exist until such point as they are
extinguished. Notably, where a colony was acquired by conquest or cession, this principle
extended to the laws of the prior inhabitants. In other words, rights to property continued to exist
following the British acquisition of the colony “[i]nsofar as they had not already been abrogated
by act of state, were not inconsistent with subjection to British sovereignty … and were not
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contrary to British conceptions of justice and humanity.”125 Thus, at British law, sovereignty
could be acquired without affecting the property rights of prior inhabitants. 126 Henderson’s
argument is based on the view that such “[d]omestic legal fictions should not be applied to
foreign lands.”127 In other words, sovereignty vis-à-vis other western states could be acquired
without the Crown acquiring radical title to land; that is, without extending the legal fiction of
the “original title of the Crown”, upon which the whole of British property law is founded, to
indigenous lands. However accurate this may be as a normative statement, the question here
revolves around its accuracy as a legal statement in the context of the British colonization of
North America.
The question of sovereignty raises another set of legal questions, the scope of which it is
beyond this paper to address in any further detail.128 The purpose here is only to note that it is
only the legitimization of the Crown assertion of sovereignty that allows for legislative
infringement of Aboriginal property rights. This is reflected in historical practice, where the
practice in the early stages of colonization in North America recognized the property rights of
Aboriginal peoples and required Aboriginal lands to be purchased before they could be settled
on.129 The question posed at the beginning of this section – i.e. the relationship between the
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Imperial Parliament and the Imperial Crown, particularly in the exercise of the royal prerogative,
as it concerned Aboriginal rights in North America – immediately invokes the question of
sovereignty. This in turn makes it clear that the capacity to extinguish Aboriginal title by
unilateral legislative act presumes that the sovereignty question is settled.
Having said that, it is not necessary in the context of this paper to resolve competing
interpretations of Mohegan Indians or determine whether the relationship with Aboriginal
nations was a responsibility of the Imperial Crown pursuant to the prerogative to manage foreign
jurisdictions. Whether it be because they were characterized as foreign jurisdictions or for some
other reason, it is clear that much of the relationship between the imperial government and
Aboriginal nations was a prerogative matter, governed, as Henderson indicates, by a body of
prerogative treaties and legislation. The prerogative legislative authority, however, was limited in
conquered and ceded colonies where representative institutions had been granted. Thus, the
imperial executive could maintain political relations with indigenous nations, including the
authority to accept voluntary surrenders of rights and title through treaty, but could not
unilaterally extinguish those rights. Though the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy extended to
prerogative affairs and, by extension, dealings with any Aboriginal peoples inhabiting a territory
the Crown claimed as a dominion, such legislative action was rare and the supremacy of
Parliament does little to alter the role that the imperial government played in circumscribing the
authority of colonial governments vis-à-vis Aboriginal peoples. Thus, whichever position one
holds on the matters discussed in the preceding paragraphs, neither contradicts the role of the
imperial government as described by Bruce Clark. Clark stated:
Conjure up an image of the imperial government balancing the scales of power,
the scales weighted on the one hand with the indigenous tribes and on the other
with the colonial governments of the colonists. Although the balance could have
been left to a political question, to be determined on an ad hoc basis as future
events might dictate, it was not. The balance was determined instead by
established rules of constitutional law, knowable a priori. The crucial principles
were subordination and delegation – the colonial governments were subordinate
to the imperial government, and could validate only such legislative acts as were
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within the mandate of power expressly delegated by the imperial to the colonial
governments.130
This is nowhere more apparent than in respect of the Royal Proclamation, 1763. Though the
Royal Proclamation served a number of functions, its importance in the context of this paper is
that it mandated a “complete overhaul of the process of acquiring Indian land.”131 Professor
Slattery aptly summarized the goals of the Proclamation:
the central idea of its Indian provisions is very simple: to ensure that no Indian
lands in America are taken by British subjects without native consent. This
objective is secured by three main measures: colonial governments are forbidden
to grant any unceded Indian lands, British subjects to settle on them, and private
individuals to purchase them, with a system of public purchases adopted as the
official mode of extinguishing Indian title.132
The Proclamation was prerogative legislation of a constitutional nature and, as such, could not be
modified by colonial legislatures.133 Upon acquiring French territories in North America, the
British hoped, through the Proclamation, to remove one of the central points of contention
between themselves and the Indian inhabitants – the presence of white settlers on Indian lands.134
Though the Proclamation was, according the Ontario Court of Appeal, “a mode of imposing the
imperial power on conquered colonies in North America,”135 in doing so it created a
constitutionalized basis for Aboriginal land rights.136 While it is important to note that the
Proclamation is not a source of Aboriginal title, it stands as an important recognition of the
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ongoing existence of Aboriginal rights to land.137 Further, despite the fact that the Royal
Proclamation was a unilateral declaration, it became “a formal part of the treaty relationship with
the Indian nations.”138
What this illustrates is that, while the Imperial Parliament had the authority to extinguish
Aboriginal title pre-confederation, the Imperial Crown and Parliament instead used a variety of
means, including ordinary legislation and prerogative legislation, to create a constitutional
framework that clearly framed both constitutional competency and repugnancy. Colonial
governments were bound to act within the confines of the powers delegated to them and in
accordance with the constitutional principles and laws established by the imperial government.
The authority to extinguish Aboriginal title rested with the Imperial Parliament unless it had been
delegated to another body.
III. The Colonial Executive
Before investigating the powers of the colonial executive, it should be recalled that I
concluded above that it was not possible for the executive to extinguish Aboriginal title unless it
had been delegated the authority to do so. Extinguishing legal rights, including property rights, is
the exclusive purview of the legislative branch and has been for several centuries. Eliminating
such rights requires clear and plain legislation to that effect. Nonetheless, it is worth detailing the
scope of authority inhering in the executive branch of colonial governments for several reasons.
First, the executive branch of colonial governments often had an executive council that had
legislative powers.139 Governors were also responsible for approving laws made by the elected
legislatures, thus playing an important role in the legislative process. Second, clearly delineating
the scope of authority of the executive and legislative branches of colonial governments will
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provide insights into the nature of colonial governance and the relationship between First
Nations, colonial governments, and the Crown, even if such insights are in the end related only
obliquely to the question of extinguishment itself. Third, the colonial executive was a
representative of the Imperial Crown that applied the Crown’s policies in the colonies. 140 Thus, if
there existed any powers of extinguishment with the Crown, those would have been able to be
delegated to the colonial executive. Fourth, this further analysis may prove valuable if there are
any errors or omissions in my previous conclusions respecting the powers of the executive.
The Imperial Crown appointed colonial governors by means of a royal commission that
conferred upon them powers and specific legal authority.141 Subsequent formal instructions laid
out specific duties and rules of conduct.142 A governor’s authority, therefore, was delegated in
nature. As such, the executive branch of colonial governments was subordinate to the imperial
government and cannot be conceived of as having possessed sovereign authority – the authority
of the governor was delegated, “derived from his commission, and limited to the powers thereby
expressly or impliedly entrusted to him.”143 The specific instruments by which the powers of
colonial governors were delegated were important in both their form and their content. In respect
of form, the commissions by which governors were appointed were granted “by letters patent
under the great seal.”144 Subsequent royal instructions “bore the signet and sign manual of the
King.”145 These formal mechanisms were the only means by which authority could be
delegated.146 It follows that other means of purported delegation could not have had the legal
effect of delegating authority. In light of the extensive correspondence between colonial
governors and the colonial office in London, it is particularly important that the form of
140
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instrument relied on as evidence of delegation be scrutinized.147 Crucially, “it was not open for
governors to assume from mere dispatches expressing opinions or sentiments a jurisdiction to
make laws upon a subject.”148 Only instruments bearing the signet and sign-manual of the king
or the great seal of Great Britain could legally delegate authority and transfer jurisdiction.
One example illustrates the importance of form and the extent to which governors were
bound by formal delegations of authority. It was well established that upon a change in governor,
the succeeding governor was appointed by “letters-patent under the Great Seal.”149 These formal
mechanisms could be time consuming to produce and, as such, a workaround was sought that
would allow the succeeding governor to take office and perform the duties of that office while
awaiting the formal documentation. Though as 19th century treatise writer Alpheus Todd
explained:
[a]s the preparation and issue of these formal and authoritative instruments
usually takes considerable time, it became the practice, prior to the year 1875, to
issue a minor commission, under the Royal sign-manual and signet, to a newly
appointed governor, empowering him, meanwhile, to act under the commission
and instructions given to his predecessor in office. But, doubts having been raised
in certain cases, whether these minor commissions effectually authorized the
holder to perform all the duties and functions appertaining to his office [the
practice was discontinued] under the advice of the law officers of the Crown.150
Even a temporary “minor commission” bearing the signet and sign manual, then, was considered
to be inadequate by the law officers of the time to confer authority beyond that explicitly detailed
in the instrument. The temporary commission could not referentially confer the powers granted
in the commission of the previous governor. A commission issued by way of letters patent,
bearing the Great Seal, and explicitly detailing the authority to be held by the incoming governor
was the only way to effectuate such a delegation. Coupled with the explicit statements referenced
above, this example makes it clear that any communications not bearing the signet and signmanual or great seal could not legally delegate authority. It is also clear that even those involved
in the day-to-day operations of colonial governance did not always understand the high legal
standards required to delegate power. Nonetheless, it was considered a matter of sufficient
importance that the law officers felt compelled to modify the practice.
That this distinction is of considerable importance in the contemporary context is evident
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from the Supreme Court’s decision in Calder.151 There, Judson J. relied on a letter to the
governor of British Columbia, James Douglas, from the secretary of state for the colonies, E.B.
Lytton, as evidence that governor Douglas had been delegated discretionary power in dealing
with Aboriginal land issues.152 It is useful to reprint the dispatch in full as it illustrates the
importance of form. The dispatch states:
I have to enjoin upon you to consider the best and most humane means of dealing
with the Native Indians. The feelings of this country would be strongly opposed to
the adoption of any arbitrary or oppressive measures towards them. At this
distance, and with the imperfect means of knowledge which I possess, I am
reluctant to offer, as yet, any suggestion as to the prevention of affrays between
the Indians and the immigrants. This question is of so local a character that it
must be solved by your knowledge and experience, and I commit it to you, in the
full persuasion that you will pay every regard to the interests of the Natives which
an enlightened humanity can suggest. Let me not omit to observe, that it should be
an invariable condition, in all bargains or treaties with the natives for the cession
of lands possessed by them, that subsistence should be supplied to them in some
other shape, and above all, that it is the earnest desire of Her Majesty's
Government that your early attention should be given to the best means of
diffusing the blessings of the Christian Religion and of civilization among the
natives.153[Judson J.’ emphasis]
Judson J. interpreted this dispatch as delegating discretionary authority to Governor Douglas.
The highlighted passage is particularly telling, as matters of local concern were under the
authority of colonial governments pursuant to their commissions. Thus, Judson J. refers to the
colonial government as “the sovereign authority elected to exercise complete dominion over the
lands in question.”154 It appears that Judson J. may have conflated the “full executive powers”155
of the governor with “sovereign authority.”156 As discussed above, colonial governments had an
authority that was delegated in nature.157 Only formal instruments bearing the signet and signmanual of the King or the Great Seal could delegate jurisdiction and, at least in some cases, even
that was considered insufficient by the law officers.
A competing interpretation was provided by Justice Hall. Hall cited the same
communication, though tellingly emphasized different passages. Hall J. placed his emphasis on
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the first and last sentences of the passage quoted above. In doing so, he construed the letter not as
granting the authority to dispose of Indian lands, but as recognizing the restrictions on the
powers of the colonial government, reminding the governor of his obligations under the law.158
Indeed, Hall J. noted that “[a] Governor had no powers to legislate other than those given in the
commission.”159 Given this, Hall J. held:
If in any of the Proclamations or actions of Douglas, Seymour or of the Council of
the Colony of British Columbia there are elements which the respondent says
extinguish by implication the Indian title, then it is obvious from the Commission
of the Governor and from the Instructions under which the Governor was required
to observe and neither the Commission nor the Instructions contain any power or
authorization to extinguish the Indian title, then it follows logically that if any
attempt was made to extinguish the title it was beyond the power of the Governor
or of the Council to do so and, therefore, ultra vires.160
This illustrates two important points. First, it confirms that any action taken by a governor
outside the powers granted in a governor’s commission and royal instructions should be
considered ultra vires. Second, it again illustrates the importance of form. While Hall J. held that
the dispatch to Governor Douglas did not delegate authority beyond that conferred in the royal
commission, he did so not on the basis that such an instrument could not do so, but rather on his
interpretation of the content of the dispatch. As Bruce Clark has noted:
As a result of not paying due attention to the form of the instrument, an extremely
important point (the extinguishment of aboriginal rights in British Columbia) was
therefore treated largely as a matter of interpretation of a mere letter, a letter
better to have been set aside in order to concentrate upon genuinely relevant
instruments.161
A governor did not possess, and could not legally exercise, powers outside of those stated in the
commission and instructions.162 In Cameron v. Kyte (1835) the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council held that the governor of the colony of Berbice could not modify the commission (i.e.
salary) to be recovered by the colony’s deputy vendue master as the power to make such a

158

Calder, supra note 4 at 409, 412.
Ibid. at 406.
160
Ibid. at 413.
161
Clark, Native Liberty, supra note 6 at 65.
162
See Roberts-Wray, supra note 57 on this point. A governor was required to obey dispatches, especially if
following them was mandated in the commission or instructions establishing the office. These dispatches, however,
were directory in nature and could not confer new powers or jurisdiction. This is implicit in Hall J.’s reasoning, as
he identified only the commission and instructions as potential sources of the delegated authority to extinguish
rights.
159

84

modification was beyond the scope of those delegated.163 The Privy Council held that a governor
“has only such portion of the sovereign authority as is expressly or by implication conferred.” 164
In other words, a governor cannot “be considered as having a delegation of the whole Royal
power in any colony.”165 In The Queen v. George Clarke (1848), this principle was held in New
Zealand to apply equally to the granting of lands:
The Governor of a Colony, it would be admitted, had no power ex-officio to
convey the lands of the Crown to a subject: he commonly executed conveyances
of Crown lands it was true; but always by an authority expressly delegated to him
either by the Crown or by Act of Parliament.166
It is clear from the foregoing that colonial governors, even where they could act in a legislative
capacity, could not extinguish title unless the power to do so was expressly or impliedly
delegated by means of the proper legal instrument. As the Privy Council stated in Cameron v.
Kyte, “if the Governor be an officer merely with a limited authority from the Crown, his
assumption of an act of sovereign power, out of the limits of the authority so given to him, would
be purely void.”167 Given these restrictions, it is of the utmost importance to determine what
range of authority was delegated to specific governors in assessing extinguishment of title. Some
important powers they may have been granted included: executive powers regarding colonial
assemblies (prorogation, dissolutions, etc.), the power to grant or refuse assent to legislation, and
the power to grant Crown lands.168 Nonetheless, none of these powers were inherent to the office
of the colonial governor – each power must have been delegated; any party attempting to
demonstrate extinguishment of title by an act of a the executive branch of a colonial government,
be it legislative or otherwise, bears the burden of demonstrating that the authority to do so was
explicitly delegated by the proper instruments.
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IV. Legislative Authority in the Colonies
Legislative authority in colonies could reside in several bodies and be distributed in
various configurations. The 19th century treatise writer Charles Tarring described several classes
of colonial government. In the first, termed Crown colonies, “the Crown has the entire control of
legislation while the administration is carried on by public officers under the control of the Home
Government.”169 In Crown colonies, legislative power either rested entirely with the governor or
was exercised by the governor and an executive council appointed by the Crown.170 The second
class of colony Tarring identified were those “possessing representative institutions, but not
responsible government.”171 While the Home Government retained control over the
appointments to public offices in this arrangement, the Crown’s control over legislation was
limited to the veto power.172 Under this configuration the ability to elect law makers was
beginning to appear in the colonies, with laws being made by the governor with the concurrence
of either a single legislative chamber in which half the members were elected and half appointed
by the Crown or two legislative chambers, one elected, the other appointed.173 In the third class
of colony, those possessing both representative institutions and responsible government, the
Home Government retained no powers of appointment other than the governor and held only a
veto power in respect of legislation.174 Thus, legislative authority in the colonies was variable
and subject to change over time. Nonetheless, the separation of powers were clearly delineated
and colonial authority was subject to explicit legal constraints.175
The role of the governor in legislative affairs, then, depended on the institutional
arrangements in the colony.176 While the initiation of laws typically only began with the
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governor in colonies lacking representative assemblies, this was not a steadfast rule.177 Despite
assuming a less direct role in the development of legislation as colonies moved toward
responsible governments, as late as 1882 Tarring could state that “[i]n every colony the
Governor has authority to give or withhold assent to laws passed by the other branches or
members of the legislature. Without his assent no laws are binding.”178 Thus, while the precise
legislative role of the governor varied over time, the office held a degree of control over colonial
legislation.179 The governor had a “negative voice” in the legislature, a voice which was
characterized by the powers of disallowance, adjournment, prorogation, and dissolution.180 That
is, in addition to the general power to withhold assent, the governor also had a range of powers in
respect of the functioning legislative body itself that would allow a degree of “negative” control
to be exercised over legislation and the legislative process. As mentioned above, where
representative institutions existed, a bicameral legislature, with one chamber appointed and one
elected, was typical. Prior to the establishment of responsible government, the appointed council
was typically “selected from those who have the best fortunes and most considerable influence in
the colony.”181 The council, though often referred to as the “executive council,” exercised both
legislative and executive powers.182 They were appointed by warrant from the Crown or by the
governor’s instructions, though they could be dismissed only by the Crown, the governor only
having the power to suspend.183 Where a colony had responsible government, members of the
executive council were appointed and dismissed by the governor, though by convention a
member of the executive would step down if they lost the confidence of the elected assembly. 184
Importantly, where responsible government had been achieved, the governor was bound to act on
the advice of the executive council; a governor may have acted without such advice where the
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public interest required it, though in such cases the action always must have conformed to the
explicit rules laid out in the royal instructions.185
The elected branch of the typical bicameral colonial legislature was an assembly raised
by the governor pursuant to the royal commission received for the purpose of establishing
government in the colony.186 The law making power of the elected assembly was circumscribed
by the royal commission to which it owed its existence and was limited to making law
concerning local affairs and for peace, order, and good government of the colony. 187 The
representative assembly had a delegated authority to make “laws for its interior government.”188
The assembly’s legislative activity did not, however, exist in a vacuum; rather, a formal process
was to be followed in which laws were to be made “with the concurrence of the governor and the
council.”189 Further, the legislative jurisdiction of the assembly was restrained by other means.
While the assembly had the “power to make laws suited to the exigencies of the colony,” it was
confined by the requirement that those laws be “agreeable as nearly as may be to the laws of
England.”190 The principle of repugnancy required that “all law, bye-laws [sic], usages, and
customs, which shall be in practice in any of the plantations, repugnant to any law made or to be
made in this kingdom relative to the said planation, shall be utterly void and of none effect.”191
This principle was distinct from the powers of disallowance and will be addressed below.
Laws developed in the colonies were also subject to disallowance not only by the
governor (prior to responsible government), but also by the Imperial Crown.192 Thus, some
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colonies “have legislatures of their own which propound laws for their internal government,
subject to the approval of the Queen in Council.”193 The power of disallowance held by the
Crown existed even in colonies where the royal prerogative to legislate no longer existed.194
Importantly, both the laws of the colonies and the legislative institutions themselves were
considered subordinate to the power of the “mother country.”195 Though, again, a colony was no
longer subject to prerogative legislation of the Crown once representative institutions had been
established.196 In this light, it is important to note that the delegated nature of colonial assemblies
rendered them fundamentally different, in their sources and scope of authority, from the Imperial
Parliament.197
Thus, the legislative power in the colonies was constrained in three ways. First, the
commission from which the colonial government’s authority was derived limited the scope of
colonial legislation to matters of local concern. Crucially, “Indian affairs were no concern of the
colonial legislatures.”198 Second, legislation was subject to disallowance by both the governor
and the Imperial Crown and could be annulled by the Imperial Parliament; colonial legislation, in
other words, was subordinate to the will of both branches of the imperial government. Crucially,
positive affirmation of colonial legislation was required; it was not enough that the imperial
government did not disallow it. Third, colonial legislation was constrained by a requirement that
it not be repugnant to English law that extended to the colony. These limitations were subject to
some degree of variation as the colonies moved to responsible government, but they represented
a tangible restriction on legislation in the colonies.
The repugnancy doctrine represented an important, and at times contentious, limitation
on the legislative authority of colonial assemblies. Though it was relatively rare for the King-in193
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council to disallow a piece of colonial legislation or for a court to deem it void by way of
repugnancy, it is clear that “colonial governments acquiesced in the restriction on local
legislative competence and formulated their policies with reference to it.”199 The doctrine, which
appeared first in 1609 in the second Virginia Charter, came to be repeated in numerous colonial
charters and governor’s commissions.200 Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to address at
length, Professor Campbell provides two possible justifications for the development of the
doctrine. Campbell argues first that it was likely derived from the view that the Crown could not
delegate law making authority that would allow the delegated authority to pass laws contrary to
those of England.201 Drawing on this principle, the view was advanced that where the corporate
form was used to establish government by charter, that government would be subject to the same
restrictions as other corporate bodies whose by-laws would be considered void ab initio if they
were repugnant to common law or statute law.202 Second, Campbell argues that this same
principle was then extended to colonial governments raised by commission rather than charter
and that “the Crown lawyers apparently assumed that legislatures constituted by Royal
Commission stood on precisely the same footing as legislatures in the chartered colonies.”203
Repugnancy provisions therefore came to be included in numerous charters and commissions
and were later reinforced by imperial statute and the courts.204 In Winthrop v Lechmere, for
example, the Privy Council held that “by the Charter their power of making laws is restrained
and limited in a very special manner, (viz) such laws must be wholesome and reasonable, and
[not] contrary to the laws of this realm of England.”205 This case is notable as it dealt specifically
with property rights, with the Privy Council holding that, despite the fact that it was intra vires
the General Assembly of Connecticut to legislate in respect of property rights pursuant to the
colonial Charter, the law in question was nonetheless void by way of repugnancy to the laws of
England.206
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Considerable difficulties arose in the 18th century, however, concerning the application of
the doctrine. Though the doctrine had the potential to severely restrict colonial legislation,
interpretation became a difficult matter as courts attempted to discern what level of local
variance from the laws of England was acceptable.207 Further, it was unclear whether the
doctrine was to apply only to those English laws which were in effect in the colony in question
or to the entire body of English law. The Privy Council came to take a broader view on the
matter, not limiting the doctrine to only those laws in effect in the colony. 208 In the early 19th
century these issues came to a head in New South Wales when the role of judges in the
legislative process became a contentious issue. Issues of interpretation and enforcement caused
ongoing problems for the application of the doctrine. This began calls for increased legislative
clarity concerning the doctrine of repugnancy.209
The difficulties surrounding the issue of repugnancy gave rise to the Colonial Laws
Validity Act, 1865. The crucial questions for this essay are: first, what effect did the Act have on
colonial legislation that would otherwise have been inoperable on grounds of repugnancy or
beyond the jurisdiction of the colonial government? Second, did the Act save colonial legislation
that would have otherwise been inoperable to the extent that it contradicted prerogative
legislation or constitutional principles? The importance of the Colonial Laws Validity Act is clear
if we recall the relationship between colonial laws and Aboriginal title. The issue that I have
been concerned with here is whether colonies had the capacity to extinguish Aboriginal title
through legislation. As has been illustrated, such power existed only insofar as it had been
expressly or impliedly delegated and where such delegation conformed to the formal
requirements governing such transfers of authority. The effect of the Colonial Laws Validity Act
on the validity of colonial legislation may be instrumental in assessing whether a given piece of
legislation may have extinguished title.
The Act, given royal assent on June 29th 1865, was said to resolve “once and for all any
doubts which might be raised as to the constitutionality of colonial Acts without exact English

207

Campbell, supra, note 199 at 154.
Ibid. It is important to note that repugnancy provisions in royal instructions applied only to laws dealing
specifically with the colony or laws specifically mentioned in the commission or instructions.
209
Ibid. at 155 -156.
208

91

precedent.”210 The Act sought to provide clarity regarding the constitutionality of colonial laws,
taking aim not only at future, but also past legislation. As Professor Campbell wrote:
s.3 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 cut the Gordian knot by the simple
expedient of declaring repugnancy to English law no longer to be a ground for
adjudging colonial enactments void and inoperative. This provision, it should be
noted, applied not only to future colonial legislation but also to legislation already
passed. Its effect, therefore, was to validate legislation which at the date of its
passing, lacked the force of law.211
While the Act maintained the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament and imperial legislation, it
brought about a “fundamental constitutional change” by eliminating “the old rule requiring
colonial enactment to conform as near as possible with the fundamental principles of English
law.”212 The important exception to this new principle was in the case of repugnancy to “British
legislation extending to the colony by paramount force.”213 Where colonial legislation was
repugnant to British legislation extending to the colony, the supremacy of the British legislation
was invoked to render the colonial legislation void and inoperative to the extent of the
repugnancy.214 British legislation would be construed as extending to a colony “when it [was]
made applicable to such colony by the express words or necessary intendment of any Act of
Parliament.”215
Royal instructions did not render colonial law inoperative in the same manner as
legislation extending to the colony under the Act.216 S.4 of the Act states that no colonial law that
had been assented to by the governor would be inoperative only because it was repugnant to
royal instructions about that matter.217 That is, royal instructions about a given matter would no
longer be paramount to colonial legislation. This did not extend to constitutional documents,
such as the letters patent or royal commission.218 In effect, this precluded a colonial legislature
from stripping the governor of power that was fundamental to the foundational sovereignty of the
Crown. This restraint is owing to the constitutional nature of the royal commissions. Though the
colonial legislatures had the authority under the Act to modify the constitution, powers, and
210
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procedures of the legislature itself, such laws “shall have been passed in such manner and form
as may from time to time be required by any Act of Parliament, letters patent, Order in Council,
or colonial law for the time being in force in the said colony.”219 Any such laws would still be
subject to possible disallowance.
The effect of the Colonial Laws Validity Act was to create a clearer division of powers
between the imperial and colonial governments. The colonial legislatures could make laws
pertaining to the “peace, order, and good government” of the colonies, thereby assuming
legislative control over matters of a local character, while the colonies ultimately remained
subordinate where the Imperial Parliament wished to legislate in respect of the colony. The
doctrine of repugnancy was circumscribed by the Act to provide colonial legislatures greater
means to adapt to local circumstances, while the doctrine was reaffirmed in respect of Imperial
legislation targeting a colony.220
The combined effect of the doctrine of repugnancy and the laws pertaining to how
colonies were acquired, was that English law prevailed in respect of matters that concerned the
empire and where imperial legislation targeted a colony specifically, while matters of local
concern were left to localities. Though the retroactive applicability of the Colonial Laws Validity
Act, 1865 obviated the need for colonial laws to be commensurate with those of England except
where an Act applied specifically to the colony, colonial legislatures remained constrained by the
jurisdiction granted under the royal commission to which they owed their existence. A party
wishing to rely on colonial legislation as evidence of extinguishment of Aboriginal title,
therefore, must demonstrate that the colonial legislature in question was delegated the authority
to extinguish Aboriginal rights and that the law by which such extinguishment was to occur was
not repugnant to any imperial law pertaining specifically to the colony.
V. Post-Confederation
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With the passage of the Constitution Act, 1867, new jurisdictional lines were drawn. The
BNA Act of 1867 was an Imperial Statute and could therefore only be amended by the Imperial
Parliament.221 It was only because the colonies were subordinate to the Imperial Parliament that
the BNA Act could have constitutional force. This arrangement left some confusion as to the
precise nature of the relationship between the imperial, dominion, and provincial governments.
More precisely, a question arose as to whether the powers of the dominion and provincial
governments should be characterized as delegated. As one author has argued:
When the British North America Act enacted that there should be a legislature for
Ontario, and that its legislative assembly should have exclusive authority to make
laws for the province and for provincial purposes in relation to the matters
enumerated in section 92, it conferred powers not in any sense to be exercised by
delegation from or as agents of the Imperial Parliament, but authority as plenary
and as ample within the limits prescribed by section 92 as the Imperial Parliament
in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow. Within these limits of
subject and area, the local legislature is supreme and has the same authority as the
Imperial Parliament or the Parliament of the Dominion.222
While the powers of the provincial legislatures were described here as “plenary and ample,” the
source and limits of that authority has led others to emphasize the subordinate nature of both
provincial legislatures and the federal parliament.223 The argument that the federal and provincial
governments remained subordinate after 1867 is based on the fact that the imperial government
could, if it wished, continue to legislate in respect of the Canadian dominion and its provinces.
Thus, the local legislatures did not have “the same authority” as the Imperial Parliament. As
Professor McNeil has argued, “[t]here can be little doubt that the Imperial Parliament's authority
to extinguish Aboriginal title prior to Confederation would have continued thereafter, since the
Parliament at Westminster retained authority to legislate for Canada when it enacted the
Constitution Act, 1867.”224 Similarly, the protections afforded to Aboriginal lands right by way
of imperial legislation (including prerogative legislation) and the common law survived the
passage of the BNA Act.
Regardless, the division of powers between federal and provincial legislatures in the
BNA Act is clear:
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the respective powers of the parliament of the Dominion and the legislatures of
the provinces are stated in express terms in the constitution; any subject that does
not fall within the powers of the provincial governments belongs to the Dominion.
This is intended to prevent disputes, as far as possible, as respects the powers of
the separate governments.225
One power so expressly stated is the “make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of
Canada, in relation to… Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” in s.91(24).226 The apparent
ambiguity of this phrase sowed confusion about whether the ability to legislate in respect of, and
thereby extinguish, Aboriginal title was exclusive to the federal legislature.227 In Delgamuukw,
the province put forward a more limited reading of s.91(24), arguing “that “Lands reserved for
the Indians” are lands which have been specifically set aside or designated for Indian occupation,
such as reserves.”228 Lamer C.J. rejected this argument, holding that it ran counter to the Privy
Council’s decision in St. Catherine’s Milling where the Privy Council stated that had it been
intended s.91(24) be limited to reserve lands, such a limitation would have been made explicit.229
Thus, in Delgamuukw, Lamer CJ held that the power to extinguish title rested with the
federal government. Lamer C.J. held:
Since 1871, the exclusive power to legislate in relation to “Indians, and Lands
reserved for the Indians” has been vested with the federal government by virtue of
s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. That head of jurisdiction, in my opinion,
encompasses within it the exclusive power to extinguish aboriginal rights,
including aboriginal title.230
As it has been demonstrated that the extinguishment of rights is the exclusive purview of the
legislative branch, Lamer C.J.’s use of the term “federal government” should be understood to
refer to the federal parliament. That is, since 1871, “the exclusive power to extinguish aboriginal
rights, including aboriginal title” rested with the federal parliament. This limits the power of the
provincial government to grant title lands to third parties. Relying on Delgamuukw, Justice
Vickers stated at the trial level in Tsilhqot’in:
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Given that the jurisdiction to extinguish has only ever been held by the federal
government, the Province cannot and has not extinguished these rights by a
conveyance of fee simple title to lands within the Claim Area.231
And further:
[R]egardless of the private interests in the Claim Area (whether they are fee
simple title, range agreements, water licences, or any other interests derived from
the Province), those interests have not extinguished and cannot extinguish
Tsilhqot’in rights, including Tsilhqot’in Aboriginal title.232
It is clear that the provinces at no point had the capacity to extinguish Aboriginal title. 233 From
1867 – 1982 the jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal rights resided with the federal Parliament.
The Imperial Parliament could have also extinguished title until it renounced legislative power in
Canada in the Statute of Westminster in 1931, though there is no evidence that this power was
ever exercised.

C. Clear and Plain Intent
As discussed, the two central issues in assessing legislative extinguishment are
jurisdiction (competence) and repugnancy. Should it be demonstrated that the legislation being
relied on as evidence of extinguishment was passed by a competent legislative body and was not
repugnant to any prevailing constitutional documents or principles, a further requirement
mandates that the legislation exhibit the “clear and plain intent” to extinguish title.234 As Dickson
CJ stated in the Sparrow235 decision, “[t]he test of extinguishment to be adopted, in our opinion,
is that the Sovereign's intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish an aboriginal
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Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at para 997 [Tsilhqot’in Trial].
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233
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right.”236 In Calder, Hall J. “concluded that if a right was to be extinguished, it must be done by
specific legislation, not by general land legislation.”237
The “clear and plain intent” standard, though, does not require an explicit statement
extinguishing the right in question. That is, while the intention to extinguish the right in question
must be clear, the standard is below that of an explicit statement. As Bastarche J. stated for the
majority of the Supreme Court in the Sappier/Gray decision, “intent need not be expressed and
therefore aboriginal rights may also be extinguished implicitly.”238 The Court, in other words,
has left the door open to the possibility that implied intent to extinguish rights may suffice.
Nonetheless, the standard remains quite high. As Lamer C.J. wrote in Gladstone:
While to extinguish an aboriginal right the Crown does not, perhaps, have to use
language which refers expressly to its extinguishment of aboriginal rights, it must
demonstrate more than that, in the past, the exercise of an aboriginal right has
been subject to a regulatory scheme.239
This follows the view expressed by Dickson CJ and LaForest J in Sparrow that, although the
exercise of a right may have historically been curtailed by government act or regulation, such
control does not in itself extinguish a right. In other words, “that the right is controlled in great
detail by the regulations does not mean that the right is thereby extinguished.”240 A general piece
of legislation or set of regulations that had an incidental effect on the exercise of a right will not
suffice; even if not explicitly stated, the extinguishment of the right must have been a purpose of
the legislation being relied on the demonstrate extinguishment.241

D. Summary
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Once Aboriginal title has been established, the burden is on the party seeking to establish
that title has been extinguished to prove such extinguishment. As has been outlined above, prior
to the constitutionalization of Aboriginal rights in 1982 extinguishment could have occurred in
two ways: by voluntary surrender or unilaterally through legislation. There are a number of
restrictions circumscribing these modes of extinguishment. Extinguishment by voluntary
surrender, from 1763 until at least 1931, must have conformed to the Indian land provisions laid
out in the Royal Proclamation, 1763. The relevant provisions of the Royal Proclamation, which
restrict the alienation of Aboriginal lands to parties other than the Crown and establish
procedural requirements for acquiring the consent of the Aboriginal community for any
surrender, also seem to have been incorporated into the common law.
In assessing extinguishment by unilateral legislation, the first consideration is whether the
legislative body which passed the legislation being relied on had the jurisdiction to extinguish
Aboriginal title. The legal authority to legislatively extinguish Aboriginal rights in the preconfederation period was a legislative power that resided with the Imperial Parliament. Two
important exceptions existed to this rule. First, in colonies acquired by conquest or cession, the
royal prerogative included the power to legislate until such time as a governor was authorized to
establish a legislative assembly.242 Second, the authority to legislatively extinguish rights could
be delegated to colonial authorities by the Imperial Parliament. In a conquered or ceded colony,
such as those in the Maritime Provinces, this authority could also be delegated by the Imperial
Crown until such time as a legislative assembly was granted. Until that point the Crown had the
authority to legislate in respect of both constitutive and ordinary legislation and a delegation
could have occurred by either means. Though the Crown retained its constitutive power
following the granting of an assembly, its authority to legislate in respect of ordinary matters,
such as property rights, was limited. It seems, then, that prerogative acts could not have been
used to delegate authority to extinguish property rights in settled colonies or colonies acquired by
cession or conquest where a legislative assembly had been granted, as the Crown no longer held
that power and could not delegate a power it did not itself possess. In the post-Confederation era,
exclusive jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal rights resided with the federal parliament by way
of s.91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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There are, therefore, four types of legislation that may be have had the effect of
extinguishing Aboriginal title: (1) imperial legislation until 1931; (2) prerogative legislation prior
to the promise of a representative assembly, or enacted under the authority delegated by the
Imperial Parliament; (3) colonial legislation enacted under the delegated authority discussed
above; (4) federal legislation prior to 1982. If colonial legislation is relied on, the onus rests with
the party seeking to demonstrate extinguishment that the jurisdiction to do so was delegated by
the proper legal instruments.
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3.

Extinguishment in the Maritime Provinces

Aboriginal title is no longer presumed to have been extinguished in the Maritime Provinces. 1
Indeed, courts at all levels have acknowledged that title has not been entirely extinguished. The
Nova Scotia trial Court and Court of Appeal in Marshall and Isaac, respectively, held that title
has likely not been extinguished to reserve lands or small territories around traditional village
sites, the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench held that the treaties of peace and friendship
recognize and protect Aboriginal title, and the courts of appeal in both New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia held in the Bernard and Marshall cases that title could be proven and had not been
extinguished to broad tracts of territory. The Supreme Court of Canada in Marshall/Bernard did
not foreclose the possibility of title being proven in the region, thereby acknowledging that title
has not been extinguished prima facie. The question of extinguishment in the Maritime
Provinces, then, is still very much alive. As detailed in the previous chapter, extinguishment at
common law could occur in one of two ways: by voluntary surrender or through unilateral
legislative act. The burden of demonstrating extinguishment rests on the party seeking to prove
such extinguishment. As Hall J held in Calder, “the Nishgas are the owners of the lands that
have been in their possession from time immemorial and, therefore, the burden of establishing
that their right has been extinguished rests squarely on the respondent.”2 A party seeking to
establish that title has been extinguished in the Maritime Provinces, then, would have to
demonstrate that title was extinguished by voluntary surrender or a unilateral legislative act
passed by a competent body.

A. Voluntary Surrender
The treaties relevant to the Maritime Provinces were canvassed in some detail in Chapter 1.3
There I put forward the argument that, far from ceding land, the treaties in fact recognize and
protect Aboriginal land rights. While that argument has thus far found little support in the courts,
1

Brian Slattery, “Some Thoughts on Aboriginal Title” (1999) 48 UNBLJ 19 at 40 [Slattery, “Some Thoughts on
Aboriginal Title”]. As Slattery put it, “[t]o my mind, then, the question of aboriginal title in New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia is very much alive.”
2
Calder v. British Columbia (A.G), [1973] SCR 313 at 375.
3
See: Infra at 43 – 53.
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the Court of Queen’s Bench decision in the Thomas Peter Paul case notwithstanding, the
conclusion that the treaties do not cede land is well established. As Dickson CJ stated
unambiguously in R v Simon, “[n]one of the Maritime treaties of the eighteenth century cedes
land.”4 This was reaffirmed in Marshall # 1, where Binnie J. wrote for the majority that “there is
no applicable land cession treaty in Nova Scotia.”5 Turnbull J. put it more strongly still in the
Thomas Peter Paul decision, stating: “I refuse to accept any contention that the Indians ceded
Indian title” in the treaties.6
While the court in Marshall/Bernard did not explicitly state that title had not been ceded
by treaty, it implicitly recognized as much by focusing its analysis on whether title had been
proven – this would have been an unnecessary inquiry had it been extinguished by treaty.
Further, the Supreme Court had the opportunity in that case to overturn statements from the
Courts of Appeal holding that the treaties did not cede land, and it did not do so. The most telling
evidence, though, may be the fact that the Crown itself, in the Simon decision, relied on the fact
that the treaties did not cede land to argue that they could not be categorized as treaties. 7 Here,
the Crown put forward the argument that “because the Treaty did not deal with the ceding of
land or delineation of boundaries,” it should not be considered a treaty as the term is used in s.88
of the Indian Act.8
Voluntary surrenders of title could also have occurred by means other than treaty, though
such surrenders were bound by the terms of the Royal Proclamation, 1763, which prohibited
alienation other than to the Crown and required that Aboriginal consent be acquired at a public
meeting. There were undoubtedly many small surrenders made in the Maritime Provinces. In
New Brunswick, for example, Barnaby Julian, chief of the Mi’kmaq reserve at Red Bank (aka
R v Simon [1985] 2 SCR 387 at 50. At the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, Cromwell JA noted that “the Supreme
Court of Canada on two occasions has expressed the view that the 1760 - 61 treaties do not cede land”: R v
Marshall, 2003 NSCA 105 at 99. In R v Isaac [1975] NSJ 412, at 57, the Court of Appeal held that “[n]o Nova
Scotia treaty has been found whereby Indians ceded land to the Crown, whereby their rights on any land were
specifically extinguished, or whereby they agreed to accept and retire to specified reserves.” Similarly, Professor
Slattery has concluded that “[t]reaties of cession have been signed for large parts of Canada, notably in Ontario and
the Prairie Provinces. But no such treaties exist for the Atlantic Provinces, and parts of Quebec, British Columbia,
the Yukon, and the Northwest Territories, as well for pockets of land elsewhere.” Brian Slattery, “The Hidden
Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” (1984) 32:2 The American Journal of Comparative Law 361 at 372.
5
R v Marshall (No. 1), [1999] 3 SCR 456 at para 21 [Marshall #1].
6
R v Peter Paul [1997] NBJ 439 at para 12 [Peter Paul].
7
This is also recognized on the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development website, which
recognizes that “[u]nlike later treaties signed in other parts of Canada, the Peace and Friendship Treaties did not
involve First Nations surrendering rights to the lands and resources they had traditionally used and occupied.”
https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028589/1100100028591#a3.
8
Simon, supra note 4 at 47.
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Metepenagiag Mi’kmaq Nation), “had assumed the right to sell and lease the greater part of the
reserve of 10,000 acres on the Little South West [Miramichi River].”9 It is beyond the scope of
this paper to determine the legality of these many surrenders, as they are wrapped in a nest of
competing claims, leases, and sales.10 Many sales were made to third parties by individuals
without the consent of the community and much land was settled by squatters whom the
government lacked the resolve to remove. Lands surrendered in the pre-confederation period by
means other than treaty must be assessed against the standards established in the Royal
Proclamation. Even the most ambitious of these type of surrender, however, represent relatively
small areas of land in considering Aboriginal title in the region.
The fact that the treaties did not cede land leaves unilateral legislation as the only other
means by which title may have been extinguished. It is particularly important to assess other
modes of extinguishment in the Maritimes for reasons alluded to by Binne J. in Marshall #1,
where he stated:
While it is true that there is no applicable land cession treaty in Nova Scotia, it is
also true that the Mi'kmaq were largely dispossessed of their lands in any event,
and (as elsewhere) assigned to reserves to accommodate the wave of European
settlement which the Treaty of 1760 was designed to facilitate. It seems harsh to
put aboriginal people in a worse legal position where land has been taken without
their formal cession than where they have agreed to terms of cession.11
The question that remains to be addressed is whether the dispossession that Binnie J. alluded to,
the gradual confining of Aboriginal peoples to reserves that represented but a fraction of their
traditional territories, was undertaken in a way that legally extinguished Aboriginal title. The
remainder of this chapter will focus first on the question of legislative extinguishment of title.
Having discussed the framework for legislative extinguishment in the Maritimes and assessing
instances of possible extinguishment, I will turn to the issue alluded to by Binnie J. That is, if
Aboriginal title was not ceded, and if it was not extinguished by legislation, how were the
Aboriginal peoples dispossessed of their lands and was such dispossession lawful?

9

W.D. Hamilton, “Indian Lands in New Brunswick: The Case of the Little South West Reserve.” (1984) 4
Acadiensis 3 at 16.
10
See Ibid. for a thorough review of these difficulties in respect of a single Mi’kmaw First Nation in the Miramichi
region of New Brunswick.
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Marshall #1, supra note 5 at para 21.
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B. Extinguishment by Unilateral Legislation
I. Legislative Competence
The analysis of possible extinguishment of Aboriginal title in the Maritime Provinces begins in
the old colony of Nova Scotia, which was ceded to the British by the French at the Treaty of
Utrecht in 1713.12 Until 1784 New Brunswick was a part of Nova Scotia, while Prince Edward
Island and Cape Breton remained under French control until 1763 when they were ceded to
Britain at the Treaty of Paris and annexed to Nova Scotia in the Royal Proclamation issued that
year.13 Cape Breton subsequently became an independent colony in 1784, a status it maintained
until 1820.14 Prince Edward Island became an independent colony in 1769, at which point a
colonial government, consisting of a Lieutenant Governor and a Council, was formed. The
Council possessed both executive and legislative powers, while an elected assembly was formed
and met in 1773.15 In the period from 1713 – 1784, then, any extinguishment in present day
peninsular Nova Scotia or New Brunswick can be assessed with reference to the actions of the
colonial government of Nova Scotia or the imperial government acting in respect of Nova Scotia.
From 1763 – 1769, the same is true of PEI and for Cape Breton from 1763 – 1784 and from 1820
onward. The constitutions of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island were closely modeled on
that of Nova Scotia and are subject to the same legal considerations.16 The constitutions in the
12

Sir John G. Bourinot, Builders of Nova Scotia (Toronto: The Copp-Clark Co., 1900) at 27-28 [Builders of Nova
Scotia]; Brian Slattery, The land rights of indigenous Canadian peoples, as affected by the Crown's acquisition of
their territories Thesis (D. Phil.) University of Oxford, 1979 at 128 [Slattery, Land rights of Indigenous Canadian
peoples]. The entire region was in fact granted to Sir William Alexander by means of a Charter in 1621. This has
been ignored when establishing the date of sovereignty in the region, likely because Alexander never fulfilled the
requirements of the Charter. For a discussion of the effect of the charter see Slattery, Land Rights of Indigenous
Canadian peoples at 106-107 and Brian Slattery, “Paper Empires: The Legal Dimensions of French and English
Ventues in North America” in John McLaren, A.R. Buck, Nancy E. Wright. Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in
British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) at 70-71. For a detailed analysis of the context in which the
Charter was granted and the reasons why Alexander had difficulties fulfilling its provisions, see John G. Reid, “Sir
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British Dependencies (London: John Murray, 1856) at 214.
14
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well as executive functions. This constitution remained in force until the reannexation of the island in 1820 to Nova
Scotia of which it still forms a part.” Bourinot, Builders of Nova Scotia, supra note 12 at 29.
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Maritime Provinces were prerogative in nature, gradually developed by prerogative instruments,
primarily governors’ commissions and royal instructions.17 Both the form and legal authority of
the colonial governments in the Maritimes were detailed in these prerogative instruments. That
is, in addition to detailing the authority of colonial governments, these prerogative constitutional
instruments provided for the establishment of representative legislative bodies and imported
from the British Constitution the clear division between executive and legislative bodies.18
A bicameral legislature was not established in Nova Scotia until 1758. 19 Prior to the
founding of Halifax in 1749, the government “was vested solely in a governor who had
command of the garrison stationed at Annapolis.”20 Until that point, Nova Scotia was largely
under military rule.21 Governor Philipps was issued a commission in 1719 authorizing him to
appoint a council of no less than twelve people. The council served legislative, executive, and
some judicial functions.22 The legislative authority of the council, however, was very limited in
scope.23 In 1749 the seat of government was moved to the newly established settlement at
Halifax, with the newly appointed Governor Cornwallis appointing a twelve-person executive
council.24 Though Cornwallis also had the authority to summon a general assembly pursuant to
the royal commission establishing him as governor, such an assembly was not called for another
nine years. The delay in summoning an assembly had important consequences for the legislative
authority of the Governor and Council. When the issue of the legislative authority of the
Governor and Council was raised, the Attorney and Solicitor General of England stated in 1755
that “the Governor and Council of Nova Scotia had no authority from His Majesty to make
17
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laws.”25 This opinion was based on the view that legislative activity was beyond the scope of the
royal commission granted to Governor Cornwallis.26 As the Governor and Council were found to
have no legislative powers by virtue of the fact that such powers were not granted in the royal
commission and instructions to Governor Cornwallis, it is clear that the power to legislatively
extinguish Aboriginal rights was beyond the scope of authority of the colonial government in the
period 1749-1758. Once empowered to summon an assembly, the legislative power of the
executive was greatly diminished. This contemporary analysis provides valuable insight into the
powers of colonial governors in the 18th century.
The royal commission establishing Cornwallis as governor stated that he was
commissioned to the office “with all the rights members appurtenances whatsoever thereunto
belonging,”27 rights which clearly did not include the authority to legislate. The commission
further stated:
[W]e do hereby require and command you to do and execute all things in due
manner that shall belong unto your said Command and the Trust We have reposed
in You according to the several powers and authorities granted or appointed You
by the present Commission and the Instructions herewith given you or by such
further powers Instructions and authorities as shall at anytime hereafter be
Granted or appointed you under our Signet and Sign Manual or by Order in our
Privy Council and according to such reasonable Laws and Statutes as hereafter
shall be made or agreed upon by you with the advice and consent of our Council
and the Assembly of our said Province under your government hereafter to be
appointed…you the said Edward Cornwallis with the advice and consent of our
said Council and Assembly or the major part of them respectively shall have the
full power and authority to make constitute and ordain Laws and Statutes and

25

Murdoch, supra note 20 at 189. It had long been believed that a decision delivered by Chief Justice Belcher
concurred with that of the Imperial law officers. John Bourinot, for example, stated that “[d]uring nine years the
governor-in-council carried on the government without an assembly, and passed a number of ordinances, some of
which imposed duties on trade for the purpose of raising revenue. The legality of their acts was questioned by Chief
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governor's commission, which limited the council's powers” (Bourinot, supra note 12 at 52-53). Subsequent
scholarship, however, has shown that Belcher in fact believed that “the primitive circumstances of Nova Scotian
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an elected assembly”: S. Buggey, “Belcher, Jonathan,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 4, University of
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Commission to Edward Cornwallis, Governor in Chief of Nova Scotia, 6 May 1749, Commissions and
Instruction, Nova Scotia Archives, supra note 21 at 35 [Commission to Cornwallis].
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Ordinances for the publick [sic] Peace Welfare and good Government of our said
province and the people and Inhabitants thereof. 28
Thus, while Cornwallis was issued a seemingly expansive range of powers, including the
authority to “make laws,” he was to do so only upon the advice not only of the executive council,
but also of an elected assembly. As Cornwallis was authorized to summon a legislative assembly,
the legislative power of the office of the governor and the council, as representatives of the
British Crown, was immediately limited.29 The legislative role of the governor, then, was limited
to the power of disallowance, as the commission stated that the governor “shall have a negative
office in the making and passing of all Laws Statutes and Ordinances.”30 The commission also
included a repugnancy clause limiting the legislative authority of the colony, stating that the
governor was not permitted to assent to any laws which were repugnant to the laws of England.31
The authority of the governors and councils in Nova Scotia in the 1713 – 1749 period
may be assessed upon the same reasoning as that employed by the Attorney and Solicitor
General of England in respect of the legislative authority of Governor Cornwallis and his
Council. The authority to establish an executive council was not granted to a Nova Scotia
governor until 1719. As mentioned above, the legislative authority of the council then
established by Governor Philipps was limited, both in terms of the scope of powers delegated to
the colonial government by the relevant prerogative instruments and in the geographic reach of
the ordinances they did pass. Thus, “[t]heir acts did not extend beyond temporary regulations
relative to trade in grain in the Bay of Fundy, or else local enactments touching the people of the
village of Annapolis.”32 Again, this was a constitutional matter (i.e. the scope of powers
delegated was limited) and a practical matter; the British had no functional control over Nova
Scotia outside the fort at Annapolis Royal.33

28

Ibid.
Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204, 98 ER 1045.
30
Commission to Cornwallis, supra note 27 at 43.
31
Ibid. at 42. For detailed discussion of the powers of colonial governments see infra at 65-99.
32
Bourinot, Builders of Nova Scotia, supra note 12 at 22; For a discussion of the symbolic importance of renaming
Acaida and its towns see Wicken, William C. Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land, and Donald Marshall Jr.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 99.
33
Though “Acadia”, present day peninsular Nova Scotia, was ceded to the British in 1713, the British (more
precisely, New Englanders.) had “conquered” the province in 1710. As discussed in Chapter 2, however, this is
somewhat misleading. What the British in fact conquered in 1710 was the fort and garrison at Annapolis Royal.
Well into the 18th century, the British had no effective control over areas outside the immediate vicinity of the fort.
Thus, while the authority of the colonial governors and council theoretically extended to all of the territory ceded
under the Treaty of Utrecht, their power over that territory was gained slowly.
29

106

The tenuous British control over the colony was reflected in the early commissions. Col.
Nicholson, for example, received two commissions in 1712. The first was military in nature,
appointing Nicholson as the “General and Commander in Chief” of the British forces “employed
or to be employed in our Province of Nova Scotia or Acadia.” While this commission also
empowered Nicholson to make rules and ordinances, they were only to be applicable to the
soldiers in Nova Scotia.34 The main concern was providing for punishment for mutiny or
desertion. In the second 1712 commission, Nicholson was appointed Governor, extending his
authority to all British subjects in Nova Scotia, but not granting any authority to make laws,
statutes, rules or ordinances. Col. Samuel Vetch was commissioned as Governor of “Nova Scotia
and of ye [sic] town and Garrison of Annapolis Royal” in 1714. As with the 1749 commission to
Governor Cornwallis, Vetch and Nicholson were enjoined to execute the duties of the
Governor’s office and “all manner of things thereunto belonging.” As discussed above, though,
these duties did not in themselves include legislative powers and no such powers were mentioned
in the commissions. Subsequent commissions to Col. Richard Philipps and Capt. John Doucet in
1717 (as Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, respectively) are nearly identical in form and
content to that of 1714.
It was not until 1719 that Governor Philipps was instructed to form a twelve-person
council and an assembly, both with legislative capacity.35 This is also the first commission that
delegated the authority to grant lands for the purposes of settlement. The issue of settlement will
be dealt with in more detail below. An assessment of the impact of these early commissions on
the legislative jurisdiction of the colonial governors and the Imperial Crown must look to when
an assembly was “promised” in Nova Scotia.36 The 1749 commission clearly instructed
Cornwallis to summon and call a general assembly of the freeholders and planters (according to
usage and custom in other plantations in America).37 An assembly was mentioned as early as
1719, though, and in the subsequent commission to each incoming governor. The 1749
commission is the first to use the word “elected” in respect of the assembly or to signify who was
qualified for election. It is also the first to grant the governor powers of prorogation,
34
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disallowance, etc. that characterize the executive powers vis-à-vis the legislature in the British
constitutional system and clearly establish the governor as the head of civil government in the
colony. Importantly, the 1719 commission to Governor Philipps grants the governor authority to
make laws “with the advice of council and assembly.”38 Nonetheless, the instructions regarding
the summoning of an assembly are much more robust in the 1749 commission and most
commentators have pointed to 1749 as the date when Nova Scotia received a constitution.39 It is
unclear, then, whether the royal prerogative was limited by the promise of an assembly in 1719
or 1749. There is reason, though, to think that it may have been 1719.
Beamish Murdoch, sometimes referred to as “Nova Scotia’s Blackstone,” asserted that
“[o]n the conquest and subsequent cession of this country to the English Crown, the Monarch of
England became sole lord and proprietor of the dominion, with the full right of legislating for the
land and its inhabitants.”40 However, he went on to state that “[i]n the instructions to the
Governor of Nova Scotia there were always directions to call an assembly of the people, but
owing to the almost entire absence of British inhabitants this instruction remained long
inoperative.”41 This would seem to suggest that the 1719 commission should be interpreted as
providing instructions to call an assembly. Indeed, granting the authority to make laws under the
advice of an assembly makes little sense absent an assembly and seems to require that such an
38
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assembly be called before laws can be made. Thus, Murdoch’s assertion that the Crown retained
“the full right of legislating” in Nova Scotia must be qualified. As has been seen, it was a
fundamental principle of imperial law that the royal prerogative to legislate in colonies was
limited when an assembly was granted. The “full right of legislating” that Murdoch refers to, if
considered to extend to ordinary legislation, would have applied in Nova Scotia only from 1713
to either 1719 or 1749. Alternatively, the “full right of legislating” may be interpreted as
meaning the right to legislate equal to the right to legislate in England, though, as has been seen,
this was a very limited authority. Thus, while Murdoch wrote that the legislative power of the
Crown “was exercised only as far as necessity demanded, and only by means of the commissions
issued by the Crown to the several Governors and the royal instructions given in connection with
them,”42 he may have overlooked the fact that this may have been the case not because of
restraint on the part of the Crown, but because the authority to legislate by way of prerogative
had been drastically curtailed in either 1719 or 1749. Given the wording of the 1719
commission, and Murdoch’s statement that the instruction to establish an assembly was “long
inoperative” (a phrase that suggests more than the nine years between 1749 and 1758), it is
difficult to argue that the authority to call an assembly was not granted in 1719, despite that
commission lacking the more detailed instructions provided in 1749. It is clear that the 1719
commission limited the legislative authority of the governor until an assembly was formed.43
The authority of the Crown to legislate in respect of ordinary legislation under the auspices of the
royal prerogative was extinguished in either 1719 or 1749.44
Thus, there were important limitations on the authority of colonial governors and the
Imperial Crown (King-in-Council) in the Maritime Provinces. As discussed in Chapter 2, the
legislative power of the Crown existed in a ceded colony only until such time as an assembly
was granted. Given that we have also seen that Aboriginal title could only have been
extinguished by legislation (or voluntary surrender), it is clear that legislation from the Imperial
Crown could not have extinguished title after 1749 at the latest (in my opinion, 1719). Further, a
reading of the royal instructions and commissions to early governors makes it clear that the
colonial executive was limited not only by the British constitutional restrictions on the legislative
42
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activity of the executive branch, but also by the fact that the power to extinguish rights had not
been delegated. The authority of the governor to legislate independently of the assembly was
limited in 1719. Consequently, the only body with the constitutional capacity to extinguish
Aboriginal title from 1719 to 1758 was the Imperial Parliament.45 These limitations extended to
the territory that is now New Brunswick from 175946 and Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton
from 1763. Put otherwise, despite the fact that New Brunswick, PEI, and Cape Breton were
acquired by cession, the legislative authority of the Crown was limited as soon as they came
under British control by virtue of the fact that they were promptly annexed to a province that
already had a representative assembly. Despite this, considerable Aboriginal lands were taken
during this period by way of settlement, which was authorized in the royal commissions. This
issue will be dealt with in detail below.
In this first period of analysis, focusing on the colonial government of Nova Scotia until a
colonial assembly was summoned on October 2nd 1758, there is no evidence that the authority to
legislatively extinguish Aboriginal rights was ever delegated to colonial authorities. Indeed, until
1758, it is not clear that legislative authority existed at all beyond local ordinances within the
explicit terms of the royal commissions. That is, prior to 1758, the only means of extinguishment
were legislation from the Imperial Parliament, prerogative legislation or legislation from the
colonial executive prior to 1719 or made under authority delegated by the Imperial Parliament.
Authority for such action does not appear to have been delegated.47 Following the division of
Nova Scotia in 1769 and again in 1784, each of the colonies were governed by the same
principles under very similar constitutions.48
Given these limitations on prerogative and executive authority, the question then
becomes whether colonial legislatures in the Maritimes had the authority to legislatively
extinguish title. As discussed in Chapter 2 the jurisdiction of colonial assemblies was delegated
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in nature.49 If colonial legislation is relied on to demonstrate extinguishment, it must be
demonstrated that the colonial assembly in question was delegated the authority to extinguish
title. Colonial legislatures were delegated authority to legislate in respect of the “Peace Welfare
and good Government” of the colony.50 As Sir Roberts-Wray has argued, “[w]hether a particular
enactment is calculated as matter of fact or policy to secure peace, order and good government is
not a question into which the Courts will inquire. In short, it is apparent that the Courts have
attached little value to the actual words but have concerned themselves with the general doctrine
of legislative competence.”51 The phrase, then, is best understood as conferring an expansive,
rather than limited authority, seeming only to limit the jurisdiction of the colony to internal
matters, that is colonial legislation could not have extra-territorial application.52
Determining whether “Peace Welfare and good Government” included the authority to
extinguish Aboriginal title is a complicated task. In Sappier/Gray, Bastarache J held that “it is
not at all clear that the colonial legislature of New Brunswick was ever granted the legal
authority by the Imperial Crown to extinguish aboriginal rights.”53 This would suggest that the
initial delegation of authority to legislate in respect of local matters did not include the authority
to extinguish such rights. Any authority to extinguish rights, then, would have to have come from
a subsequent delegation, a delegation which, it seems, would have to have been made by the
Imperial Parliament. If Aboriginal title could only be extinguished by legislation, and if the
Imperial Crown did not have the authority to legislate after 1749 at the latest, then it is difficult
to see how the Crown could delegate the authority to extinguish such rights.54 While it is
possible that the Crown could delegate such authority in the original commission and
instructions establishing government in the colony (owing to the fact that until that time the
Crown could legislate broadly under the prerogative in conquered or ceded colonies), the Crown
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no longer possessed such authority once an assembly was promised.55 The Crown presumably
could not delegate an authority greater than that which it possessed, meaning that only the
Imperial Parliament could delegate the authority to extinguish rights after 1719 (1749 at the
latest) in the Maritime Provinces.
One problem with this analysis is that, on the face of it, it seems to directly contradict
historical practice. The American colonies, under similar constitutions as those of the Maritimes,
legislated repeatedly in respect of Indians and Indians lands,56 and in the mid-19th century the
assemblies in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island did the same. The
Maritime Provinces all employed Indian Commissioners appointed by the colonial
governments.57 Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether in all of the
cases just mentioned authority was properly delegated to the colonial legislatures, it does not
appear to have been delegated by the Imperial Parliament. The fact that colonial legislatures
legislated in respect of Aboriginal affairs, then, suggests on its face that their initial grant of
authority and subsequent directives from the Crown were thought to have grounded their
jurisdiction.
The language of the 1749 commission to Governor Cornwallis also seems on its face to
suggest an authority to legislate “for” Aboriginal peoples; it grants the power to “make constitute
and ordain Laws and Statutes and Ordinances” for the “Peace Welfare and good Government of
our said province and the people and Inhabitants thereof” [emphasis mine].58 If the term
“inhabitants” includes Aboriginal peoples, then the authority delegated to the legislature to
legislate for “Peace Welfare and good Government” in the Maritime provinces would seem to
have extended to Aboriginal peoples. As discussed in Chapter 1, it is not clear whether
“inhabitants” was meant to include Aboriginal peoples. The term is used in several senses that
seem to exclude Aboriginal people. In Thomas Carleton’s 1784 instructions, for instance, the
term is used to denote the group from which members of the executive council may be chosen.
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Most suggestive, perhaps, is clause 84, which instructs Carleton to “take care that all Planters
Inhabitants and Christian Servants, be listed under good Officers, and when and as often as shall
be thought fit, mustered and trained, whereby they may be in a better readiness for the Defence
of our said Province under your Government.”59 It is doubtful that it was intended that
Aboriginal peoples be included in this group in the 18th century. Most other uses of the term,
though not excluding Aboriginal people, certainly seem not to have them in contemplation;
instead, Aboriginal people are referred to as “neighbours.” The one exception I have found is the
earlier 1729 instructions to Governor Philipps, which instruct the Governor to provide a reward
to any white man who married “an Indian woman, native and inhabitant of Nova Scotia.”60 It
seems that the term “inhabitant” likely did not have a legal definition and instead must be
understood in the context in which it was used; the provisions relating to land settlement
discussed in Chapter 1, for example, seem to include Aboriginal people, while the provisions
requiring military service almost certainly do not. The meaning of the term, then, must be
assessed on a case-by-case basis with reference to the context in which it is used. Whether
“inhabitants” included Aboriginal people in the context of the initial grant of legislative authority
to the colonial governments, however, may not be as important as it first seems, for reasons that
will be made clear below.
In assessing the apparent contradiction between the view that the authority to extinguish
Aboriginal title could only have been delegated by the Imperial Parliament and the fact that
colonial legislatures legislated in respect of Aboriginal peoples in the seeming absence of such a
delegation, we must recall the precise nature of the powers inhering in each branch of
government to assess what may and may not have been delegated. It is clear that the
responsibility to manage Aboriginal affairs in the colonies was left to the King/Queen-in-council,
an authority which was exercised primarily through the various committees of the Privy Council
(various configurations of the Board of Trade) and a Minister of State responsible for colonial
affairs. Once British sovereignty had been acquired, the relationship with Aboriginal peoples fell
within the purview of colonial administration more generally.61 This is evidenced by the frequent
59
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communications between governors and the Board of Trade and relevant secretary of state
concerning Aboriginal issues. The 1784 instructions to Governor Thomas Carleton are
illustrative of the range of authority Governors were delegated in respect of Aboriginal affairs.
Carleton was to maintain correspondence with the Indians, inducing them to be both good
neighbours and British Subjects and, further, to enter into treaties of peace and friendship with
them.62 The 1729 instructions to Richard Philipps directed him to offer a reward to any white
man who married an Indian woman.63 Governors, then, were delegated the authority to enter into
treaties and were tasked with maintaining relationships with Aboriginal peoples. These
relationships were political in nature. The nature of the authority delegated to the Colonial
Governors, then, reflected the authority of the Imperial Crown.64 That authority was limited by
its status as the executive branch of government. Aboriginal title could only have been
extinguished by legislation and legislating was beyond the constitutional bounds of the executive
branch.
The conclusions arrived at in the foregoing analysis are dependent to an extent on matters
of interpretation. If “inhabitants,” as used in the royal instructions, is meant to include Aboriginal
peoples, then it appears that the colonial assemblies were delegated the authority to pass laws
which extended to Aboriginal peoples. In other words, they were under the jurisdiction of the
colonial government. Whether this extended to the authority to extinguish rights is not clear. If
such a delegation needed to be explicit, then it clearly was not. Thus, the situation would mirror
that of the Provinces post-confederation, where laws of general application apply on Indian
reserve lands but the provinces cannot legislate in respect of Indian lands.65 It should also be
noted, however, that, at least in the case of New Brunswick, the colony itself did not believe it
62
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had jurisdiction to legislate in respect of Indian lands until such delegation had been made by the
Colonial Office. That is, whether the term “inhabitants’ as it was used in the royal instructions
included Aboriginal peoples or not, the colonial government believed it required a further
delegation of authority to legislate in respect of Indian lands. If “inhabitants” did not include
Aboriginal people, or if a delegation for the purposes of extinguishment needed to be more
explicit, authority to extinguish rights would have to have been delegated subsequently. After
1719 (or 1749), this subsequent delegation could only have come from the Imperial Parliament,
as the only body with the jurisdiction to legislatively infringe rights. Again, while this conclusion
is at odds with the management of Aboriginal affairs by the executive branch, a clear analysis of
the distinct powers held by each branch of government reveals that the types of delegations
typically made by the Imperial Crown are not incommensurate with the position that the
authority to legislatively extinguish title could only come from the Imperial Parliament.
II. Repugnancy
Repugnancy functions in two senses: (1) colonial laws could not be repugnant to higher order
constitutional laws and principles; and (2) the “doctrine of repugnancy” voided any colonial laws
which were repugnant to imperial laws applying to the colony.
In respect of higher order constitutional laws and principles, two important examples are
the Royal Proclamation, 1763, and the treaties of peace and friendship. The Royal Proclamation
was held by the Supreme Court to apply to the Maritime Provinces in the Marshall/Bernard
decision.66 While the Imperial Parliament possessed the authority to legislate contrary to the
terms of the Proclamation if it wished to do so, the Proclamation bound all colonial governments
in the territories where it applied. The “Indian provisions” of the Proclamation, which prohibited
alienation of Indian lands to any party other than the Crown and established procedural
requirements guiding the acquisition of Indian lands by the Crown, applied in the Maritime
Provinces from 1763 onward, acting to protect the Aboriginal interest in their lands. Similarly,
the treaties of peace and friendship constrained the discretionary authority of British and colonial
governments respecting future settlement and resource management. As discussed at length in
Chapter 1, the treaties created a body of inter-societal law governing the relationship between
66
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Aboriginal peoples and the British and colonial governments. While the doctrine of
Parliamentary supremacy could be invoked to support the view that the Imperial Parliament
could have legislated contrary to the terms of one of the Maritime treaties, there is no evidence
that it did so explicitly. Since 1982, of course, treaties have been given formal constitutional
protection and can only be infringed subject to the test articulated in Badger.
In Bernard, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal skirted the competency question by
relying on the argument that the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 186567 retroactively validated
colonial laws that would otherwise be void for repugnancy. Robertson J. stated:
The legitimacy of colonial legislation was confirmed by the Colonial Laws
Validity Act. That Act retroactively validated all laws passed by a legislature in
any British Dominion by deeming them valid and effectual from the date of their
having received Royal Assent. The only exceptions were with respect to statutes
that had previously been disallowed or repealed.68
With respect, this analysis overstates the effect of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. The Act stated
that laws which were void for repugnancy to British law would no longer be void, but confirmed
that colonial law was subject to, and could not contradict, any imperial law concerning the
colony itself.69 This would have included the Royal Proclamation, as well as the constitutional
framework establishing governmental jurisdiction. In other words, the Colonial Laws Validity
Act could not have operated to revive a law which would have been ultra vires a colonial
legislature, as the constitutional framework establishing that jurisdiction was constituted by
imperial laws about the colony. Robertson J. seems to have recognized this, at least in part, as he
went on to state that “[t]o the extent that the Royal Proclamation is applicable [despite the
passage of the CLVA], extinguishment of aboriginal title can only occur with the consent of the
aboriginal community.”70 In Calder, Hall J confirmed not only that the Proclamation continued
to apply following the Colonial Laws Validity Act, but that the Act in fact made the Proclamation
law in jurisdictions it may not originally have applied to; he held that that “the Colonial Laws
Validity Act applied to make the Proclamation the law of British Columbia.” 71 Thus, colonies
continued to be bound by the Royal Proclamation and the Colonial Laws Validity Act could not
function to retroactively save laws that were in violation of the Proclamation. In recognizing that
67
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the Proclamation continued to apply, Robertson J acknowledged that imperial legislation that
extended to the colony in question, be it ordinary or prerogative legislation, was not affected by
the Colonial Laws Validity Act. His error was in not extending this analysis to the Governors
commissions. While s.5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act provided colonial legislatures with the
capacity to amend prerogative constitutions, absent such amendment they would continue to be
bound by their provisions.
In the result, colonial laws which were repugnant to British law, and have therefore been
considered void ab initio, were retroactively given the force of law by the Colonial Laws Validity
Act. The Act, however, could not function in itself to modify the jurisdiction of colonial
governments. While colonial laws would not be considered void for contradicting royal
instructions, jurisdiction itself still had to be delegated by way of the proper constitutional
instruments. As such, the authority to extinguish Aboriginal rights remained with the Imperial
Parliament as jurisdiction to do so could not have been transferred by retroactively validating
colonial laws that were ultra vires the colonial assembly when they were passed.
III. Clear and Plain Intent
Most extinguishment claims in the Maritime Provinces have been assessed by way of the clear
and plain intent test. In Sappier/Gray, Bastarache J. eschewed the jurisdictional analysis in
favour of application of the clear and plain intent test. This approach followed that taken by
lower courts in both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Second, as the legislation that has been
assessed on the clear and plain intent standard is that put forward by the Crown to prove
extinguishment, it can be assumed that this is the legislation which the Crown attorneys thought
most likely to demonstrate extinguishment. Though this does not mean that legislation which
was not brought forward by the Crown may not have extinguished title, it provides valuable
insight into the types of legislation the Crown may rely on and, as such, is helpful as a starting
point.
In the Bernard litigation, the Crown relied at the trial and appellate levels on four preconfederation statutes to prove extinguishment.72 In fact, the Crown only relied on this
legislation to prove extinguishment of the Aboriginal right to harvest timber, as a “parasitic”
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right derived from title, and not of Aboriginal title itself. Daigle JA rejected this framing,
holding:
Nowhere in the Canadian aboriginal jurisprudence have I found the notion of
piecemeal extinguishment being sanctioned by the courts. Short of
extinguishment of aboriginal title, legislation purporting to limit access to
resources, such as timber in this case, which would otherwise be available
pursuant to aboriginal title, must be analyzed in terms of infringement and
justification. To fail to recognize the distinction between these two approaches is
to confuse regulation and extinguishment.73
The New Brunswick Court of Appeal applied the clear and plain intent test in analyzing the four
pieces of pre-confederation legislation relied on by the Crown. The first was an 1840 act entitled:
“An Act to provide for the more effectual prevention of Trespasses and protection of Timber
growing on Crown lands within this Province, 3 Victoria, Cap. LXXVII.” The remaining three
were: an 1850 act entitled “An Act for the better prevention of Trespasses on Crown Lands and
Private Property, 13 Victoria, Cap. VII,” a revision of the 1850 legislation “reproduced as
Chapter 133 of the Revised Statutes of New Brunswick 1854 but relabelled Of Trespasses on
Lands, Private Property, and Lumber, R.S.N.B. 1854, c.133” and an 1862 amendment to Chapter
133: see c. XXIV S.N.B. 1862.74 As can be seen, the Crown in fact relied on two pieces of
legislation and an additional two legislative amendments to the 1850 Act.
The 1840 Act “prohibits any person from cutting, felling, removing or destroying various
species of trees and lumber made from them without right derived from the Crown to do so.”75
Robertson JA dismissed the submission that this Act extinguished the Mi’kmaq treaty right to
harvest logs on two grounds. First, he held that the legislation gave implicit recognition of the
right to harvest trees from Crown land by virtue of the fact that the treaty right was in fact
derived from the Crown and therefore not subject to the relevant provision of the Act.76 Second,
the Act did not, implicitly or explicitly, evince the requisite clear and plain intent to extinguish
the right. As Robertson JA held, the purposes of the Act were regulatory and penal in nature and
thus cannot “be equated with an implicit intention to extinguish aboriginal rights.”77
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The 1850 Act made it a misdemeanour offense for anyone to remove logs or timber from
any granted or ungranted lands without legal authority.78 As explained by Robertson JA, the Act
further provided that:
[T]he property in timber taken from Crown lands held under lease or licence is in
the lessee or licensee. Section 3 authorizes the lessee or licensee to recover
damages in any action for trespass or replevin. The Crown submits that in
recognizing a licensee to be the owner of the timber, the legislation negates any
notion of a right vested in an aboriginal community.79
A later amendment to this Act deemed licensees to be in possession of the lands on which they
held timber licences, giving them the ability to bring actions in trespass and replevin against
parties that removed timber without permission.80 The Crown argued that this amendment
undermined the ability of the Mi’kmaq to establish title by demonstrating that they did not have
exclusive occupation of the lands in question. This argument was rightly dismissed by Robertson
JA by pointing to the fact that the occupation must have been exclusive at the date of the
assertion of Crown sovereignty, in this case 1759.81 An inability to demonstrate exclusive
occupation subsequent to the date of sovereignty would have no effect on the ability to prove
title.
The last piece of legislation the Crown put forward once again expanded the definition of
“licensee” so that the licensee could bring an action despite “any law, usage or custom to the
contrary.”82 While Robertson JA recognized that this phrase may seem to include Aboriginal
rights, he dismissed this possibility, holding:
This is true until one places the phrase in its historical context. Under the common
law and equity a person who might otherwise be labelled a trespasser could assert
a right to enter on Crown lands for logging purposes provided that person could
establish, for example, adverse possession or a profit à prendre. It seems to me
that the true purpose of the 1862 amendment is to extinguish any non-consensual
right to cut Crown timber that a person may have acquired through the application
of common law and equitable principles. In the present case, we are dealing with
a right established under a consensual agreement and, therefore, the legislation
could not have the effect of implicitly extinguishing a right which arises by
agreement and not by prescription. With respect to aboriginal title, it arises
because of historical occupation prior to the assertion of British sovereignty, not
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by prescription. The Indians were first in time and cannot be compared to
someone who squats on another person’s lands.83
That is, the consensual nature of a treaty right differentiates such rights from the categories of
customary and usage based rights which he interpreted the Act to be contemplating. Further, the
nature of Aboriginal title as a right whose source is derived from pre-sovereignty occupation
distinguishes it from those same categories.
The salient feature of the legislation relied on by the Crown to demonstrate
extinguishment in Bernard was that it dealt with access to Crown lands.84 As Robertson JA
noted, “[a]t the end of the day the Crown’s argument can be reduced to the simple proposition
that by vesting licensees and lessees with ownership of timber growing on Crown lands, the
legislature intended to extinguish aboriginal title and any treaty right to harvest and sell timber
growing on the same lands.”85 Robertson JA disagreed, holding that the statutes controlling
access or granting timber licences to Crown lands did not possess the intent required to
extinguish Aboriginal and treaty rights.86
This reasoning was adopted again by the NBCA in the Gray decision, where Robertson
JA held that his “concurring opinion and that of Justice Daigle in Bernard is a sufficient basis for
purposes of disposing of any argument that an existing aboriginal right was extinguished by
either pre- or post-Confederation provincial legislation.”87 In the Sappier litigation, in which
Maliseet individuals from the Woodstock First Nation relied on treaty and Aboriginal rights to
harvest lumber from Crown lands as a defense to a charge of unauthorized possession of lumber
taken from Crown lands, the Crown did “not allege that the right was extinguished by either preor post-Confederation legislation”88 at the appellate level. Further, the Crown accepted that the
asserted Aboriginal and treaty rights, should they be proven, had been infringed by the Crown

83

Ibid. at para 187.
An argument can be made that Crown lands legislation of the type relied on in Bernard is, by its very definition,
precluded from applying to Aboriginal title lands. In Tsilhqot’in, the Supreme Court held that the British Columbia
Forest Act could not apply to Aboriginal title land because, once title has been recognized, that land is not Crown
land and so not subject to Crown lands legislation. The Court stated: “Once Aboriginal title is confirmed, however,
the lands are “vested” in the Aboriginal group and the lands are no longer Crown lands.” Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra
note 65 at para 115. The difficulty with the analysis is that the Court also held that lands remained Crown lands until
such time as title is “confirmed” through negotiation or litigation. The relationship between Aboriginal title and
Crown lands will be discussed further the section “How Were Aboriginal Lands Taken?”
85
Bernard, NBCA, supra note 68 at para 185 (Robertson JA).
86
Ibid. at para 187.
87
R v Gray, 2004 NBCA 291 at 25; Sappier;Gray, supra note 53 at 56.
88
R v Sappier, 2004 NBCA 295 at 3 [Sappier NBCA].
84

120

Lands and Forests Act and that such infringement could not be justified under the Sparrow and
Badger tests.89
Despite having made this concession at the appellate level, the Crown brought the
extinguishment issue again before the Supreme Court. As discussed above, Bastarache J., writing
for a near unanimous court (with Binnie J. writing a concurring decision), agreed with the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal’s characterization of the legislation being relied on by the Crown as
essentially regulatory in nature, relying on Sparrow to support the holding that the regulation of
the exercise of a right does not extinguish the right.90 The Court therefore held that the preConfederation legislation did not meet the clear and plain intent standard required to extinguish
Aboriginal rights despite a prima facie circumscription of the exercise of those rights.91
In Nova Scotia, the extinguishment of a treaty right to harvest timber under the 1760-61
treaties and the extinguishment of Aboriginal title were addressed by the Court of Appeal in the
Marshall decision.92 Here, the Crown relied on two statutes, An Act to Prevent Waste and
Destruction of Pine or other Timber trees, on certain reserved and un-granted lands in this
province, 1774, c. 3 and An Act concerning Trespasses to Crown Property, 1859, c. 22, to prove
extinguishment of both the asserted treaty right and Aboriginal title. The Crown argued that
because these Acts, which prohibited the removal of timber from Crown lands, did not explicitly
exempt Aboriginal peoples, any rights enjoyed prior to enactment of the legislation were
extinguished. Cromwell JA rejected this view and, like the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in
Bernard, Sappier, and Gray, drew on a long line of Supreme Court decisions to support the
position that regulating the exercise of a right did not demonstrate extinguishment.93 As such, the
legislation relied on by the Crown failed to meet the clear and plain intent standard.
It is evident that the clear and plain intent standard will be difficult for pre-confederation
legislation to meet, as there is almost none that deals specifically with Aboriginal peoples.
Various pre-confederation resource-based Acts, such as those regulating fishing or hunting, are
unlikely to satisfy the clear and plain intent standard for extinguishment of Aboriginal title. Even
if site-specific Aboriginal or treaty rights to hunt or fish were deemed to have been extinguished,
this in itself does not necessarily equate to extinguishment of title. As has been discussed, the
89
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regulation of the exercise of a right does not necessarily extinguish that right. Aboriginal title is a
right to use land. A regulatory framework that restricts that use does not in itself extinguish that
right. Further, many of the resource-based rights are now recognized as both treaty and
Aboriginal rights.94 If a treaty right to hunt survived regulation of that right, it is difficult to see
how that same regulation could then be relied on to extinguish title. Hunting, fishing, etc. are
uses of the land, the regulation of which should have no effect on the underlying title.

C. Instances of Possible Legislative Extinguishment
Having established the parameters of extinguishment particular to the Maritime Provinces
and reviewed the instances where extinguishment of title in the region has been put before the
courts, I will now look to certain Acts that have not yet been tested in court.
I. Colonial Legislation
Most colonial Acts that may have had the effect of extinguishing title on a large scale
have been addressed by the courts and detailed above. I will not review those again here. As the
analysis above illustrates, even if colonial legislatures are found to be competent to extinguish
Aboriginal title, the clear and plain intent test ensures that extinguishment could not have
occurred inferentially; the legislature in question must have clearly intended to extinguish title.
As such, the analysis above can be brought to bear on a number of other acts which may have
had the effect of taking an interest in Aboriginal lands while falling short of extinguishing title.
This would include, for example, acts setting aside land for railroads, wharfs, and mines. I have
yet to find colonial legislation of this character that is likely to satisfy the clear and plain intent
standard applied in the cases discussed above. There were virtually no colonial Acts dealing
directly with Aboriginal peoples until mid-century 19th century attempts to secure the title of
squatters on Aboriginal lands, settle Aboriginal peoples in agricultural communities, and sell off
reserve lands.95 These Acts were: in New Brunswick, the 1844 “Act for the Management and
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Disposal of Indian Reserves in This Province”96; in Nova Scotia, “An Act to Provide for the
Instruction and Permanent Settlement of the Indians”97; and in Prince Edward Island, “An Act
relating to the Indians of Prince Edward Island.”98 I will address each of these in turn.
As the title of the New Brunswick Act suggests, its purpose was to dispose of “unused”
Indian reserve lands.99 The immediate aim of the 1844 Act was to open desirable lands to
settlement, agriculture development, and resource exploitation. Like similar Acts passed in the
other Maritime Provinces and the Canadas in this period, the Act was cast by proponents as a
means of ameliorating the condition of the Indians by settling them in agricultural communities
and “civilizing” them. The purpose of the Act is stated plainly enough in the preamble, which
reads:
Whereas extensive Tracts of Valuable land reserved for the Indians in various
parts of this Province tend greatly to retard the settlement of the country, while
large portions of them are not, in their present neglected state, productive of any
benefit to the people, for whose use they were reserved: And whereas it is
desirable that these Lands should be put upon such a footing as to render them not
only beneficial to the Indians but conducive to the settlement of the Country. 100
The Act granted power to the Lieutenant-Governor, on the advice of the Council, to appoint
individuals to survey Indian reserve lands, to “distinguish the improved from the unimproved
lands,” and to determine which lands were fit for settlement. The lands so identified were then to
be leased or sold pursuant to the procedures established under the Act, which required lands to
be publicly auctioned to the highest bidder.101 The Act included a suspending clause requiring it
to receive royal approbation before it could be enacted; assent was given to the on the 3rd of
September 1844.
The 1842 Nova Scotia Act did not authorize the sale of Indian reserve lands. Indeed,
while permitting the surveying of reserve lands, it provided the Commissioner of Indian affairs
(an office itself created under the auspices of the Act) with reasonably robust powers to deal with
squatters on those lands. The Nova Scotia Act focused more explicitly than the New Brunswick
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Act on the settlement and education of the Mi’kmaq. Thus, while it did not authorize the sale of
lands, it instructed the commissioner to divide the reserves among the heads of families and
prohibited the alienation of those parcels by the Indians themselves. In the revised statues of
1858, however, the Nova Scotia assembly brought the legislation more in line with its New
Brunswick counterpart.102 The revised Act authorized the survey of Indian reserves to determine
where they may be fit for settlement and authorized the sale or lease of such lands on the same
terms as New Brunswick’s Act. The proceeds arising from sales and leases was to go to a
support fund to provide relief to the “indigent and infirm Indians” and to purchase agricultural
implements. Further, the Indian Commissioner was to set apart reserve lands into villages or
townships, in which plots could be freely granted to Indians that “the Governor and Council may
deem fit objects thereof”, who would then be granted the lots free of encumbrances (except
presumably a prohibition on alienation) if they resided upon and improved the lot for ten
years.103
The assembly of Prince Edward Island passed An Act Relating to the Indians of Prince
Edward Island in 1856.104 This Act did not permit the sale or leasing of Indian reserve lands and,
like the earlier Nova Scotia Act, tasked the Indian Commissioner with the protection of reserve
lands, including the authority to take court action against intruders. The Act directed the
Commissioner to communicate with chiefs regarding the settlement and education of the Indians
and to apportion reserve lands to individual families, again subject to prohibitions on alienation.
Importantly, this Act did not authorize the disposal of reserve lands.
These Acts, taken together, represent the whole of the colonial legislation pertaining to
Indian lands in the Maritime Provinces. This statement must be qualified of course, as there is
ample legislation pertaining to lands that may be subject to Aboriginal title (e.g. the legislation
102
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that has previously been relied on as demonstrating extinguishment). Where tested in the courts,
however, such legislation has been unable to satisfy the clear and plain intent requirement and, as
discussed above, was likely ultra vires the colonial assemblies to the extent that it impacted
Aboriginal title lands (and these deal with Indian reserve lands, not Aboriginal title lands writ
large). The Acts just surveyed represent the only pre-confederation legislation from colonial
assemblies that deal directly with Aboriginal lands. With the exception of the Prince Edward
Island Act, then, these pieces of legislation seem to satisfy the clear and plain intent test.105
Given this, the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Acts must be assessed on the basis of
competence and repugnance.
The alienation that took place under the auspices of these Acts, over 10, 000 acres in New
Brunswick alone,106 must be assessed with reference to procedural requirements established in
the Royal Proclamation, 1763. That is, “a surrender required a voluntary, informed, communal
decision to give up the land.”107 These protections have been incorporated into the common law
and apply regardless of the application of the Royal Proclamation to the territory in question.108
The question of whether the decision to sell or lease lands under the colonial Indians Acts was
voluntary, informed, and communal, is a question of fact that I cannot speak to conclusively
here. There is clear evidence that in many cases the Aboriginal people resisted the sale of their
reserve lands.109 In any case where such resistance is evident the Royal Proclamation would
serve to invalidate the alienation. There is also evidence that in some instances Indian
Commissioners sought the approval of communities for the sale of lands.110 Should it be
demonstrated that the consent of a community, given voluntarily and on an informed basis, was
conveyed to the government, the Proclamation would not stand in the way of an otherwise valid
sale.
Even if consent for a sale were given, however, the procedural requirements of the
Proclamation may pose further problems for land transactions conducted under these Acts. The
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third clause of the Royal Proclamation mandates that no sales of lands reserved to the Indians
may be made to private persons.111 By the terms of the Proclamation, alienations could only be
made to the Crown. Under the regime established by the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Indian
Acts, purchases were made directly by third parties. It is not clear whether the fact that the
government was facilitating the sale would satisfy a court that the spirit of the Proclamation had
been followed, but given the Supreme Court’s numerous holdings that the Proclamation “must be
interpreted liberally, and any matters of doubt resolved in favour of aboriginal peoples,” 112 there
is a strong argument in favour of giving a strict interpretation to the prohibitions on alienations to
parties other than the Crown. Indeed, such an interpretation would align with the overarching
purpose of implementing procedural safeguards through the Royal Proclamation, which was to
protect Aboriginal lands from being fraudulently and dishonestly taken. On this interpretation,
even consent of the Aboriginal community could not save sales of land under the Acts.
A party seeking to rely on the sales made under these acts as evidence of extinguishment
would have the burden of demonstrating that the colonial legislatures were competent to
extinguish Aboriginal title. As has been discussed above, it seems that the authority to extinguish
title could only have been delegated by the Imperial Parliament. If this is accurate, then the Acts
at issue here, at least in so far as they deal with the sale or lease of Indian lands, would be ultra
vires the colonial legislatures, the authority for such activity never having been delegated by the
Imperial Parliament. If the authority to extinguish title could have been delegated by the Imperial
Crown, the question becomes whether such a delegation occurred and, if so, whether it was made
according to the proper legal form. Providing a definitive answer to these questions requires
archival research that has unfortunately not been possible, though extensive research of
secondary sources has revealed nothing that suggests such authority was delegated. Again, the
burden of establishing a valid delegation rests with the party seeking to demonstrate
extinguishment.

II. Imperial Legislation

111

Bruce D. Clark, Micmac Grand Council, Lisa Patterson, The Mi’kmaq Treaty Handbook (Truro: Native
Communications Society of Nova Scotia, 1987) at 11.
112
Marshall/Bernard, supra note 66 at 86; Nowegijick v The Queen [1983] 1 SCR 29 at para 36.

126

There are two types of imperial legislation that have a bearing on the question of the
extinguishment of Aboriginal title, Acts of the Imperial parliament (King/Queen-in-Parliament)
and prerogative Acts of the Crown (King/Queen-in-Council). As has been seen, the authority to
extinguish rights at common law rested with the Imperial Parliament. Extinguishment in the
Maritime Provinces, then, would have required an Act from the Imperial Parliament that clearly
extinguished title or delegated the authority to do so. The executive (King/Queen-in-Council)
could only have extinguished title where unambiguously delegated the authority to do so by
Parliament. The lone exception to this was when a conquered or ceded territory had not yet
received instructions to establish an assembly, wherein the executive retained the authority to
legislate for the colony. As has been seen, this authority existed in the Maritime Provinces only
until 1749 at the latest. Any purported extinguishment of title after that date required an Act of
the Imperial Parliament either extinguishing title or delegating the authority to do so.
There is very little legislation pertaining to the Maritime Provinces from the Imperial
Parliament. Certain imperial legislation was of particular importance, such that ensuring it was
obeyed was part of the governor’s commissions. Imperial Acts of Navigation and Trade were
cited specifically in royal commissions as Acts which colonial authorities were bound to ensure
compliance with. While “the legislative authority of Parliament extends over the United
Kingdom, and all its colonies and foreign possessions; and there are no other limits to its power
of making laws for the whole empire than those which are incident to all sovereign authority –
the willingness of the people to obey, or their power to resist,”113 the imperial government was
sensitive to the concerns of colonists that the imposition of imperial legislation in the colonies
amounted to unrepresentative governance.114 The Imperial Parliament dealt little with the local
affairs of the Maritime colonies. Once the colonies were well established and the Indians ceased
to be of strategic importance, the imperial officials, both executive and legislative, were largely
content to put responsibility for dealing with the Indians on the colonial government. 115 This
should not, however, be taken as a delegation of authority to extinguish Aboriginal rights and
title.
The majority of imperial legislation directed specifically at New Brunswick and Prince
113
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Edward Island dealt with customs and duties, including the importation of rum for sale in the
Canadas, opening ports to trade, governing trade between the Maritime Provinces, and
establishing New Brunswick’s border with the Canadas.116 The lone exceptions appear to be two
1834 Acts creating land acquisition companies; “An Act for granting certain Powers to the New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia Land Company”117 and “An Act for granting certain Powers to the
British American Land Company.”118 As the names suggest, these companies were “established
for the Purpose of purchasing, holding, improving, clearing, settling, and cultivating, letting,
leasing, exchanging, selling, and disposing of waste Lands, and other Lands, Tenements, and
Hereditaments.”119 In short, the land companies functioned as a means of privatizing the
settlement process, with companies being permitted to purchase Crown lands at discount rates on
the condition that they build the infrastructure necessary to facilitate settlement.120 The
companies were then tasked with selling the lands to prospective settlers.
These are the only Acts from the Imperial Parliament which deal directly with the sale or
disposal of lands in the Maritime Provinces. In assessing whether the Acts may have
extinguished Aboriginal title, competence is not at issue. These Acts may, however, prove
problematic where constitutional repugnancy is concerned. Should Aboriginal title be proven to
lands to which the New Brunswick Company held the first Crown derived title, a party seeking
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to demonstrate that this acquisition extinguished title would be required to demonstrate that the
acquisition was not repugnant to prevailing constitutional laws and principles. I have found no
evidence that the 589,000 acre purchase made by the company in York County, which sits
primarily in the traditional territory of the Maliseet though extends into traditional Mi’kmaw
territory as well, was preceded by an Aboriginal surrender of land pursuant to the procedural
terms of the Royal Proclamation.121 It is important to recall that even surveying the land itself
without Aboriginal consent is a violation of the Royal Proclamation. Further, the interpretation
of the Peace and Friendship Treaties articulated in Chapter 1 would require that the Aboriginal
interest be purchased or ceded to any areas outside those already settled by the British in 1726.
If the land in question was not purchased or ceded, the Act enabling the company’s
activities must satisfy the clear and plain intent test if it is to be relied on as evidence of
extinguishment. The Imperial Parliament could, if it wished, legislate contrary to the Royal
Proclamation (e.g. the Quebec Act 1774), though extinguishment must still be assessed on the
basis of the clear and plain intent standard. The New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Land Company
Act granted the power to purchase and re-sell or otherwise dispose of “waste Lands, and other
Lands, Tenements, and Hereditaments.”122 It also grants subsurface rights in lands acquired
under the Act. Though the Act stops short of an explicit extinguishment of title, the standard the
courts have applied falls somewhat short of requiring an explicit statement. In Calder Hall J
rejected the view that “general land” legislation could extinguish title, holding that
extinguishment requires “specific legislation.”123 The first question, then, is whether the
terminology in the act (“waste Lands, and other Lands, Tenements, and Hereditaments”)
contemplates Aboriginal lands. As seen in the analysis of the 1844 Act, “waste lands” was a term
that indicated that lands were unused or uncultivated and was used in the context of that Act to
describe Aboriginal reserve lands that had not been cultivated or improved. The phrase “other
Lands, Tenements, and Hereditaments” is certainly broad enough to include Aboriginal land
rights. The question here is indeed whether the phrase is too broad and falls into the category of
“general land” legislation. Lamer CJ’s statement in Gladstone is instructive here; he stated:
121
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While to extinguish an aboriginal right the Crown does not, perhaps, have to use
language which refers expressly to its extinguishment of aboriginal rights, it must
demonstrate more than that, in the past, the exercise of an aboriginal right has
been subject to a regulatory scheme.124
The distinction drawn here is between a general regulatory scheme on the one hand and
an explicit statement of extinguishment on the other. This distinction is reflected in Daigle JA’s
reasoning in Bernard where he held that creating regulatory regimes governing the use of Crown
land and licensing regimes regarding the timber on those lands was insufficient to extinguish
Aboriginal rights.125 The facts here are somewhat different. This is not a case of imposing a
regulatory scheme which has the effect of limiting the full exercise of a right; rather, it is a grant
of land so complete that it seems inimical to the existence of any other interest. While it is clear
that as a general proposition a grant cannot extinguish rights, in this instance we are dealing not
with a grant, but a right to purchase enabled by imperial legislation. In this light, it seems the
interest of the New Brunswick Company sits between the two poles identified by Lamer CJ in
Gladstone. While there is no explicit extinguishment of rights or title, nor is it merely general or
regulatory legislation. Adoption of a somewhat different articulation of the clear and plain intent
test may yield a clearer result in this case. In Van der Peet, McLachlin J, as she then was, writing
in dissent, articulated a clear and plain standard that would require an “indication that the
government of the day considered the aboriginal right on the one hand, and the effect of its
proposed action on that right on the other.”126 In other words, McLachlin would have required
evidence that the government of the day had the Aboriginal right in question in mind and made a
deliberate decision to legislate in a manner incommensurate with the existence of that right, even
if extinguishment did not need to be expressly stated in the legislation. The widely held belief in
the 19th century that Aboriginal peoples in the Maritimes possessed no land rights whatsoever
would, on this reading, seem to preclude satisfaction of the clear and plain intent standard.127
Further, the term “waste lands” as used in the legislation was likely intended to refer only to
Crown lands. It seems highly unlikely, for example, that the Act was intended to apply to
privately owned lands that were going unused. While some early grants were allowed to escheat
if they went unused, this is much different from permitting the taking of privately held lands. It
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seems likely, then, that the Act was only intended to apply to lands held by the Crown that were
unburdened by any other interest, which would exclude Aboriginal title lands.
The legislative history of the Imperial parliament in respect of Nova Scotia is much the
same, with trade dominating the agenda, with one important exception. Every year from 1748 –
1779, the Imperial Parliament approved money for the settlement of Nova Scotia, specifically,
“for supporting, maintaining and enlarging the Settlement of his Majesty's Colony of Nova
Scotia.”128 Thus, the governor’s commission to Cornwallis seems to have had enabling
legislation from the Imperial Parliament. This would have allowed the governor to settle lands in
Nova Scotia while the enabling legislation continued to be passed annually and would have
extended to present day New Brunswick and PEI, after those colonies became part of Nova
Scotia (Prince Edward Island until only 1769)
The authority to settle lands, however, should not necessarily be equated with the
authority to extinguish rights. It is well established that the Crown possessed the authority to
create interests in land by granting Crown land.129 Rather than delegating authority to the Crown
to settle lands, the Supply Acts simply authorized the money required by the Crown to carry out
its prerogative activity of granting Crown lands. As discussed in Chapter 1, it should be
presumed that the Imperial Parliament intended to act in accordance with the treaties of peace
and friendship (which, as discussed there, required that Indian land be purchased or ceded before
being settled). Far from authorizing the Crown to extinguish Aboriginal title, the Imperial
Parliament’s funding for settlement merely authorized the Crown expenditures required to
effectuate settlement by means of grants of Crown lands. How the “Crown lands” came to be
acquired is another question, but we should recall that no Crown lands legislation has yet been
before the courts which was found to satisfy the clear and plain intent test. Further evidence that
the grants of lands for settlement were intended to be grants of Crown land can be found in the
royal commissions themselves, where governors were instructed to “settle and agree with our
inhabitants [Indians] for such lands as now or hereafter shall be in our power to dispose of.”130
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II. Federal Legislation
Federal legislation has yet to be relied on to demonstrate extinguishment of title. There is
little federal legislation that, on its face, extinguishes or could be read as extinguishing title. The
federal government clearly had the authority to extinguish title from 1867 – 1982. However, any
legislation relied on to demonstrate extinguishment would be subject to the clear and plain intent
test. The lone exception to this is the view that statutes of limitation that operate as federal
legislation may have the effect of extinguishing title.131 This issue will be discussed in detail
below.

D. How Were Aboriginal Lands Taken?
The analysis and research presented above suggest that Aboriginal title has not been
extinguished by voluntary surrender or by legislation in the Maritime Provinces. As Binnie J.
stated in Marshall #1, however, the Aboriginal peoples of the region were “largely dispossessed
of their lands in any event.”132 The question we must ask, then, is how this dispossession took
place. Given that we have seen that Aboriginal title could only have been extinguished by
voluntary surrender or clear and plain legislation passed by a competent legislative body, any
loss of land that occurred by other means could not have legally extinguished title.
Overwhelmingly, Aboriginal peoples in the Maritime Provinces were dispossessed of
their lands by settlement and by the Crown assertion that all lands lands in the region were
Crown lands over which the Crown held the authority to regulate the use of the land and
resources. The process of claiming lands as Crown lands was fundamentally intertwined with the
process of creating Indian reserve lands. These three interrelated matters, Crown lands,
settlement, and the creation of Indian reserves, must be considered in assessing the dispossession
of Aboriginal lands. Moses Perley, an Indian Commissioner in New Brunswick from roughly
1837 – 1848, put the matter clearly when he stated:
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[t]he first step was a joint occupation of the country by the Indians and British
settlers: the second was assigning to the Indians certain districts of counties,
within which they were not to be disturbed, the next, confining each Tribe to a
certain tract or portion of land called a reserve and finally, reducing those reserves
by degrees until in 1842 only one half remained ... and to conclude by selling all
that remains ... without any provision for their [the Indians] future welfare.133
Perley’s comment was prompted by the passage of the 1844 Act discussed above, which aimed
to sell “unused” portions of Indian reserves and validate the title of illegal squatters on those
lands. As this Act and its counterparts in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island were analyzed
above, it is the earlier stages that Perley identified that are of most interest here. In particular, the
transition from a period of joint occupation negotiated through the treaty process, to a period in
which Aboriginal peoples were pushed to certain districts and then confined to reserves, is
crucial to understanding the ways in which Aboriginal peoples were dispossessed of their lands
in the Maritime Provinces. It is not possible to provide a full accounting of this historical
transition here; the pioneering work of LFS Upton and excellent subsequent work by Professors
John Reid, William Wicken, and Richard Bartlett, among others, should be consulted for a
detailed historical analysis. Nonetheless, an identification of the broader trends underlying the
taking of Aboriginal lands can provide sufficient material to identify the relevant legal
framework that should be employed in analyzing the means, other than voluntary cession and
unilateral legislation, through which Aboriginal peoples were pushed off their traditional lands,
and to provide a range of legal conclusions.
The correlative forces of non-Aboriginal settlement and the establishment of Indian
reserves were surface manifestations of the imperial and colonial pretension that the radical title
arising from the assertion of Crown sovereignty was not burdened by Aboriginal land rights and
that all of the land in the region could be treated as Crown land and regulated and disposed of
accordingly. In other words, the assumption that all lands in the Maritime Provinces were Crown
lands was a condition precedent to the grants of settlement and the creation of Indian reserves
which effected the actual change in physical possession of lands. I will address each of these
processes before turning to an analysis of their legality.
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I. Crown Lands
Though the Supreme Court of Canada has determined that “the doctrine of terra nullius (that no
one owned the land prior to European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in Canada,”134 it is
evident that, from a practical standpoint, much of the settlement and extension of imperial
control in the Maritime Provinces proceeded as if the territory was in fact terra nullius.135 Put
otherwise, the imperial and colonial authorities took a de facto terra nullius approach in respect
of lands in the region. One justification that has been employed both historically and in relatively
contemporary times for this approach suggests that Aboriginal title in the region had been
extinguished by French colonization and, therefore, had already been extinguished when the
British acquired sovereignty.136 The British, in other words, at least purported to believe that the
French cession of Acadia transferred to them an absolute title to the region as a whole,
unburdened by any Aboriginal interest.137 Whether the British fully believed this or not,
Aboriginal peoples certainly did not. Thus, “English pioneers who mocked the savages with the
assertion that the King of France had surrendered their country were met by dignified
declarations of Abenaki sovereignty and independence.”138 The Aboriginal perspective on this
issue has gained favour with legal academics and the courts. Professor Slattery has argued that
Aboriginal land rights were not extinguished under the French regime and remained extant
through the French cession of Acadia to the British. Slattery stated that
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[w]e may conclude that the rights of indigenous peoples to Nova Scotian lands in
their possession presumptively survived the cession of 1713, not having been
abrogated in any extensive manner by the French Crown prior to transfer, nor by
the incoming sovereign in the process of acquisition.139
Professor Slattery elaborated in a passage cited authoritatively by the Supreme Court:
[t]he doctrine of aboriginal rights, like other doctrines of colonial law, applied
automatically to a new colony when the colony was acquired. In the same way
that colonial law determined whether a colony was deemed to be “settled” or
“conquered”, and whether English law was automatically introduced or local laws
retained, it also supplied the presumptive legal structure governing the position of
native peoples. The doctrine of aboriginal rights applied, then, to every British
colony that now forms part of Canada, from Newfoundland to British Columbia.
Although the doctrine was a species of unwritten British law, it was not part of
English common law in the narrow sense, and its application to a colony did not
depend on whether or not English common law was introduced there. Rather the
doctrine was part of a body of fundamental constitutional law that was logically
prior to the introduction of English common law and governed its application in
the colony.140
This view, what might be called the historical constitutional argument, was one of two arguments
relied on by the Supreme Court in R v Coté141 in dismissing the proposition that French
colonization abrogated Aboriginal land rights. Accordingly, Lamer CJ held that, even if
Aboriginal title were to have been extinguished under French law (a proposition he saw as
dubious), it “is not at all clear that French colonial law governing relations with aboriginal
peoples was mechanically received by the common law upon the commencement of British
sovereignty.”142 Lamer CJ thus concluded that “the common law recognizing aboriginal title was
arguably a necessary incident of British sovereignty which displaced the pre-existing colonial
law governing New France.”143 On the basis of what I have called the historical constitutional
argument, then, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that Aboriginal title could not have
survived French colonization.
The Supreme Court in Côté also rejected this argument on other grounds. On the basis of
what I will call the modern constitutional argument, the Court held that a finding that French
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colonization extinguished Aboriginal rights would be inimical to the “terms and purpose” of
s.35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.144 In relying on s.35(1), Lamer CJ underscored the fact
that, once given constitutional protection in 1982, Aboriginal rights could not have been
extinguished “in the absence of specific extinguishment” and that “the French Regime’s failure
to recognize legally a specific aboriginal practice, custom or tradition… clearly cannot be
equated with a “clear and plain” intention to extinguish such practices under the extinguishment
test of s. 35(1).”145 In taking this approach, Lamer CJ established that the extinguishment of
rights during the French colonial period would be adjudicated on the standards established by the
Court in the post-1982 era. As a result, the argument that Aboriginal title in the Maritime
Provinces did not survive French colonization is not tenable.
Nonetheless, by the 19th century, terra nullius had clearly become engrained as the basis
for both imperial and colonial policy in the Maritime Provinces. This was made clear by the
approach taken to Crown lands and the manner in which the executive authority to dispose of
lands in the colonies was exercised. The Crown appropriated wholesale the lands in the Maritime
Provinces as Crown lands, and, once having done so, saw fit to grant those lands for settlement
at its pleasure and to limit the scope of the use and occupation of land by Aboriginal peoples. As
Professor Harald Prins stated, “Mi’kmaq country was thus ‘magically’ transformed into Crown
land.”146 Though colonial and imperial authorities recognized limited Aboriginal rights to land,
they considered the limitations on their authority in respect of those lands (whether from the
treaties, Royal Proclamation, or common law) to apply only to Indian reserve lands, believing
there to be no Aboriginal land rights in existence beyond the boundaries to those reserves.
Control of Crown lands was vested in the executive branch and was considered a
prerogative power.147 Within the overarching category of Crown lands there was often a
distinction made between Crown lands and Crown forests, the latter sometimes referred to as
“royal reserves.” Crown lands were all those lands which were part of the domain of the Crown
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which had not already been granted to private parties. Royal reserves were broad tracts of land
which were surveyed and set aside to supply the needs of the Imperial Crown (e.g. the Royal
Navy).148 Crown lands were granted for the purposes of settlement, sold to timber companies and
financiers, and leased to the same. Forestry was a crucial industry in the early development of the
colonies and the control and management of Crown lands and forests became a contentious
political issue. As early as 1728, the Surveyor-General of the Woods in North America was
commissioned to “colonize” Nova Scotia in the hopes of securing white pine masts for the Royal
Navy when they could no longer be procured from New Hampshire.149 Control of the forests in
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia was later under the auspices of the Surveyor-General of the
King’s Woods in Halifax who oversaw a chief deputy in New Brunswick. The deputies of the
Crown forests “functioned altogether apart from the lieutenant-governor and his council.”150 The
Surveyor-General of the King’s Woods and his deputies, in other words, were offices delegated
directly by the imperial administration. As late as 1808, however, “[t]he legal basis of the
surveyor-general’s authority was still subject to clarification.”151 Colonial authorities in New
Brunswick contended, rightly it seems, that the forests were being mismanaged and, in 1816,
after a second appeal from the colonial government, the Colonial Office declared that the
Surveyor-General had no authority to grant licenses to cut timber on Crown lands.152 The dozen
years preceding this decision were characterized by poor policy and a lack of enforcement that,
as W.S. MacNutt has argued, led to there being effectively no law governing the timber trade in
the province.153 As such, “[t]he fourteen million acres of Crown lands, still ungranted, were open
to the forays of those whose business it was to get out timber almost without restraint.” It is clear
that the Aboriginal title lands which fell within what were considered Crown lands could have
been subject to intrusion from often avaricious lumbermen operating largely outside the scope of
colonial or imperial law.
Control of the Crown lands in New Brunswick would remain a highly contentious issue.
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Authority to manage Crown lands, which had rested with the colonial executive since 1816, was
transferred to a newly formed office of the Commissioner of Crown Lands in 1824. Thomas
Baillie, a highly divisive figure in the province, was appointed commissioner.154 Baillie intended
to sell off the entirety of the Crown lands in the province and “[i]n both public and private
capacities he opened negotiations with British capitalists for the sale of land.” 155 Baillie made
clear that “[r]ather than deal with a hundred timber merchants within the province on a year-toyear basis, he preferred to open the county to the endeavours of a half dozen great corporations
originating abroad.”156 This inclination coincided closely enough with the imperial desire to
employ Crown lands in the service of defraying the costs of the administration of colonial
governance that Baillie gained favour with imperial authorities.157 The sale of Crown lands
began in earnest in 1827.158
If the Colonial Office approved of Baillie’s plans, however, much of the public, and the
colonial assembly, did not. As MacNutt put it, “[t]he people of New Brunswick possessed the
general belief that the Crown lands were their own inheritance, not that of the Empire at
large.”159 Large grants to wealthy capitalists, such as those of 500 square miles to Joseph Cunard
and Alexander Rankin on the northwest Miramichi and Restigouche Rivers respectively, were
not well received in the province. Such was the imperial approval of Baillie’s plans, though, that
he quickly became the most influential man in the province.160 Baillie’s influence points to the
importance of Crown lands in the minds of Colonial Office officials. Control of Crown lands was
an exercise of the royal prerogative.161 Thus, the executive branch of the imperial government,
whether by instructing a colonial governor or establishing another delegated office (e.g.
Commissioner of Crown Lands), could exercise control over any lands deemed to be Crown
lands. This included the authority to grant, sell, or lease those lands. The battle over Crown lands
in New Brunswick in the 1830’s, then, was not only a battle over control of the lands themselves;
it was also a flashpoint in the conflict between proponents of a greater degree of self-government
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in the province and those seeking to maintain the power of the Imperial Crown in the colonies.162
The Imperial Crown wanted to retain control over Crown lands in order to profit from
their sales, to ensure a steady supply of wood for the royal navy, and as a means of facilitating
settlement. As Professor MacNutt stated, many in Britain had “acquired the imaginative
conviction that the wilderness lands of the Empire were the heritage of the unwanted surplus of
British population. The millions of acres of untilled land in North America seemed the logical
repository for the hundreds of thousands of persons who looked beyond the seas for the means of
a new life.”163 Nonetheless, the Colonial Office’s primary objective was to pass the cost of the
administration of government in the province on to the provincial assembly. Thus, control over
Crown lands was passed to the province in 1837 in exchange for a commitment from the
province to assume responsibility for the costs of government (by way of a permanent civil
list).164 The policy of making large grants of land to capitalists was abandoned; thereafter it could
only be sold for settlement in 100 acre parcels.165
It has often been asserted that jurisdiction over Indians was also passed to the province in
1837.166 This assertion seems to be based on the assumption that Indian lands were Crown lands.
As will be discussed in more detail below in the sections on the creation of Indian reserves and
on the legality of the processes of dispossession described here, colonial officials were of the
view that the Aboriginal peoples held no land rights save for a limited range of rights on Indian
reserve lands. Those reserves, in turn, were created by the executive on “Crown lands” and, as
such, were thought to pass to the province with control of the Crown lands. By the 19th century,
the dominant view held that Aboriginal peoples possessed no land rights beyond the limited right
to occupy reserve land. The failure to distinguish between Aboriginal title lands and Indian
reserve lands seems to have led to the conclusion that jurisdiction over Indian affairs passed with
jurisdiction over Crown lands. In CP v Paul167, the Supreme Court seemed to accept the finding
of the lower courts that jurisdiction to manage Indian reserves rested with the provinces by the
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mid-19th century pursuant, presumably, to the provincial authority to manage Crown lands.168
While this may have been true of Indian reserve lands, insofar as the provincial Crown held
radical title to those lands, this does not extend to the authority to extinguish Aboriginal title in
those or other lands.
If contemporary commentators have missed the mark on this point, however, it is tied to
the misapprehensions of those individuals involved at the time. So intertwined were Crown lands
and Indian lands in the minds of colonial officials that jurisdiction for Indian affairs often fell to
the Crown Lands Office. Due to the inattention of the provincial assembly and the Indian
commissioner, who focused only on relief funds, “concern for the Indian reserves passed almost
by default to the office of the commissioner of crown lands.”169 In Nova Scotia, the offices of the
Indian Commissioner and the Commissioner of Crown Lands were merged in 1862. Further, the
provincial assembly, in attempting to procure reliable surveys of Indian reserves, mandated that
where surveys had not been completed, the Crown lands commissioner be “vested with title to all
Indian [reserve] lands.”170 Again, the distinction between title lands and reserve lands is crucial
to this analysis and will be revisited below.
In Nova Scotia, the circumstances surrounding Crown land differed in many respects
from those in New Brunswick. By the 19th century the majority of the land in the province had
been sold to settlers and lumbermen. All that remained were “1,500,000 acres of relatively poorquality and difficult-to-access crown forest.”171 Nonetheless, Nova Scotia hoped to reap some of
the profits from Crown lands seen in New Brunswick and, in 1899, passed an Act that permitted
the government to lease Crown lands. The primary goal of the Act was to “allow the lease of the
only extensive, contiguous block of crown land left in the province, the so-called “Big Lease”,
covering about 620,000 acres”172 in Cape Breton. Thus, while on a much smaller scale than in
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia saw a similar pattern of sales and leases play out on its Crown
lands.173 Despite this smaller scale, the salient legal features of Crown land in Nova Scotia,
particularly the terra nullius approach and failure to distinguish between Crown and Aboriginal
lands, mirrored the situation in New Brunswick.
168

Ibid. at 675.
Upton, supra note 57 at 95.
170
Ibid. at 95 – 96.
171
L. Anders Sandberg, “Forest Policy in Nova Scotia: The Big Lease, Cape Breton Island, 1899-1960” (1991) 20:2
Acadiensis 105 at 105.
172
Ibid. at 106.
173
For a detailed account see Ibid; Upton, supra note 57 at 81-97.
169

140

The pattern of Crown land use in the Maritime Provinces was dependent on a de facto
terra nullius approach which ignored existing land rights of Aboriginal peoples, assuming that
any lands over which sovereignty had been asserted were Crown lands to be managed by the
executive pursuant to the royal prerogative.174 The language employed by W.S. MacNutt in his
recounting of the elimination of royal timber reserves is telling; MacNutt argued that the royal
reserves became part of the “ordinary domain of the Crown,” and therefore became “Crown
lands”, once they were released to the provinces.175 This is a reflection of the belief that any
lands within the Crown’s domain (i.e. over which it had acquired sovereignty) were Crown
lands. This is not a tenable assumption. Further, it is important to note that this is an assumption
which only developed in the 19th century. As discussed in chapter one, the British recognized
throughout the 18th century that the Aboriginal inhabitants of the region held rights to their
traditional territories. It was only once the influx of Loyalist settlers and the conclusion of the
war of 1812 solidified British hegemony that the dominant legal and political discourse could
exclude Aboriginal peoples from consideration. As L.F.S. Upton has pointed out, “there was no
attempt at an orderly transfer of Indian lands to the whites; everything belonged outright to the
Crown.”176 As illustrated above, once the Crown assumed ownership of “everything,” one of the
primary uses of Crown lands was forestry. The other was settlement.

II. Settlement
British settlement in the Maritime Provinces remained scant throughout most of the 18th century.
Until the founding of Halifax in 1749, there was no British sustained presence outside the fort at
Annapolis.177 The British government sought to extend its imperial control over the parts of the
region it had acquired at the Treaty of Utrecht through the extension of Protestant settlement,
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with Halifax being the first major attempt to counterbalance the French influence at
Louisbourg.178 The founding of Halifax also indicated that the Board of Trade intended to pursue
settlement without the approval of the Mi’kmaq.179 The British plan to gain control through
Protestant settlement was complicated by the presence of the Acadians and the Mi’kmaq, and
they devised plans to deal with each. In addition to assimilation through force of numbers, the
expulsion of the Acadians, which was finally executed in 1755, had been periodically considered
since 1713.180 The Mi’kmaq were treated differently. Though in 1749 Governor Cornwallis was
of a mind to forcibly remove them from peninsular Nova Scotia, the Colonial Office rejected the
idea.181 While settlement of Halifax proceeded without Aboriginal consent, a negotiated
framework for settlement continued to be sought through the treaty process. As Professor John
Reid has argued, “this strategy for pacification of Nova Scotia [through settlement and
assimilation] would have to compete with a treaty-based Aboriginal strategy for a different form
of pacification in which colonial settlement would be rigorously confined.”182
Thus, the British not only took different approaches to the Acadian and the Mi’kmaq,
their strategy respecting the Mi’kmaq was itself two-sided. While the treaty process represented
one pole of the imperial policy, one that was grounded in engaging Aboriginal peoples on the
basis of their own legal frameworks, the founding of Halifax represented the other. That the
establishment of Halifax represented an attempt to exert imperial control through settlement is
clear from the royal instructions given to Governor Cornwallis. As Professor Reid has noted, the
instructions to Cornwallis “included a series of instructions relating to settlement that had not
been issued to previous governors, in Nova Scotia or elsewhere.”183 These included directives
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not only to lay out townships, but to do so as a means of securing settlers against the incursions
of Indians.184 Nonetheless, the treaty relationship continued to be emphasized and later governors
continued to be instructed to treat with the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet.185
Though another Protestant settlement was formed at Lunenburg in 1753, by 1758 there
was still virtually no non-Acadian or Mi’kmaw settlement outside Annapolis, Halifax, and
Lunenburg.186 On 12 October of that year Governor Lawrence issued the first of two
proclamations, the second coming in early 1759, promoting and inviting settlement in the
province.187 These proclamations not only invited settlement, but also presented a comprehensive
description of the form of government that was to prevail in Nova Scotia. The ambitious scope of
settlement conceived by Governor Lawrence, which was not limited to former Acadian
settlements, was made clear in the wording of the proclamations, the earlier of which stated:
townships are to consist of one hundred thousand acres of land, that they do
include the best and most profitable land, and also that they do comprehend such
rivers as may be at or near such settlement, and do extend as far up into the
country as conveniently may be, taking in a necessary part of the sea coast. 188
It seems clear that one hundred thousand acre tracts of “the best and most profitable land,”
including rivers and sea coast, would certainly have overlapped with Aboriginal territory in
many places.189
Nonetheless, the settlement in the decade following Governor Lawrence’s proclamations
did not radically alter the power dynamics in the region. In the 1760’s, the arrival of New
England Planters caused tensions to rise with the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet. At the same time, a
small number of British entrepreneurs began to settle on New Brunswick’s main river systems.
184
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William Davidson and John Cort were granted 100,000 acre township grant along the Miramichi
River in 1765.190 Despite this, the arrival of the Planters did not shift the balance of power to the
extent that was intended. As Professor Reid wrote, “insofar as the Planter migration had
represented a coordinated, military-inspired intervention into Aboriginal territory, and one that
had intended substantial environmental change in selected locations, it had met with no greater
success than had the British efforts of the 1750s.”191 What is notable in this analysis is that,
despite Planter success at establishing agricultural communities, the balance of power in the
region continued to be shared. As Reid put it, during this period “Pax Britannica and Pax
Indigena hung in the balance.”192 Put otherwise, even following the first substantial attempts at
British settlement, the British had failed to conclusively alter the balance of power in the region.
The number of non-Aboriginal settlers at the end of the 1760’s was fewer than the number at the
beginning of the expulsion of the Acadians.193 Thus, “the Halifax regime had settled into a
pattern that made it only the latest of the many imperial intrusions that the Aboriginal nations
had been able to domesticate since the early seventeenth century.”194 The other notable point in
Reid’s analysis is that settlement itself was used, at least since the founding of Halifax, as a
“military-inspired intervention into Aboriginal territory.” Despite the limited success this tactic
initially enjoyed, the use of settlement as a means of extending imperial control seems on its face
difficult to reconcile with the treaty relationship described in Chapter 1.
The limited success of settlement in the half-century following the Treaty of Utrecht
reversed quickly following the American War of Independence. With the arrival of no fewer than
30,000 Loyalist settlers beginning in 1782, the pace of the dispossession of the Mi’kmaq,
Maliseet, and Passamaquoddy accelerated and the balance of power shifted conclusively to the
imperial and colonial governments.195 Loyalist settlement was characterized by rapacity for land
and a deep sense of entitlement.196 The impact of the Loyalist settlers was felt immediately, as
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they valued the same land as the Aboriginal inhabitants. Due to the small size of peninsular Nova
Scotia, the Mi’kmaq quickly found that there were no lands left for them to occupy. The
Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia petitioned Governor Wentworth for redress as early as 1794,
complaining that the settlers had occupied the valleys and harvested the lumber and left nowhere
for them to reside.197 In New Brunswick, the Saint John River was the first target of Loyalist
settlement.198 The arrival of Loyalist settlers, then, marked the period in which settlement as a
tool of imperial expansion began to meet with considerable success; the social, political, legal,
and economic milieus of the region came to be dominated by the settler society.199
Once the initial wave of Loyalist settlement was complete, both sanctioned and
unsanctioned settlement grew quickly, if in uneven bursts. While the impact of Loyalist
settlement is clear, the extent of the land granted to the Loyalists should not be overstated. In
New Brunswick, by 1790 “all claims to land brought forward by the Loyalists had been
honoured. Yet these grants totaled less than 1, 300, 000 acres. Nine-tenths of the province
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remained ungranted.”200 Settlement occasioned by later population growth continued to claim
more land following the initial Loyalist settlement. The population in New Brunswick, for
example, still less than 25,000 as of 1803, had grown to 74,176 by 1824 and to 119,457 by
1834.201 The slow population growth in New Brunswick in the first two decades after the arrival
of Loyalist settlers was caused in part by instructions issued by the Privy Council in 1790 to the
governors in North America to cease the granting of Crown lands.202 In New Brunswick the
prohibition on granting Crown lands would remain in place until 1807.203 The result was that
many settlers were permitted to occupy lands to which they could not receive full title. Thus,
“[b]y 1803, a million acres of Crown Land [in New Brunswick] were under grant, and perhaps a
thousand families occupied land without title to it.”204 While many settlers occupied land despite
the 1790 orders, the more pronounced effect was to limit new settlement and even to cause an
outflow of settlers frustrated by their inability to secure grants. Thus, sanctioned settlement did
not increase dramatically until after the ban on grants was lifted. The impact of the 1790
instructions was more muted in Nova Scotia where a much greater percentage of lands had
already been granted and on Prince Edward Island where all of the land on the island had been
granted in 1767.205 Cape Breton was settled extensively in the 1820’s and 30’s with many grants
that overlapped Indian reserves despite many pleas from the Mi’kmaq there to the colonial
government.206 By 1821 the Surveyor-General of Nova Scotia, Thomas Crawley, was already
taking aim specifically at Highland settlers, referring to them as “those who regardless of every
principle of Justice, would deprive these inoffensive Savages of their Property.”207
The starkest example of the use of grants of settlement to displace Aboriginal peoples
occurred on Prince Edward Island. There, the entire island was divided into 66 lots of about
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20,000 acres each and allocated to absentee British proprietors on 23 July 1767. 208 In other
words, “[t]he land had been transferred to private ownership at one stroke.”209 The Mi’kmaq
made numerous appeals for land and access to the water without success.210 Though the British
government was petitioned as early as 1806 to purchase Lennox Island (a 1,400 acre Island off
the north west coast that was granted as part of lot 12) and set it apart for the Mi’kmaq, the
Island was not purchased until 1870 when the Aborigines Protection Society purchased it with
funds raised in Britain.211
To varying degrees, then, the land in the Maritime Provinces was brought under private
ownership by sale, grant, or otherwise. Once held privately, the exclusive nature of common law
property rights served to limit Aboriginal access to much of their traditional territory. 212 Even in
New Brunswick, where a considerable extent of the province remained Crown land, the most
desirable and fertile lands – those along the rivers and coasts – were transferred to private
owners. Much of this settlement took place either in the belief that there were no Aboriginal land
rights where the grants were made (i.e. the terra nullius approach), or with a stubborn disregard
for those rights. Even where unsanctioned settlement (squatting) took place on lands explicitly
reserved or granted to Aboriginal peoples, colonial governments offered little by way of
protection. Indeed, at confederation it is estimated that there were more than 10,000 acres of
Indian reserve land in New Brunswick occupied by squatters.213 Beginning with the founding of
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Halifax in 1749, settlement was consistently employed as a means of extending and
consolidating imperial claims and power. The assumption that all lands in the Crown’s “domain”
were Crown lands allowed this settlement to occur with a veneer of legality. In concert with the
granting and leasing of Crown lands for forestry purposes discussed above, the Crown control of
ostensibly Crown land was responsible for much of the dispossession of Aboriginal peoples in
the Maritime Provinces. The final stage in stabilizing British and colonial control in the region
was to confine Aboriginal peoples to Indian reserves.
III. Indian Reserves
No land was set aside as reserves for Aboriginal peoples in the Maritime Provinces
following the initial wave of dispossession wrought by Loyalist settlement. Instead, they were
left to petition for “licences of occupation” or personal grants on which the individual or group
could settle.214 Licences of occupation first appeared in Nova Scotia in the 1770’s and continued
in New Brunswick once it became a separate province. Licences of occupation were distinct
from other forms of grant, they were “not a grant in fee simple but a licence to occupy and
possess during the pleasure of the crown; the land remained crown land and was not to be sold or
otherwise alienated by the Indians.”215 As a legal instrument, the licence of occupation reflected
the terra nullius approach of colonial officials insofar as the Aboriginal occupation was at the
pleasure of the Crown and, again, that all lands over which sovereignty had been asserted were
Crown lands; by their very nature licences of occupation rejected the premise that Aboriginal
peoples held any existing interest in the lands that were licenced.
In 1782 the Mi’kmaq at La Hève acquired a 550 acre tract at St. Margaret’s Bay and 11,
500 aces nearby.216 In 1783 nine other licences of occupation were granted in Nova Scotia.217
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More formal reserves were created in 1820 when the reserves, not exceeding 1,000 acres were
set apart in each of the ten districts of the province. These lands, which were set apart by orderin-council, were distinct from the earlier licences of occupation, though they often overlapped.218
Six reserves, totaling 12,205 acres, were surveyed in Cape Breton in 1821.219 The1842 report of
the Indian Commissioner in Nova Scotia identified 22, 050 acres of reserve, a number that went
largely unchanged at confederation.220
Most licences in the New Brunswick were issued between 1783 – 1810 and varied in size
considerably. Only two New Brunswick grants pre-dated the partitioning of Nova Scotia. The
first was a 20,000 acre grant to John Julian on the Miramichi River in 1765.221 The only other
pre-Loyalist New Brunswick grant to Aboriginal peoples was a grant of 704 acres to a group of
Maliseet along the St. John River at St. Anne’s Point in present-day Fredericton. The grant was
confirmed in 1779 to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs and the Indian Chiefs “in trust, for and
in behalf of the said Malecite Indians, inhabiting as aforesaid, their heirs forever.”222 The first
schedule of reserves for New Brunswick, produced in 1838, listed 61,293 acres throughout the
province.223

The situation in Prince Edward Island was even more unfavourable for the

Mi’kmaq. The circumstances there were discussed previously, so I will not revisit them in detail
here. It will suffice to point out that virtually no land, less than 0.1% of the province’s land base,
was reserved to the Mi’kmaq.224 This figure includes the lands reserved at Lennox Island, which
account for 1320 of the 1663.1 acres reserved.225
Under the system of licences of occupation, which preceded the more formal Indian
reserve system, Aboriginal peoples “were told to apply for parcels of the rapidly shrinking
amount of available ‘Crown land.’ Without an official permit, they could not reside on the lands
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that they had occupied since time immemorial.”226 In the result, the Aboriginal peoples of the
Maritime Provinces were “coerced into a political system of internal colonialism.”227 Under this
system the land reserved to Aboriginal peoples in the Maritime Provinces was less than 0.5% of
the total land base in the region.228 The reserve system was made possible in large part by the
terra nullius approach taken to lands in the region.229 As will be discussed below, colonial
governments interpreted any restrictions on their authority to manage Aboriginal lands as
applying only to Indian reserve lands. This allowed the leasing, sale, and granting of ostensibly
Crown lands to proceed as if those lands were not burdened by any Aboriginal interest. As will
be seen, the fact that those lands had never been ceded or purchased makes this process highly
problematic from a legal perspective.
IV. Legality
Having provided a brief overview of the manner in which the Aboriginal peoples of the Maritime
Provinces were dispossessed of the lands they traditionally occupied, a few words can be said
about the legality of these acts. It is important to note, though, that while there may be a number
of different grounds on which the legality of these processes of colonization may be assessed, the
concern here is only with the question of whether any of these modes of dispossession could
have legally extinguished Aboriginal title. As a consequence, the question of primary importance
is not whether the incidents of colonization described above are legal per se. As has been seen,
Aboriginal title could only have been extinguished by voluntary surrender or clear and plain
legislation. The first question that must be addressed, then, is whether the dispossession of
Aboriginal peoples in the Maritime Provinces by means of the wholesale appropriation of all of
the lands in the region as Crown lands, the granting by the Crown of lands in fee simple, or the
process of confining Aboriginal peoples to Indian reserves, was accomplished through one of the
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two means of extinguishing title identified by the Supreme Court. The second question, whether
the acts in question were legal, is subject to a different range of considerations, only the broad
outlines of which will be addressed here. In addressing this latter question, the issue is
identifying whether any identifiable laws were breached.230
The assumption that all lands over which the Crown asserted sovereignty were Crown
lands that could be managed and disposed of by the executive pursuant to the royal prerogative
was not supported by any imperial legislative Act. It is clear that the power to grant or otherwise
dispose of Crown lands was a long standing prerogative power.231 This power, however, was
based on the prior acknowledgement that Crown lands excluded privately held property. Though
the Crown held radical title to all lands within the Crown’s dominions, the prerogative powers in
respect of Crown lands applied only to this narrower range of lands that were not burdened by
another interest. As discussed at length in Chapter 2, common law and statutory protections of
legal rights, including proprietary rights, limited the scope of authority of the executive branch
and, inter alia, limited the prerogative power of the Crown to manage Crown lands to those lands
not burdened by other legal interests. In the Maritime Provinces, this distinction was recognized
in respect of privately held lands but not, it appears, in respect of Aboriginal lands.
The taking of all lands in the region as Crown lands as an incident of the assertion of
sovereignty, that is, the terra nullius approach, runs contrary to the fundamental principles of
colonial law. As Lamer CJ stated in Côté,
[u]nder the British law of discovery, the British Crown assumed ownership of
newly discovered territories subject to an underlying interest of indigenous
peoples in the occupation and use of such territories. Accordingly, the Crown
was only able to acquire full ownership of the lands in the New World through the
slow process of negotiations with aboriginal groups leading to purchase or
surrender.232
In the Maritime Provinces, though, the imperial and colonial governments abandoned the process
of negotiated settlement before ever acquiring a surrender of Aboriginal title. As stated above, by
230
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the turn of the 19th century at the latest the Crown had instead embraced a terra nullius approach.
As the Supreme Court stated in Tsilhqot’in, however, speaking of British Columbia but in terms
equally applicable to the Maritime Provinces,
At the time of assertion of European sovereignty, the Crown acquired radical or
underlying title to all the land in the province. This Crown title, however, was
burdened by the pre-existing legal rights of Aboriginal people who occupied and
used the land prior to European arrival. The doctrine of terra nullius (that no one
owned the land prior to European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in
Canada.233
Thus, it was not open to the imperial and colonial governments to assume that Aboriginal land
rights had been abrogated by the assertion or acquisition of sovereignty.
As discussed earlier, there were no legislative provisions empowering the taking of
Aboriginal lands by mere assertion. It is clear, then, that the acquisition of sovereignty and the
disregard for Aboriginal land rights could not have, in themselves, extinguished Aboriginal title.
The acquisition of sovereignty did not affect the property rights of prior inhabitants at British
law. Nonetheless, on the basis of the terra nullius approach, Aboriginal lands that were never
ceded or purchased were leased or sold to industry or granted for the purposes of settlement and
Aboriginal peoples were confined to a fraction of their traditional lands through the
establishment of reserves. It is worth considering the possibility that the fact that these later
incidents of colonization flow from the terra nullius approach, which was explicitly repudiated
by the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in, may delegitimize any later legislative extinguishment of
title, regardless of whether the purported extinguishment meets the extinguishment test
established by the courts. If the means by which imperial and colonial jurisdiction were extended
over Aboriginal lands was contrary to Anglo-Canadian law, how could that jurisdiction then be
exercised so as to extinguish the Aboriginal interest in those lands? Nonetheless, the remainder
of my comments here will focus on the narrower question of whether the regulation of Crown
lands, the settlement process, and the creation of Indian reserves meet the requirements for
extinguishing title as established by the Supreme Court. As discussed at length above, this would
require clear legislation from a competent legislature or an executive action supported by a clear
delegation of authority from such a legislature.
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There was no legislation pertaining to Crown lands in the colonies until the colonial
assemblies passed such legislation in the mid-nineteenth century. As has been seen above, it
appears that the colonial legislatures did not possess the jurisdiction to extinguish aboriginal title.
Even if the colonies did have jurisdiction, the Courts of Appeal in New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia held in the Marshall and Bernard decisions that the sections of colonial Crown lands
legislation relied on to demonstrate extinguishment in those cases did not possess the requisite
clear and plain intent to extinguish title. As discussed above, another problem with this
legislation is that, by definition, it applies only to Crown land. As Aboriginal title land is not
Crown land, it is difficult to see how Crown lands legislation could extinguish title.
When speaking of the extinguishment of title through settlement, the question is whether
title could have been extinguished by pre-confederation grant. This question has not been
addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada and remains an open question. As Cromwell JA
stated in Marshall,
The issue of extinguishment by pre-Confederation Crown grant has a number of
aspects of considerable and broad importance which have not been fully argued in
this case. I will give two examples. If granted land reverts to the Crown, does any
pre-existing aboriginal title that was extinguished by the grant revive when the
Crown reacquires it? Did grants require legislative authority before they could
extinguish aboriginal title and, if so, was there such authority for the grants in
issue in this case?234
For reasons I will make clear, the first of these questions does not require an answer, as it would
only become pertinent if grants of settlement were found to have extinguished title. The latter
two questions are of the utmost importance. As has been detailed at length above, Crown grants
of land, be it for settlement or otherwise, did require legislative authority before they could
extinguish title. As Professor McNeil stated, “for the executive to be able to take away the legal
rights of subjects, whatever their nature, it must have either unambiguous statutory authority or
prerogative power to do so.”235 There are longstanding prohibitions against the use of the
prerogative power to seize or otherwise extinguish property rights. 236 The executive could have
extinguished title legislatively while the prerogative legislative power remained intact, though
this authority ceased in the Maritime Provinces in either 1719 or 1749. The question of whether
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grants required legislative authority to extinguish title, then, should be answered in the
affirmative.
As Cromwell JA pointed out, the necessary corollary to this conclusion is the question of
whether the required legislative authority existed. The question of whether a given executive
action was supported by legislation requires an examination of which legislative body had the
jurisdiction to delegate such authority. As detailed above, when assessing pre-confederation
grants, the only body with the authority to extinguish title appears to have been the Imperial
Parliament; the colonial assemblies do not appear to have been delegated authority to extinguish
Aboriginal rights. Any party seeking to establish that Aboriginal title was extinguished by grant
would have to produce evidence demonstrating that the authority to do so was either delegated
directly from the Imperial Parliament or delegated to the colonial assembly in question and then
to another party. I have been unable to uncover any evidence to this effect.237
There were two sources of authority to grant Crown land. The first were royal
instructions provided to colonial governors. The second was Crown lands legislation. The royal
instructions to Sir Thomas Carleton establishing government in New Brunswick included several
lengthy clauses pertaining to settlement. Notably, Carleton was instructed to grant “such Lands
as are Our Property,” indicating that grants were to be made of Crown lands. A clear distinction
is drawn between lands the Crown had the authority to grant and ones they did not. While this
phrase may be construed as extending protection only to land under non-Aboriginal settlement,
such a view would run contrary to other provisions in the instructions referencing the Indians as
“neighbours.”238 More importantly, it is a view that would contradict the British policy of
acquiring land prior to settlement, as confirmed in the treaty relationship, a relationship which
the colonial governors in the Maritime Provinces were explicitly instructed to renew.239 In any
event, this may be beside the point. The Imperial Crown did not have the authority to extinguish
property rights absent a clear delegation from the Imperial Parliament. As there is no evidence of
any such delegation having occurred, it seems clear that the Imperial Crown could not delegate
to its representatives an authority which it did not itself possess. Further, it is only nominally
important whether the imperial executive believed itself to possess the relevant authority. As
Professor McNeil has pointed out “the fact that the government officials seem to have thought
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they had discretion that was unfettered by law (the Crown argued this in Guerin) [is] irrelevant,
as it must be in a constitutional monarchy governed by the rule of law where it is up to the
courts, not the executive branch of government, to determine what the law is.”240 It should not be
presumed that the executive acted in accordance with the law, nor should it be presumed that the
executive’s understanding of the law was accurate.
The second source of authority to grant Crown lands came from statute. While Crown
lands legislation which had the effect of excluding unlicenced individuals from accessing Crown
land was held not to have evidenced the requisite clear and plain intent to extinguish title in the
Marshall and Bernard cases, there was an important provision in the Crown Lands Act that was
not put before the Court. The 1859 Nova Scotia Crown Lands Act provided that:
The governor in council may, from time to time, sell or lease any lands, at such
price, and for such tenure, time or use, either as regards the land, or timber,
quarries, or mines thereon or other benefit to be derived therefrom, as may be
deemed expedient.241
Thus, from 1859 on in Nova Scotia, the executive’s authority to grant land was statutory rather
than prerogative. The colonial assemblies do not appear to have been delegated the authority to
extinguish Aboriginal rights. They unquestionably gained control over Crown lands and, in CP v
Paul the Supreme Court seemed to accept the argument that this include the right to manage
Indian reserve lands. Though, as noted above, the colonial assembly of New Brunswick itself
still believed more than a decade after it acquired control of Crown lands that it required the
permission of the Colonial Office to sell Indian reserve lands.242
Should evidence be uncovered confirming that the authority to extinguish aboriginal title
by grant was delegated to a colonial assembly in the Maritime Provinces, any colonial legislation
delegating the authority to grant land would be assessed on the clear and plain intent standard.
The question in respect of the passage above is whether the phrase “sell or lease any lands”
should be interpreted as including lands subject to Aboriginal title and, further, as a clear
statement of the intent of the legislature to delegate the authority to extinguish Aboriginal title. In
this instance, the phrase “all lands” should be read to exclude lands on which there is an interest
burdening the radical Crown title. To assume that this clause was meant to impart the
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extraordinary authority to lease or sell lands already held by private individuals would stretch the
terms of the legislation beyond their breaking point. The same reasoning applies to Aboriginal
lands. If the assembly had intended to authorize the sale of lands already burdened by an existing
interest, it would have made so much clear. The fact that a later clause deals specifically with
“lands for the use of the Indians” further substantiates this view. The clause of the Crown Lands
Act, 1859 dealing explicitly with Indian reserve lands reads:
12. The governor in council may, reserve lands for the use of the Indians; may
divide existing reservations, and vest in the commissioner of crown lands the title
to such lands and the duty of protecting the rights of the aborigines who are
disposed to settle thereupon.243
This clause delegates the authority to the executive to vest the title to Indian reserve lands in the
commissioner of Crown lands. Three things should be kept in mind in considering this clause.
First, this clause deals with Indian reserve lands, not Indian lands writ large. Second, any party
seeking to rely on this clause would have to demonstrate that the colonial assembly in Nova
Scotia had been delegated the authority to extinguish Aboriginal rights by the Imperial
Parliament. Third, and perhaps most importantly, this clause could not have had the effect of
extinguishing title if what was being vested in the Indian Commissioner was an interest no
greater than that held by the Crown. Further, given that the duty of “protecting the rights of the
aborigines” was also imposed on the commissioner, it seems unlikely that the intention of the
legislature was to diminish the rights of Aboriginal peoples to their reserve lands.244
The third prominent mode of dispossession was the creation of Indian reserves. The
problematic legal aspects of this process have, for the most part, been covered above. It has
sometimes been argued that by accepting Indian reserves Aboriginal peoples relinquished their
claims to title outside those reserves. This view was rejected by Cromwell JA in the Marshall
decision where he held:
The Crown argues that as lands were reserved for the Mi’kmaq, it was
“necessarily implicit” that their claims outside the lands so reserved were
relinquished. The Crown, however, does not point to evidence apart from the
creation of reservations themselves showing a clear and plain intent to extinguish
aboriginal title. Assuming that such intent may be established by necessary
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implication, the record here does not meet that standard. I agree with the
appellants’ submission that licences of occupation and land reserves provided
some protection for the Mi’kmaq, but that there is no evidence these were
accepted in lieu of any treaty or land rights they held.245
As Cromwell JA held, the acceptance of reserved lands cannot, in itself, be taken as evidence of
the extinguishment of Aboriginal title. In order for the creation of an Indian reserve to extinguish
title, the party seeking to establish extinguishment would be required to adduce evidence
demonstrating that the land purportedly exchanged for the reserve lands were surrendered
according to the procedural requirements of the common law and the Royal Proclamation.
There were also important legal protections which existed precisely to ward off
discretionary taking of Aboriginal lands, notably the treaties of peace and friendship and the
Royal Proclamation. While I have argued above that the treaties protect Aboriginal land by
limiting the scope of British settlement to negotiated areas, this argument can be reconfigured to
make a more modest claim. Simply put, to accept that the treaties permitted the wholesale
dispossession of Aboriginal lands would be to embrace an interpretation of the treaties which
their terms simply cannot bear. Regardless of what the treaties meant, they could not have meant
that Aboriginal peoples would be excluded from the entirety of the land and resource base of the
region. As Justice Turnbull stated in the Peter Paul decision,
[t]here was no further discussion of what was meant by the terms - they will not
be "molested" and the settlements "to be lawfully made." To say the English
Monarch could make fee simple Crown grants ignoring Indians' land rights on the
basis of these words is wrong. The Crown must not say one thing, but mean
another. Such a course of conduct between individuals would today be considered
a fraud. I would report the matter to the Attorney-General. I am dealing with
history and must not go too far. No matter what arguments are advanced on
traditional Micmac lands, I can only conclude there was "sharp practice" if this is
the wording whereby the Micmac and particularly the St. Johns and
Passamaquoddy Indians lost their lands.246
Though Turnbull J. was overturned on appeal, the appellate decision should not be taken as
conclusive for several reasons. First, the appellate court was most concerned not with the content
of Turnbull J.’s decision, but on how he arrived at it. Turnbull J. based his decision on his own
personal research and a number of contestable facts that he chose to take judicial notice of.
Further, the matters he decided were not pleaded before the court, nor was evidence adduced in
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support of them, and the parties to the litigation were not provided the opportunity to present
arguments in respect of the matters Turnbull J. decided. The Court of Appeal was likely right to
overturn the decision on those grounds. The Court of Appeal went further, though, also
forcefully dismissing Turnbull J.’s findings on Aboriginal title. It is here that the case should be
approached with some caution. Because the Court of Appeal rejected the “evidence” which
Turnbull J. researched himself, it confined itself to assessing the merits of the conclusions he
came to about Aboriginal title on the basis of the evidence provided to the courts by the parties to
the litigation. As, by the Court of Appeal’s own admission, the parties did not submit evidence
relevant to a title claim, the Court’s decision to make findings regarding title on the basis of a
suspect evidentiary record is seemingly more careless than the improprieties for which they
reprimanded Turnbull J. Further, the Court of Appeal’s title analysis was not persuasive in its
own right. As Professor Slattery stated,
I suggest that we should take the Court of Appeal's remarks on aboriginal title in
the Peter Paul case with a grain of salt. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia cannot
claim immunity from the general principles laid down more than a quartercentury ago in the Calder case, principles that have been reiterated and clarified
by the Supreme Court in a series of authoritative cases culminating in the recent
decision in Delgamuukw.247
As has been argued at length in Chapter 1, it is my view that Turnbull J.’s interpretation of the
treaties of peace and friendship is the correct one and that they do in fact provide a measure of
protection against Aboriginal lands being taken by executive act.
The Royal Proclamation, 1763 also provided protection to Aboriginal lands.248 As with
the treaties of peace and friendship, the Proclamation requires that lands be purchased or ceded
before they could be settled by the British.249 What is notable in this context is that the
Proclamation explicitly required lands to be ceded in order for the Aboriginal interest in land to
be extinguished. Though the governors of the Maritime Provinces confirmed receipt of the Royal
Proclamation, it appears that they did not believe that it applied to them.250 Again, we should
recall the distinction between what the law is, as pronounced by the legislatures and courts, and
statements from the executive branch about what it believes the law to be. The latter, while
providing valuable context, should not be taken as statements of the law. Thus, the statement
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confirming the application of the Royal Proclamation in Marshall/Bernard should be taken at
face value and the terms of the Royal Proclamation should be considered in assessing the
dispossession of Aboriginal lands.
To accept that the presumptive arrogation of all lands over which sovereignty had been
asserted as “Crown” lands and the subsequent process of settlement and reserve creation has
extinguished title would be to accept a line of cases that has been roundly dismissed. This since
clearly overturned view of extinguishment was aptly expressed at the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal in the Isaac decision. The Court stated:
[i]t will be noted that the Indian title or right could be extinguished by the
sovereign power. Statements are found in some of the cases (notably in Worcester
v. Georgia and see Hall, J., in Calder at p. 389) implying that the extinction of the
right could only occur with the consent of the Indians, by purchase, treaty or
otherwise. Bearing in mind the scant evidence in Nova Scotia, or indeed in New
England, Quebec or New Brunswick, of any recorded transaction or explicit
consent, I must prefer Mr. Justice Judson's view (p. 329) that extinction may
occur by prerogative acts, e.g., by setting apart reserves and opening the rest of
the land for homestead grants and settlement, however unfair that may sometimes
have been.251
This view is problematic for two reasons. First, it overlooks one mode of acceptable
extinguishment, by legislation. That is, the choice is not between extinguishment by consent or
extinguishment by “the sovereign power.” This latter term is, as has been discussed at length,
divided into the executive and legislative branches, each of which possess their own range of
authority, only one of which possessed the authority to extinguish title. Perhaps more
problematically, the decision justifies the need to accept extinguishment by the “sovereign” on
the basis that, otherwise, title would not have been extinguished. In other words, the court
assumed that extinguishment must have occurred and explicitly contorted its extinguishment
analysis to meet that end. The creation of private interests could only have extinguished title in
the pre-confederation period if support by unambiguous imperial legislation. Similarly, private
interests created by a provincial government post-confederation could not have had the effect of
extinguishing title. As Vickers J. held at the trial level in Tsilhqot’in, “[g]iven that the
jurisdiction to extinguish has only ever been held by the federal government, the Province cannot
and has not extinguished these rights by a conveyance of fee simple title to lands.”252
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If Aboriginal title was not extinguished by imperial or colonial legislation, nor by
executive act such as grants of settlement or the creation of reserves, the question that remains is
whether there is some other way that extinguishment may have occurred. A method of possible
extinguishment that has sometimes been advanced argues that statutes of limitation and/or the
doctrine of laches may effectively extinguish title by barring an Aboriginal plaintiff from
bringing an action. As Professor McNeil has pointed out, two categories of statute have been
relied on to demonstrate extinguishment in this manner: those enacted by colonial assemblies or
the British Parliament which continued to apply in Canada following confederation, and
provincial limitations statutes that have been incorporated by federal statute.253 As with any other
legislation purporting to extinguish Aboriginal title, statutes of limitation must be assessed on the
basis of competence and the clear and plain intent test.
In assessing statutes of limitation, there are three matters that must be considered. The
first, matters of statutory interpretation, concern whether the statute in question applies to the
parties and actions in the case at bar. The second issue is whether the statute was passed by a
competent legislative body. As has been seen, the only bodies competent to extinguish
Aboriginal title absent a specific delegation were the Imperial Parliament until 1931 and the
Federal Parliament from 1867 – 1982. The third issue is whether statutes of limitation should
apply in the specific context of Aboriginal rights. I will address each in turn.
Limitations statutes must be assessed in both the pre- and post-confederation eras; I will
begin post-confederation. In Chippewas of Sarnia, the owners of the privately held land within
the claim area sought to bar the Chippewas’ claim by invoking the federal Crown Liabilities and
Proceedings Act, which incorporated any Ontario limitations statutes into federal law. 254 Again,
it was necessary to demonstrate that the Ontario statues had been incorporated federally, as only
federal legislation could extinguish Aboriginal rights. On its face, the Crown Liabilities and
Proceedings Act extended only to claims brought by or against the Crown. As such, the Court of
Appeal held that the Act could only bar the Aboriginal claimants if their action was considered a
“proceeding by the Crown.”255 Thus, on a technical construction, the Act was held not to bar the
provincially created interests that are inconsistent with it.” Kent McNeil, “Reconciliation and Third-Party Interests:
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Aboriginal claimants from bringing an action.
Pre-confederation, only imperial statutes could extinguish Aboriginal rights. In
Chippewas of Sarnia the landowners sought to rely on the Nullum Tempus Act, 1769 to exclude
the Chippewas’ claim. As with the Crown Liabilities and Proceedings Act, however, application
of the Nullum Tempus Act was contingent on construing the Chippewas claim as being “brought
by or on behalf of the Crown.”256 In both the pre- and post-confederation periods, then, it is
evident that the limitations statute being relied on must, on a reasonable construction, be
applicable to Aboriginal peoples. As was held to be the case in Chippewas, this would seem to
rule out any limitations periods concerning actions brought by the Crown. Should a limitations
statute be brought forward which prima facie extends to the action brought by an Aboriginal
claimant, such legislation would be required to satisfy the clear and plain intent test before it
could be held to have extinguished title.257
In addition to these barriers to relying on statutes of limitation to extinguish Aboriginal
title, in many circumstances statutes of limitation may be held not to apply to Aboriginal
litigants. In Manitoba Métis Federation, the Supreme Court followed the precedent it articulated
in Weywaykum258 in holding that limitations periods are applicable to “Aboriginal claims for
breach of fiduciary duty with respect to the administration of Aboriginal property.”259 The
majority of the Court, however, characterized the issue before it not as an action for breach of
fiduciary duty, but as “a claim for a declaration that the Crown did not act honourably in
implementing the constitutional obligation in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act.”260 Put otherwise, while
the majority recognized that claims for breach of a fiduciary duty may be subject to limitations
periods, it held that the courts “cannot be barred by mere statutes from issuing a declaration on a
fundamental constitutional matter.”261 The majority construed s.31 of the Manitoba Act as
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creating a “solemn” constitutional obligation that engaged the doctrine of the honour of the
Crown. So characterized, the majority reasoned not only that the courts may not be barred by
statutory limitations from assessing the constitutionality of legislation, but that they may also
make declarations concerning the constitutionality of the Crown’s conduct despite the presences
of such limitations.262
This reasoning may be especially pertinent in the Maritime Provinces, particularly if the
treaties of peace and friendship are understood as recognizing and protecting Aboriginal rights to
land. As in the case of s.31 of the Manitoba Act, the treaties of peace and friendship place a
constitutional obligation on the Crown, invoking the honour of the Crown. As McLachlin CJ
stated in Haida Nation, “[i]n all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of
sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties, the Crown must act
honourably.”263

The

Supreme

Court

cited

this

statement

authoritatively

in

Little

Salmon/Carmacks, where the majority explicitly stated that the principle of the honour of the
Crown applies to pre-confederation treaties.264 The majority in Little Salmon/Carmacks held that
there are not distinct legal rules applicable to various types of treaty and that the Court will not
develop “rules specific to each category of treaty identified in the legal literature or by the
government (e.g., “peace and friendship” treaties, “pre-Confederation” treaties, “numbered”
treaties and “modern” treaties).265 Thus, the constitutional principle of the honour of the Crown
applies in respect of the Maritime treaties and mandates that the Crown seek to implement its
treaty promises in a manner which furthers the goals of reconciliation.
The honour of the Crown and principles of reconciliation require “the government to act
with diligence in pursuit of the fulfillment of the promise[s]” made in the constitutional
context.266 As such, an Aboriginal party seeking a declaration that the Crown has been
insufficiently diligent in fulfilling its treaty promises (the promise that all future settlements
would be made “lawfully,” for example) should not be barred from applying for such a
declaration by statutes of limitation. Again, “limitations acts cannot prevent the courts from
issuing a declaration on the constitutionality of the Crown's conduct.”267 Importantly, this applies
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not only to treaty rights, but also to Aboriginal rights.268 A party seeking a declaration that the
Crown had failed to uphold the honour of the Crown by negotiating a resolution to outstanding
Aboriginal rights and title issues, for example, could not be barred by statutory limits. The
remedy sought is an important component of this analysis. The majority in the Manitoba Métis
case held that the reasoning they applied prevailed only so far as the remedy sought was narrow
in scope – while declarations pertaining to the constitutionality of the Crown’s conduct were said
to meet this requirement, personal remedies would not.269
Like statutes of limitation, the doctrines of laches and acquiescence have been relied on
in attempts to bar Aboriginal claimants’ actions. Laches is an equitable defence that allows a
defendant to resist an equitable claim against them on the basis that the claimant unduly delayed
asserting their claim.270 Where the doctrine would be most likely to arise in the Maritime
Provinces is where a title claim had the potential to negatively affect a private party, though it
may also be employed by the Crown. In order to avail themselves of the equitable defence of
laches, a plaintiff must demonstrate that, through the delay in prosecution, the plaintiff either: 1)
acquiesced to the behavior of the defendant or, 2) caused the defendant, in reasonable reliance on
the plaintiff’s acceptance of the circumstances, to modify their situation or allow circumstances
to develop that it would not be just to disturb.271 The issues to be taken into account where laches
is relied on are “the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which
might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as relates to the remedy.”272 In Chippewas of Sarnia the Ontario Court of Appeal
held that the doctrine of laches could apply to bar the Chippewas’ claim.273 The Court of Appeal
also invoked the “good faith purchaser for value” rule, another equitable principle, in dismissing
the Chippewas’ claim.274 The Court held that all of the purchases made from the first individual
to own the land after the Chippewas had surrendered it had been made by innocent parties. As
demands that such declarations not be barred.” Ibid. at para 143.
268
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the Court succinctly stated, “[o]n the facts of this case, it is our view that the Chippewas' delay,
combined with the reliance of the landowners, is fatal to the claims asserted by the
Chippewas.”275
In the context of Aboriginal title in the Maritime Provinces, one important question is
whether the analysis in the Chippewas decision is likely to prevail to bar a title claim on the basis
of statutory limitations, the doctrine of laches, and/or the bona fide purchaser for good value rule.
The difficulty the Crown faces in relying on limitations periods where a plaintiff seeks a
declaration that the Crown acted unconstitutionally was addressed above; the Supreme Court
held unambiguously in Manitoba Métis Federation that courts will not be barred by statute from
making declarations on constitutional matters. Further, should this reasoning not apply in
specific factual circumstances, any purported extinguishment by statutory instrument is subject
to the principle of legislative competence and the clear and plain intent test. That is, in the preconfederation period only imperial statutes of limitation could bar a claim, while in the postconfederation period only federal legislation, provincial statutes which had been incorporated
federally, or pre-confederation legislation that survived confederation could be relied on to
extinguish title. This is a narrow body of legislation and, when taken together with the clear and
plain intent test, provides only limited applicability for statutes of limitation.
In respect of the doctrines of laches and the bona fide purchaser for good value rule, there
are three reasons to believe that the reasoning in the Chippewas case would not be considered
persuasive in the context of the Maritime Provinces. First, the factual basis of the Chippewas
decision was unique and the legal reasoning crafted in response to those facts is not necessarily
applicable where different circumstances prevail. As I will argue, the principles articulated in the
Chippewas decision are factually contingent and should not be taken as universalizable even if
they are legally sound. In Guerin, Dickson J. rejected the Crown’s attempt to have the plaintiff’s
claim barred by the doctrine of laches on the basis that “the conduct of the Indian Affairs Branch
personnel amounted to equitable fraud,” that “the Band did not have actual or constructive
knowledge” of the terms of the transaction in question for several years, and that “the Crown was
not prejudiced by reason of the delay” in bringing the action forward.276 In Chippewas, the Court
distinguished Guerin, holding that the facts in that case differed materially from those in the case
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before them. In particular, the Court noted that the Chippewas were fully aware of the settlement
of their unsurrendered lands and, indeed, acquiesced in their transfer by accepting payments in
return for the land.277 Further, the Chippewas appear to have been willing to surrender the land,
but the surrender itself failed to comply with common law procedural requirements governing
such surrenders.278
Regardless of whether the Chippewas decision was decided correctly, it is clear that the
circumstances surrounding the dispossession of Aboriginal peoples in the Maritime Provinces
differ in important respects from the improper surrender at issue in that decision. In particular,
Dickson J.’s reasons for rejecting the application of the doctrine of laches in Guerin apply more
readily to the circumstances in much of the Maritime Provinces than the reasoning developed in
Chippewas in response to the specific facts of that case. Further, land rights in the Maritime
Provinces were protected by treaty, a fact which further impugns the Crown’s callous disregard
for those rights. This is not to say that circumstances similar to those in Chippewas may not have
occurred in the Maritimes - they likely did in localized areas; rather, it is my view that the
significant balance of the dispossession occurred in ways, such as those discussed at length
above, which do not comport with the reasoning in the Chippewas decision. The factual
contingency of the outcome in Chippewas was recognized by the Court of Appeal itself. As the
Court noted, “the need to reconcile aboriginal title and treaty claims with the rights of innocent
purchasers, are factors that should be considered on a case-by-case basis.”279 The Court also
qualified its decision, prefacing it by stating “[o]n the facts of this case.”280 Further, the Court did
not purport to be departing from the principles articulated in Guerin. Rather, it took pains to
distinguish the cases on a factual basis.281 Of particular importance is the fact that the Chippewas
decision decision dealt specifically with a situation where the land that was subject to the title
claim was currently owned by third parties. In the Maritime Provinces the reasoning in
Chippewas, if it applied at all, would only apply where the land is currently held by third parties
and not on “Crown land.”
The second and third reasons why it is doubtful that the reasoning in the Chippewas
decision is applicable in the Maritime Provinces relate to the precedential value of the case quite
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apart from its unique factual circumstances. The Court of Appeal’s reliance on the laches and
innocent purchaser defences was contingent on the Court’s holding that equitable defences were
applicable in the case because the remedy sought by the Chippewas, a return of the land, was
equitable in nature.282 Put otherwise, the Court of Appeal held that in seeking a declaration of
their unextinguished Aboriginal title, the Chippewas invoked the equitable jurisdiction of the
Court. As Professor McNeil has pointed out, however, this conclusion is problematic on a
number of grounds.283 In particular, this holding conflicts with judicial precedent confirming that
Aboriginal title is a proprietary right due all the protections afforded other common law
proprietary interests.284 Further, as Professor McNeil notes, the Supreme Court in Calder
explicitly rejected the claim that seeking a declaration of title invoked the equitable jurisdiction
of the courts.285 Thus, it appears that the Court of Appeal misapplied the principles of equity,
improperly assuming equitable jurisdiction where none existed.
The Supreme Court provided a third reason to question the applicability of the
Chippewas decision in the Manitoba Métis Federation case. As discussed above, the majority of
the Court held that declarations respecting Aboriginal rights invoke the honour of the Crown,
thereby displacing any statutes of limitation. The Court also addressed the issue of laches,
providing an analysis which is likely to prevail in the context of the Maritime Provinces. While
the Court did not question its equitable jurisdiction in the case, it stated that the acquiescence
branch of the laches defence “depends on knowledge, capacity and freedom”286 of the plaintiff
who is supposed to have acquiesced in the impugned conduct. As such, the Court held that the
imbalance of power following the acquisition of Crown sovereignty precluded the Métis delay in
bringing an action from being interpreted as acquiescence. The same reasoning should apply
wherever Aboriginal peoples were dispossessed of their lands as the alternative would fail to live
up to the obligations created by s.35(1). Further, as the Court stated, “a court exercising equitable
jurisdiction must always consider the conscionability of the behaviour of both parties.”287 In the
context of the Maritime Provinces, the failure of the Crown to live up to its treaty obligations and
282
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the 19th century embrace of a terra nullius approach clearly call into question the conscionability
of the Crown’s conduct. Indeed, the very notion that equity may be relied on to legitimize the
dispossession of Aboriginal peoples of their lands carries with it an air of absurdity. For the three
reasons outlined above, then, the reasoning in the Chippewas decision should not apply in the
context of the Maritime Provinces.

E. Summary
Aboriginal title can no longer be presumed to have been extinguished in the Maritime
Provinces. Determining whether it has been extinguished requires that two question be asked: (1)
was title voluntarily surrendered? and (2) was title extinguished by clear and plain legislation
passed by a competent legislative body? It is clear that title has not been voluntarily surrendered,
by treaty or otherwise. This is evident on a reading of the treaties and the historical context
surrounding their signing and has been confirmed by the Supreme Court on multiple occasions.
In fact, there is a strong argument suggesting that the treaties both recognize and protect
Aboriginal title. Certainly this is the view of the Aboriginal peoples themselves, who have
routinely asserted a treaty protected right to the land for well over two centuries.
Given that title was not extinguished by voluntary surrender, it could only have been
extinguished by or pursuant to legislation. Legislation based on the royal prerogative could have
extinguished title in the region until either 1719, or 1749. I favour the earlier date, as this is when
the governor of Nova Scotia was first instructed to form a legislative assembly in the colony.
Whichever date is chosen, from that date onwards the prerogative power to legislate was limited
and only the Imperial Parliament could have extinguished title unless such authority was
unambiguously delegated to a colonial assembly or the colonial or imperial executive. Such a
delegation does not appear to have occurred in the Maritime Provinces. As such, in the preconfederation period, it appears that Aboriginal title could only have been extinguished by
imperial legislation. In the post-confederation period, the exclusive authority to extinguish title
rested with the Federal Parliament. As in the case of the Imperial Parliament, there does not
appear to be federal legislation that extinguishes Aboriginal title. Given that there is no imperial
or federal legislation which appears to extinguish title, we must conclude that Aboriginal title has
not been extinguished. Any party seeking to establish that title has been extinguished must
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adduce evidence of imperial or federal legislation that has the effect of extinguishing title or of a
clear and unambiguous delegation of the authority to do so.
Despite the fact that title does not appear to have been extinguished in the Maritime
Provinces, the Aboriginal peoples of the region were largely dispossessed of their traditional
territories. A close examination of this process of dispossession, however, reveals it was enabled
by a terra nullius approach that has been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada. In
particular, the assumption that all lands within the Maritime dominions could be managed as if
they were not burdened by any Aboriginal interest was contrary to British common and
constitutional law and the terms of treaties entered into with Aboriginal peoples. The subsequent
lease, granting, and sale of Crown lands and the creation of Indian reserves could not have
extinguished title unless they were supported by legislative authority. The fact that they were not
raises a number of difficult questions for the region, not least of which is what the procedure
should be for dealing with Aboriginal title lands occupied by “innocent” third parties.
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CONCLUSION
In 1749, Governor Cornwallis sailed into Chebucto Harbour with a convoy of ships carrying
some 2,547 people intent on settling there.1 That year, Halifax, the first British settlement in
Acadia outside the fort at Annapolis, was founded. The Mi’kmaq had long considered Chebucto
Harbour an important part of their territory. On 18 October, 1749, Mi’kmaw elders and chiefs
addressed Governor Cornwallis, stating:
The place where you are, where you are building dwellings, where you are now
building a fort, where you want, as it were, to enthrone yourself, this land of
which you wish to make yourself now absolute master, this land belongs to me. I
have come from it as certainly as the grass, it is the place of my birth and of my
dwelling, this land belongs to me, the Indian, yes I swear, it is God who has given
it to me to be my country forever… Your residence at Port Royal does not cause
me great anger because you see that I have left you there at peace for a long time,
but now you force me to speak out by the great theft you have perpetrated against
me.2
In 1794, Mi’kmaw Chiefs petitioned Governor John Wentworth complaining that, whereas there
had once been enough room for the British, French, and Indians to live, land had since become
scarce and there was nowhere left to hunt.3 In 1825, a Mi’kmaw Chief from Nova Scotia, Chief
Adelah (Andrew Meuse) travelled to London to speak out about lands that had been taken by
settlers.4 Chief Louis Francis Algimou (L’kimu), along with four other Mi’kmaw chiefs,
appeared at the colonial assembly of Prince Edward Island in 1831 to plead for land, saying that
“[t]hey promised to leave us some of our land – but they did not – they drove us from place to
place like wild beasts – that was not just.”5 In 1841, Chief Pemmeenauweet wrote a letter
addressed to Queen Victoria asking for assistance for his people and noting that the “white man
has taken all that was ours.”6 In 1853, another petition to the Queen was penned, this one by
Baptist Missionary Silas Rand on behalf of the Mi’kmaq. As Rand wrote:
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We can neither disbelieve nor forget what we have heard from our fathers, that
when peace was made between the Micmacs and the British, and the sword and
the tomahawk were buried by mutual consent, by the terms of the treaty then
entered into which was ratified by all the solemnities of an oath, it was stipulated
that we should be left in the quiet and peaceable possession of the far greater
portion of this Peninsula. May it please Her Majesty. The terms of that treaty have
never been violated by the Indians, but the white man has not fulfilled his
engagements.7
These views have continued to be expressed up to the present day. On Treaty Day, 1987, Dr.
Albert Levi, former Chief of the Mi’kmaw First Nation at Elsipogtog, stated in his address:
I am filled with pride to be able to speak with you on this important day. Today
we celebrate our Eastern Treaties: they are our deeds to the land of the Micmacs
and our Charter of Rights. Non-Indian governments try to explain our treaties
away, but they cannot. The Treaties say that no land can be held by non-Indians
until it is sold by the Indians. And I say, when was this ground that I am standing
on ever sold by the Micmac Nations? The answer is, “never.”8
This was echoed by the current Chief and Council of Elsipogtog, who proclaimed in 2013 that
they were “reclaiming all unoccupied reserved Native lands back and put in the trust of our
people.”9
In short, the Aboriginal peoples of the Maritime Provinces have been continuously
asserting their rights to the land since Europeans arrived on the region’s shores. Though these
rights were recognized and respected in the first centuries following contact, they were forgotten
as soon as the balance of power in the region shifted decisively to the British colonizers. Secure
in their claims and no longer fearful of Aboriginal military power, the colonial and imperial
authorities slowly came to more brazenly ignore Aboriginal claims and confine Aboriginal
peoples to the periphery of colonial life. But for the desire to usurp their lands, Aboriginal
peoples may not have been acknowledged at all in the middle 19th century. Slowly, however, the
land rights of Aboriginal peoples have re-emerged in the Canadian legal consciousness. Though
the legal, political, and economic structures of the Canadian state continue to reinforce barriers to
the recognition of Aboriginal land rights, the centuries’ old demands for recognition of rights to
their ancestral territories, repeated with each subsequent generation, have proven more accurate
than not.
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An analysis of the relevant case law, legal scholarship, and historical material
demonstrates that Aboriginal title can be proven to have existed in the Maritime Provinces at the
date of the assertion of British sovereignty. The clear embrace of the “territorial” conception of
Aboriginal title in the Tsilhqot’in decision reinforces the view that properly pleaded title
litigation supported by a reasonably complete evidentiary record is likely to find that title can be
proven to have existed in the region. In the Maritime Provinces title is recognized and protected
not only at common law, but also in the Treaties of Peace and Friendship. Once title has been
proven, the question becomes whether or not it has been extinguished.
On this point, the protestations of Aboriginal peoples once again seem to align with the
dictates of the law. It is clear that Aboriginal title was not ceded by treaty. It also appears that it
was not extinguished by legislation in either the pre- or post-confederation periods. The manner
in which Aboriginal peoples were dispossessed of their lands – by assuming all land under
British sovereignty could be leased, granted, and sold at the pleasure of the Crown – violated the
common law, the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and the treaties of peace and friendship. This
process was not supported by legislation and, as such, could not have extinguished title. In point
of fact, this approach was made possible only by the adoption of a terra nullius approach which
denied the existence of Aboriginal rights contrary to both British law of the 18th and 19th
centuries and contemporary Canadian law. This approach was identified as problematic in 1837
by the British Select Committee on Aborigines, which stated in their report of that year:
“[i]t might be presumed that the native inhabitants of any land have an
incontrovertible right to their own soil: a plain and sacred right, however, which
seems not to have been understood. Europeans have entered their borders
uninvited, and, when there, have not only acted as if they were undoubted lords of
the soil, but have punished the natives as aggressors if they have evinced a
disposition to live in their own country”10
While the Select Committee’s views are undoubtedly accurate, what they overlook is the fact
that this approach came to be taken only once the colonizing powers acquired the power required
to maintain a system built upon such profound injustice – it followed centuries in which
European settlers were dependent upon Aboriginal peoples not only as trading partners and
allies, but often for their very survival. This period was characterized by the existence of a robust
body of inter-societal law, developed in part through the treaty process, which came to be cast
aside only as British hegemony and military strength allowed it. Again, in recent decades the law
10
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has begun to return, however haltingly, to a relationship with Aboriginal peoples based on
mutual respect and the rule of law as opposed to the wanton and capricious abuse of power. As
the Supreme Court stated in Haida Nation, “the Crown, acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run
roughshod over Aboriginal interests.”11 Despite the fact that this is precisely the approach the
Crown has taken for two centuries in the Maritime Provinces, the possibility of having their land
rights recognized now exists owing to the persistent resistance of the Aboriginal peoples of the
region. When Professor Slattery spoke about Aboriginal title at the University of New Brunswick
in 1999, he closed by saying: “[t]o my mind, then, the question of aboriginal title in New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia is very much alive and will continue to preoccupy the courts of
those provinces for some years to come.”12 This is as true today as it was then, and the
Tsilhqot’in decision, coupled with the limited success of negotiations, suggests that the courts
will continue to be occupied for many years yet.
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